On 31 Januray 2013, ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, has introduced the construction and operation license application for the surface disposal facility for category A waste at Dessel. The objective of this paper is to present the development of this national programme. First the key milestones and their impact on the development of the project will be highlighted. This includes in particular: 1) the turning point in 1994, when ONDRAF/NIRAS converts its purely techno-scientific work method into an approach of participation that allows for societal aspects to be taken into account and 2) the decision of the government in 2006 in favour of the surface disposal of category A waste in Dessel. Then the paper presents the pillars of the long-term safety of a surface disposal and the principles for site selection and how they were applied to the surface disposal facility for category A waste at Dessel. The pillars of the long-term safety of a surface disposal are: (1) the passive confinement and isolation provided by the Engineering Barrier System, (2) the contribution to this passive isolation and confinement by the site, (3) the limitation of the radioactive source term, and (4) the control and monitoring measures.

The paper describes the methodology that ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, in consultation with the metallurgical company who aims the Olen-site, is developing and wants to apply to arrive at a safe and sustainable long-term solution in Olen. The complex problematic in Olen and how this does fit in the legal missions of ONDRAF/NIRAS is also presented.

Numerous facilities in the non-nuclear sector in Belgium (e.g. in the non-radioactive waste processing and management sector and in the metal recycling sector) have been equipped with measuring ports for detecting radioactive substances. These measuring ports prevent radioactive sources or radioactive contamination from ending up in the material fluxes treated by the sectors concerned. They thus play an important part in the protection of the workers and the people living in the neighbourhood of the facilities, as well as in the protection of the population and the environment in general. In 2006, Belgium’s federal nuclear control agency (FANC/AFCN) drew up guidelines for the operators of non-nuclear facilities with a measuring port for detecting radioactive substances. These guidelines describe the steps to be followed by the operators when the port’s alarm goes off. Following the publication of the European guideline 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003 on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, a procedure has been drawn up by FANC/AFCN and ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, to identify the responsible to cover the costs relating to the further management of detected sealed sources and if not found to declare the sealed source as an orphan source. In this latter case and from mid-2006 the insolvency fund managed by ONDRAF/NIRAS covers the cost of radioactive waste management. At the request of the Belgian government, a financing proposal for the management of unsealed orphan sources as radioactive waste was also established by FANC/AFCN and ONDRAF/NIRAS. This proposal applies the same approach as for sealed sources and thus the financing of unsealed orphan sources will also be covered by the insolvency fund.

ONDRAF/NIRAS–the Belgian radioactive waste management agency–has published in 2001 the SAFIR 2 report on request of the authorities. The SAFIR 2 report is to be considered as a state-of-the art report and not as a complete safety case. This report gives an overview of the Belgian R&D program related to the geological disposal of HLW and ILW for the period 1990–2000 in the Boom Clay (reference host rock). The three main outcomes of the SAFIR 2 report on which this paper will be more specifically focusing, are the following (including results reported after 2000): long-term safety functions, confirmation of the role of the Boom Clay formation as the main barrier and identification of practical difficulties with respect to technical feasibility (repository design).

In 2001, ONDRAF/NIRAS completed a second Safety Assessment and Interim Report, SAFIR 2, on the Belgian research and development programme on geological disposal of radioactive wastes. This report presents the state of the art in Belgium about deep disposal of high and medium-level wastes in a clay formation. In SAFIR 2, the focus was very much on the capacity of the Boom Clay to fulfil its role as main barrier. Indeed, in many evolution scenarios it has been shown that the clay host formation plays the dominant role in performance assessment (PA) calculations. Nevertheless, the basic assumptions on which these PA calculations rest often depend much on processes which occur inside or in the vicinity of the engineered barriers system (EBS). In this respect, detailed EBS modelling appears complementary to PA calculations. To ensure the sound transfer of EBS behaviour understanding, a tight collaboration between experimentalists, modellers and PA specialists is required.

The classical numerical output, or indicator, from assessments of the long-term safety of geological disposal systems for high-level radioactive waste is the individual effective dose rate. This indicator is an estimate of the possible individual health detriment and it is commonly compared to regulatory limits for assessing the safety of other nuclear activities as well, such as medical and industrial activities. As a safety indicator, the individual dose rate provides an estimate of the overall safety of the disposal system. However, because of the time frames involved in safety assessments of geological disposal systems, the need arises of complementary safety indicators that could be less affected by uncertainties like those associated with future human behaviour or the effects of climate change on the biosphere and the aquifers. Such alternative safety indicators can be, for example, radionuclide concentrations in the groundwater or fluxes to the biosphere due to a repository. Safety indicators only tell how globally safe a disposal system is. For confidence building, performance indicators can be used in addition to tell how the system works. In particular, performance indicators such as fluxes, activities or activity concentrations of selected radionuclides can show how the different components of the system fulfil their safety functions and contribute to the overall safety. The SPIN project of the European Commission assessed the usefulness of seven safety indicators and fourteen performance indicators by testing them in four actual assessments of disposal systems in granite formations. In this paper, indicators calculated from an assessment of the disposal of spent fuel in the poorly indurated Boom Clay formation are presented. Conclusions from the SPIN project that hold for repositories in clays are highlighted, as well as results that illustrate differences between the granite and clay disposal options. Finally, various performance and safety indicators are combined into a logical sequence to comprehensively present, and explain, the results of a safety assessment.

In Belgium the possibilities to dispose of high-level waste in the plastic Boom Clay formation has been studied since 1975. Consequently many results of the site characterisation programme are already available. Various performance assessments have been carried out dealing with the disposal of high-level waste arising from reprocessing and with direct disposal of spent fuel. The performance assessment consists of two main steps: scenario development and consequence analyses. The scenario analysis is based on a catalogue of features, events and processes (FEPs) having the potential to influence the behaviour of the repository system. Two main groups of scenarios are distinguished. The normal evolution scenario, including a number of variants, treats the FEPs that are fairly sure to take place. Altered evolution scenarios focus on FEPs having a probability of occurrence lower than one but that might influence the performance of the repository system. For the impact analyses, a robust concept approach was introduced, which focused the analyses on a limited number of well-characterised barriers and processes. The impact analyses are complemented with sensitivity and uncertainty analyses based on deterministic and probabilistic approaches.

Abstract Geological repository systems for the disposal of radioactive waste are based on a multi-barrier design. Individual barriers contribute in different ways to the overall long-term performance of the repository system, and furthermore, the contribution of each barrier can considerably change with time. In a systematic analysis of the functional requirements for achieving long-term safety a number of basic safety functions can be defined: physical confinement, retardation / slow release, dispersion / dilution and limited accessibility. In the case of the geological disposal of spent fuel in a clay formation a series of barriers are designed or chosen to contribute to the realisation of the basic safety functions. The physical confinement is realised by the watertight, high-integrity container, which prevents contact between groundwater and the confined radionuclides. In first instance the retardation / slow release function is realised by the slow dissolution of the waste matrix and by the limited solubility of many elements in the near field. However, the natural clay barrier provides the main contribution to this safety function. The migration of radionuclides through the Boom Clay is mainly due to molecular diffusion, which is an extremely slow process. Furthermore, many elements are strongly sorbed by the clay minerals what makes their migration even much slower. The dispersion / dilution function mainly occurs in the aquifer and the rivers draining the aquifer in the surroundings of the disposal system. Various performance indicators are used to quantify the contributions of each safety function and to explain the functioning of the repository system.