Although authority relationships are obviously ubiquitous in organizations, management scholars have, curiously, contributed little to the substantial body of research into the authoritarian personality. Moreover, an observed large-magnitude negative relationship between authoritarianism and ethical relativism, first reported over a quarter century ago, has made almost no meaningful impact on our conceptions of either construct. Perhaps as a consequence, some business ethics researchers have gravitated toward demonstrably inaccurate interpretations of relativism. From these starting points, this paper makes the case that an understanding of the authoritarian personality, with its grounding in low relativism, may provide otherwise unavailable insights into business ethics. Past research reveals that high authoritarians readily comply with authority figures that advocate ethically questionable actions, prioritize the needs of business over concern for the natural environment, appear to lack personal initiative at work, display hostile and aggressive tendencies, and often view diverse others negatively. Awareness of such findings may expand research horizons to include the possibility that highly authoritarian employees might, for example, regard organizational attempts to increase diversity or 'go green' as anathema, want no part of participation in decision making, and feel totally justified when engaging in bullying behaviors at work. Managers wanting intelligent and creative employees able both to think for themselves and take initiative, and employees who lack preconceived notions of inferiority about diverse others that has to be overcome when interacting with them at work, should consider hiring persons who are low in authoritarianism.

Some researchers interested in assessing moral reasoning among business practitioners or students have developed their own vignettes or scenarios set in business contexts, based on assumptions that the situations presented in the often-used Defining Issues Test (DIT) will somehow be inappropriate for these specific types of respondents. This paper is the first to examine in depth both the actual details contained in these business-oriented scenarios and empirical findings emerging from them. Among this paper’s conclusions are: (1) assumptions underpinning the presumed superiority of business-oriented vignettes have yet to be tested; (2) the DIT possesses considerable advantages unavailable in alternative measures; (3) many business-oriented scenarios have underlying Dilemma themes that seem inherently ambiguous and thus of questionable relevance for assessing moral reasoning; (4) these scenarios have no obvious equivalent in the DIT and thus cannot definitively be placed under the umbrella of the latter’s demonstrated construct validity; and (5) meaningful empirical findings have not clearly emerged from investigations using business-oriented vignettes. In light of these conclusions, we recommend that investigators interested in moral reasoning advance knowledge in a coherent and unified way by using the DIT that seems entirely appropriate for use among respondents with business experience or training. Although alternative measures may have value for assessing ethical judgments, evidence of their validity as a measure of moral reasoning is lacking.

In Ethics Position Theory, relativism is the degree to which people believe that universal moral rules should not always be applied unwaveringly. Researchers often predict that highly relativistic individuals are characterized by questionable ethics given their ostensible self-interested "anything goes" approach. Corroborating evidence for such predictions, however, remains elusive. This paper suggested that high relativists are perhaps not unethical, and reviewed four decades of relevant literature in order to clarify the meaning and implications of the relativism construct. The portrait of relativism that emerged is often contrary to prevalent expectations. Relativistic individuals seem tolerant of ambiguity, open to experience, non-authoritarian, accepting of others with different backgrounds and lifestyles, and troubled by injustice. No persuasive evidence of questionable ethics is available. These findings have profound implications for managerial practice and suggest that highly relativistic employees may be among the most valuable. Future research grounded in an understanding of what relativism is rather than what it should be has the potential to allow a deeper understanding of this important construct to emerge. We also explore possible reasons why an inaccurate narrative about relativistic orientations may have emerged and persisted among both researchers and people generally.

Two distinct and perhaps mutually exclusive understandings of utilitarianism have emerged in the ethics literature. Utilitarianism is typically regarded as an approach to determine ethicality by focusing on whether or not actions produce the greater good, but has also been conceptualized as a set of traits to which individuals might be predisposed. This paper is designed to clarify the meaning and implications of such utilitarian traits as “results-oriented,” “innovative,” and “a winner.” Although the Janus-headed model of ethical theory from which these traits emerged had been acknowledged by its developer as possibly misrepresenting typical views of utilitarianism, much research using these traits appears to have been conducted without clear recognition of this. If the conceptual foundation underpinning hypothesis development is disconnected from the measure used to test them, then little support for relevant predictions should emerge. A review of the literature which featured utilitarian traits generally confirmed this. This paper also explored the origins and emergence of these traits and suggested that existing evidence that these measure utilitarian ethical predispositions is not especially persuasive. Understanding what utilitarian traits do not assess is critical in order for knowledge about this potentially useful measure to advance.

Moral reasoning typically relates unexpectedly weakly with both Machiavellianism and authoritarianism. Although researchers often explain this by pointing to apparent shortcomings in both the construct and the measure of moral reasoning, such explanations are questionable given the many instances of support for hypotheses involving moral reasoning using the same construct and measure. As these latter cannot only sometimes be flawed, we explored the possible influence of moral reasoning index choice on observed results by using multiple indices available in the Defining Issues Test (DIT). In a sample of 201 employed persons surveyed in 1998, with results reported for the first time, advanced moral reasoners tended to be neither Machiavellian nor authoritarian. However, the specific moral reasoning index employed was critical to detecting these hypothesized inverse relationships. Specifically, we proposed (and determined) that currently unavailable D scores would be the relevant index for examining inverse relationships with Machiavellianism and that P scores would be most appropriate in the context of inverse relationships with authoritarianism, particularly among persons inclined to utilize their characteristic moral reasoning (assessed with U scores). We extrapolate the conceptual logic underpinning such relationships, and suggest that appropriate index choice flows from this logic and is essential to hypothesis testing across a broad array of constructs. Future research could adopt this logic to examine relationships involving constructs with implications similar to those found in Machiavellianism and authoritarianism.

Investigations into ethical judgments generally seem fuzzy as to the relevant research domain. We first attempted to clarify the construct and determine domain parameters. This attempt required addressing difficulties associated with pinpointing relevant literature, most notably the varied nomenclature used to refer to ethical judgments (individual evaluations of actions’ ethicality). Given this variation in construct nomenclature and the difficulties it presented in identifying pertinent focal studies, we elected to focus on research that cited papers featuring prominent and often-used measures of ethical judgments (primarily, but not exclusively, the Multidimensional Ethics Scale). Our review of these studies indicated a preponderance of inferences and conclusions unwarranted by empirical evidence (likely attributable at least partly to inconsistent nomenclature). Moreover, ethical judgments related consistently to few respondent characteristics or any other variables, emergent relationships may not always be especially meaningful, and much research seems inclined to repetition of already verified findings. Although we concluded that knowledge about ethical judgments seems not to have advanced appreciably after decades of investigation, we suggested a possible path forward that focuses on the content of what is actually being judged as reflected in the myriad of vignettes used in the literature to elicit judgments.

Knowledge about ethical judgments has not advanced appreciably after decades of research. Such research, however, has rarely addressed the possible importance of the content of such judgments; that is, the material appearing in the brief vignettes or scenarios on which survey respondents base their evaluations. Indeed, this content has seemed an afterthought in most investigations. This paper closely examined the vast array of vignettes that have appeared in relevant research in an effort to reduce this proliferation to a more concise set of overarching vignette themes. Six generic themes emerged from this process, labeled here as Dilemma, Classic, Conspiracy, Sophie’s Choice, Runaway Trolley, and Whistle Blowing. Each of these themes is characterized by a unique combination of four key factors that include the extent of protagonist personal benefit from relevant vignette activities and victim salience in vignette descriptions. Theme identification enabled inherent ambiguities in vignettes that threaten construct validity to come into sharp focus, provided clues regarding appropriate vignette construction, and may help to make sense of patterns of empirical findings that heretofore have seemed difficult to explain.

Naughton proposed that workaholism may result from a combination of high job involvement with an obsessive-compulsive personality. This study was designed specifically to elaborate upon and to explore this proposal. Both obsessive-compulsive personality and workaholism, however, seem to be multidimensional rather than unidimensional variables, and their multidimensional nature needed clarification before the study could proceed. Obsessive-compulsive personality consisted of six distinct traits: obstinacy, orderliness, parsimony, perseverance, rigidity, and superego. Workaholism was operationalized as having two behavioral components: tendencies both to engage in non-required work activities, and to intrude actively on the work of others. This study predicted specificaly that high job involvement coupled with high scores on the obstinacy, orderliness, rigidity, and superego traits would lead to high scores on tendencies to engage in non-required work. These four predictions received some support in data emergingfrom a sample of 278 employed persons, although support was strongest for the obstinacy and superego traits. These results add to understanding of the work attitude of job involvement given its associations with some obsessive-compulsive traits, suggest the relevance of obsessive-compulsive personality in non-clinical settings, and add to understanding of the phenomenon of workaholism as behavioral tendencies.

This study examined some ethical implications of two different individual competitive orientations. Winning is crucially important in hypercompetitiveness, whereas a personal development (PD) perspective considers competition as a means to self-discovery and self-improvement. In a sample of 263 senior-level undergraduate business students, survey results suggested that hypercompetitiveness was generally associated with "poor ethics" and PD competitiveness was linked with "high ethics". For example, hypercompetitive individuals generally saw nothing wrong with self-interested gain at the expense of others, but PD competitors viewed such activities as largely inappropriate. Hypercompetitive people also tended to be highly Machiavellian but not ethically idealistic. In contrast, PD competitors tended to be ethically idealistic but not Machiavellian. Managers that are interested in both high ethics and high functioning work groups may wish to consider the potential importance of attempting to channel hypercompetitive tendencies into PD directions.

Asceticism seems an "invisible" Protestant work ethic (PWE) dimension that has largely been ignored in research. This study, building directly on existing knowledge, investigated the possibility that deference to authority was central to asceticism and the possible ethical implications of this. In 3 samples of employed persons, results demonstrated that highly ascetic individuals were highly authoritarian, were low in advanced moral reasoning, and regarded ethically questionable activities benefiting organizations (but not individuals) as relatively acceptable. However, "hard workers," another PWE dimension, regarded all ethically questionable activities as inappropriate, regardless of the beneficiary, and were less clearly authoritarian. Significant relationships involving the PWE may sometimes be undetectable when combining distinct dimensions, and asceticism merits attention as a distinct PWE component.

This study examined whether undergraduate students’ perceptions regarding the acceptability of cheating were influenced by the amount of ethics instruction the students had received and/or by their personality. The results, from a sample of 230 upper-level undergraduate students, indicated that simply taking a business ethics course did not have a significant influence on students’ views regarding cheating. On the other hand, Machiavellianism was positively related to perceiving that two forms of cheating were acceptable. Moreover, in testing for moderating relationships, the results indicated that the extent to which taking a business ethics course influenced attitudes varied substantially across individuals. Specifically, taking a course in business ethics did result in students who scored lower on Machiavellianism holding even more negative views regarding certain forms of cheating. In addition, individuals with higher grade point averages (GPAs) who had taken a course in business ethics were also less accepting of certain forms of cheating than individuals with similar GPAs who had not taken the business ethics course. The implications of these findings are discussed.

What types of persons are likely to believe in a narrow view of corporate social responsibility—that is, that managers should seek only to maximize profits in the interests of shareholders? Prior research suggested that such persons seemed likely to defer unquestioningly to organizational authority and thus to approve of unethical activities performed for organizational benefit. This article examined additional implications of such deferential tendencies among high social traditionalism scorers. In three samples of employed respondents ( N = 491), social traditionalists emerged as Machiavellian, had an entitled pattern of equity sensitivity, had an external work locus of control, were self-denying and authoritarian, felt that misfortune accrues to deserving people, and scored low on principled moral reasoning. These findings suggest that normative views about the rightness of social responsibility are closely tied to fundamental personality traits, attitudes, values, and thinking patterns. Therefore, resolving the long-standing social responsibility debate by determining once and for all whether social responsibility is good or bad may be an elusive goal.

This study examines the influence of ethics instruction, religiosity, and intelligence on cheating behavior. A sample of 230 upper level, undergraduate business students had the opportunity to increase their chances of winning money in an experimental situation by falsely reporting their task performance. In general, the results indicate that students who attended worship services more frequently were less likely to cheat than those who attended worship services less frequently, but that students who had taken a course in business ethics were no less likely to cheat than students who had not taken such a course. However, the results do indicate that the extent to which taking a business ethics course influenced cheating behavior was moderated by the religiosity and intelligence of the individual student. In particular, while students who were highly religious were unlikely to cheat whether or not they had taken a business ethics course, students who were not highly religious demonstrated less cheating if they had taken a business ethics course. In addition, the extent of cheating among highly intelligent students was significantly reduced if such students had taken a course in business ethics. Likewise, individuals who were highly intelligent displayed significantly less cheating if they were also highly religious. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Moral reasoning should not be clearly associated with measures of personality traits. Although this assumption pervades the moral reasoning literature, it may not always be true. This paper provides evidence that moral reasoning, as assessed with P scores of the Defining Issues Test, is indeed positively associated with five traits from the California Psychological Inventory: Achievement via Independence, Intellectual Efficiency, Tolerance, Responsibility, and Capacity for Status. Such relationships make conceptual sense, shed light on the meaning and implications of moral reasoning, call into question prevailing assumptions in the literature, and may encourage investigators to broaden the types of research questions asked in the context of moral reasoning.

This paper examined tendencies actually to utilize moral reasoning capabilities when making decisions, and suggested that utilization becomes especially salient in the context of variables having clear "deference to authority" implications. A "critical question" described here provided insights into the specific situations in which U (utilizer) scores from the Defining Issues Test (DIT) measure of moral reasoning should be considered. Hypotheses were tested involving relationships between moral reasoning and the personality variable of authoritarianism, and results suggested the importance of moral reasoning utilization. Researchers have long recognized a need to bridge the gap between moral cognition and moral action (Blasi, 1980), but actually bridging this gap has not always proceeded smoothly. Moral cognition or moral reasoning refers to how individuals reason about dilemmas with moral or ethical implications, and the considerations that are important to them in resolving these dilemmas. Moral reasoning often seems only loosely connected with "action" or decision making, and perhaps surprisingly also seems weakly connected with "ethics" and ethical orientations. For

Beliefs in a “just world” (BJW) suggest a direct causal link between merit and fate. This paper proposed that the specific nature of the “fate” (positive or negative) may be crucially important in understanding such beliefs. Stated differently, beliefs relevant to deserved misfortune (people suffer because they are “bad”) may be conceptually and empirically distinct from those pertaining to deserved good fortune (people prosper because they are “good”). In this study, a sample of employed persons completed a 20-item BJW scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). From these items, this paper recommended a five-item Deserved Misfortune scale and a six-item Deserved Good Fortune scale. These scales showed evidence of empirical utility, as Deserved Misfortune alone related as predicted (positively) with authoritarianism and the Protestant work ethic. The use of outcomes-based BJW scales may explain existing results in the literature, as well as increase the relevance of the BJW construct in future research.

The construct of cognitive moral development seemingly has powerful practical relevance in many areas of life. Nonetheless, moral reasoning seems of marginal relevance at best in the context of business ethics. Simply put, moral reasoning measurement indices are often only weakly related to many other apparently pertinent variables, and such findings cast doubt upon the construct validity of cognitive moral development. Many such unexpectedly weak relationships, however, may stem from two largely unrecognized methodological artifacts. The first artifact is an almost total reliance on the P index of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) designed to assess moral development even when this index may be inappropriate in a particular context. A second artifact that seems particularly salient in the context of attitudes toward authority involves a not always appropriate reliance on samples that include respondents whose moral reasoning is uncoupled from their action choices. These artifacts may restrict the amount of variance explained in observed relationships, and thus constrain the potential for moral reasoning to understand and explain behavior and attitudes relevant in the context of business ethics. Researchers are urged to use DIT D scores (in addition to P scores) in specific situations, and to examine relationships among high DIT U scorers whose moral reasoning is tightly coupled with their action choices. The application of these guidelines may have profound implications for advancing our fundamental understanding of moral reasoning, and of increasing its relevance to business ethics.