the member's environment may ultimately be much more costly. Management's reluctance to change organizational strategies to comply with idiosyncratic human needs may reflect a decision based on the realities of its economic environment. On the other hand, money, by providing the worker with more choicealternatives, may actually give him more freedom and opportunities toward the advancement of his dignity and ideal self, including the chance to escape from an oppressive environment. Human relators must come to terms with the observation that in spite of their efforts and missionary zests, industrial organizations still resemble much more closely the rational, impersonal model described by Max Weber and that in spite of some verbal protestations, they seek primarily to increase predictability. As long as the feedback from the organizational environment (internal and external) reaffirms the viability of its strategy, it is not likely to change. Moreover, unless the human relators produce more compelling evidence that power equalization, job satisfaction, and control over one's job do indeed contribute to productivity, there is no compelling reason for industrial organizations to adjust their strategy. The evidence is not quite as clear and uncontroversial as Gellerman indicates, for he ignores studies which contradict his case.* Moreover, some of the data which Gellerman presents to support his case can be interpreted in several ways, because they are based on correlational studies rather than experimental ones. The fallacies of inferring causal relationships from measures of association although recognized by Gellerman fail to temper his interpretations. Contrary to Gellerman's assertions, the findings reported by Likert, on whom he draws for support, regarding the positive relationship between employee-oriented supervisory behavior on the one hand and productivity and employee satisfaction on the other were not based on observations of supervisory behavior but consisted of correla-