The Indian Competition Commission has recently challenged Ericsson's practice of licensing its standards-essential patents (SEPs), relating to cellular standards, for percentage-based royalties based on the selling prices of the end-user licensed products. Ericsson had committed to the relevant standards-development organisation that it would license its SEPs on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”) terms. The Commission contends that such royalties are “prima facie discriminatory” in violation of the Competition Act, in the (novel) sense that different products selling for different prices pay different per-unit royalties. We analyse the broader implications of the Commission's reasoning, concerned that if adopted, the Commission's reasoning would disrupt common industry licensing practices.

We respond to a recent proposal by Profs. Lemley and Shapiro for compulsory binding final-offer (baseball-style) arbitration for disputes over licensing FRAND-commited standards-essential patents. We demonstrate that, contrary to their suggestions, their proposal is not "best practices" for any standards-setting organization and suffers from a number of practical and conceptual problems.

We examine various conceptual issues raised by the “patent wars” that have occurred in recent years in telecommunications. We conclude that “patent wars” are the natural consequence of the multi-invention nature and massive growth of the industry and the probabilistic and non-self-enforcing nature of patents with the resulting uncertainty about patent validity and infringement, and that concerns about patents have not precluded the successful development and deployment of telecommunications standards or the massive commercial success of new telecommunications technology.

Iron sulfide (pyrite and pyrrhotite) was mined by open pit methods at Brukunga, located 40 km east of Adelaide in the Mount Lofty Ranges of South Australia, between 1955 and 1972 to provide feedstock for sulphuric acid production in the South Australian fertiliser industry. The site has been managed by Primary Industries and Resources South Australia (PIRSA) since 1998. Eight million tonnes of waste rock (2 wt % S) were mined and stored in three waste rock dumps. 3.5 Mt of tailings (1.7 wt % S) were produced and stored in an above ground facility. The total area of disturbance at the Brukunga Mine site is 155 ha, comprising the tailings dam, waste rock storages, quarry and Brukunga township. Oxidation of the mine and processing waste, and exposed remnant sulfidic rock mass, has resulted in acid drainage (pH<3) with elevated sulfate and dissolved metals. A hydrated lime-based water treatment plant was commissioned at Brukunga in September 1980 to treat acid drainage. The plant initially treated acidic seepage from the tailings storage facility (estimated at mine closure to be 80,000 m3/year), but has subsequently been expanded to treat acidic drainage collected from the waste rock dumps and the mine workings. The plant was upgraded to a high-density sludge operation, which has improved reagent efficiency and water quality, and also reduced overall treatment costs. Dawesley Creek drains the mine site precinct and prior to June 2003 this acid drainage entered this Creek making the water unsuitable for livestock and irrigation use for up to 20 km downstream. A diversion drain was constructed in June 2003 to separate non-mine related flow in Dawesley Creek from acidic mine drainage, which is collected and treated in the water treatment plant, in an attempt to reduce the total volume of water requiring treatment. Water treatment timelines to reduce acid, metal loads are estimated to range from 300 to greater than 1000 years. PIRSA has implemented a process for determining the most effective long-term solution for the remediation of the Brukunga Mine site. The goal of the Brukunga Remediation Project is to develop a walk-away solution, which is remediation allowing return of the land to a landuse suitable for release of the land from Government ownership such that the site requires no further intervention by, ongoing responsibility for or cost to Government and/or community.

A new acid and metalliferous drainage (AMD) avoidance / minimisation technique has been developed. It involves the strategic placement of selected alkalinity producing materials on top of sulfidic waste rock materials. This technique relies on the passive but sustained addition of soluble alkalinity to sulfidic waste materials from specialised amendments within cover materials. The amendments are placed above sulfidic materials to prevent surface passivation and blinding. Suitable amendments need to demonstrate elevated solubility values and relatively rapid dissolution rates compared to typical carbonate minerals. As the alkaline amendments dissolve during rainfall infiltration, sulfide grains and preferential pathways in the waste materials are coated with inert precipitates when acid salts are encountered. This coating process results in the minimisation of water–acid salt interaction, thereby lowering the acidity load emerging from sulfidic mine wastes. If the coating of sulfidic materials and lining of fluid flow pathways can be achieved from the top to the base of a waste rock pile, there is no reason why this methodology cannot provide sustainable reduction in AMD generation. This approach is predicted to be very cost effective as very small masses of amendment should be capable of passivating entire fluid flow networks in waste rock piles. Hence there is no requirement for the mass of alkaline amendment to match the mass of potential acidity with mine wastes. The performance of two alkalinity producing cover materials is being tested at the former Brukunga Pyrite Mine in South Australia. Preliminary results presented here indicate that alkalinity producing covers have significant potential to provide cost effective and sustainable reduction in acidity load discharges from sulfidic waste rock piles. Additional

Pyrite (FeS 2 ) and pyrrhotite (FeS) were mined by open pit methods at Brukunga, South Australia, between 1955 and 1972. Eight million tonnes of waste rock (2 wt.% S) and 3.5 Mt of tailings (1.7 wt.% S) were produced. Oxidation of this material, and remaining in-situ rock mass, has resulted in acid drainage (pH<3) with elevated sulphate and dissolved metals. Prior to June 2003 this acid drainage entered Dawesley Creek making the water unsuitable for livestock and irrigation use for up to 20 km downstream. The site is now under the care of the State Government. A lime neutralization plant commissioned by the State Government in 1980 and currently operated by Primary Industries and Resources South Australia (PIRSA), a government body, was built to address water quality issues on site and reduce downstream impacts in Dawesley Creek. Construction of a drain in June 2003 diverted flow from Dawesley Creek around the mine enabling all acid drainage to be retained, collected and treated on site. Upgrade of the existing plant to High Density Sludge (HDS) mode resulted in additional improvements in water quality, increased reagent efficiency and reduced overall treatment costs, including a 50% cost savings on sludge handling and disposal. An additional plant has been commissioned to cope with increased treatment volumes brought about by improvements in the containment and collection of acid drainage from the site. Having substantially reduced the water quality risks to downstream users PIRSA's ongoing rehabilitation of the site is aimed at lowering the acid load entering the treatment plants. Future stages in the rehabilitation program include plans to move and cap waste rock piles and to continue to revegetate the site. This will further reduce treatment and sludge handling costs while maintaining water quality for users downstream of the site.

Since its establishment in 1987, SEMATECH (the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology consortium) has received considerable attention from U.S. policymakers and managers. The consortium has been endorsed by the Clinton Administration as a model of government-industry cooperation in supporting research in "critical technologies".1 Other industry-led consortia have been proposed or established in areas ranging from electric automobiles (the Advanced Battery Consortium) to high-definition displays and other semiconductor industry products (the proposed multi-chip module foundry consortium) to aircraft development and production (the proposed Aerotech consortium). Contrary to the predictions of Cohen and Noll (1992), SEMATECH has been followed by a number of other U.S. technology development consortia funded from public and private sources.2

This article reviews the experience of SEMATECH as a model for high-technology research consortia. SEMATECH's original aims of developing next-generation manufacturing technology proved hard to achieve, and the program has refocused on generic technology and the equipment industry infrastructure. Though more modest, these new objectives have produced significant tangible results. The study considers the reasons for the change and implications for consortium design. This is contrasted with the history of other major collaborative research programs in Japan, Europe, and the United States.

A central problem in setting standards is finding a balance between the use of government standards bodies and market forces. Telepoint, a UK public cordless telephone system, provides a valuable example of an attempt to use market forces within a regulated framework. The exercise has to date had an unhappy history. A problem has been that despite intentions the regulator effectively defined the system, pursuing its own broad policy agenda. The initial configuration did not appeal to users and attempts to redefine it took too long. Meanwhile, thc service providers scemed to lack commitment. As a result initial services were withdrawn within two years of the launch, though a subsequent re-launch by a single operator has taken place. Hopes that the system could become a de facto European standard have been set back. Neither policy nor commercial aims have been achieved. The result, including the commitment and credibility problems, may be traced to contradictions in policy. If hybrid policies are to work the framework may need to be more market responsive, and the private agenda of the regulator less evident than here.

This article reports the initial results of SEMATECH, a joint experiment in semiconductor manufacturing technology between the U.S. semiconductor industry and the federal government. Although it is too soon to make a full evaluation, SEMATECH has already had a positive impact on industry performance. It has strengthened the links between the manufacturers and the equipment industry, which in turn has helped bring U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capability up to world competitive standards. The lessons from this experience may prove useful in forming a model for research consortia in other manufacturing industries and for addressing some the of issues of U.S. competitiveness.

Firms often think that technology is the quick way to business success, allowing them to bypass other business problems and to leap ahead of competitors. Such strategies are rarely successful. Technology can only be effective if it is fully integrated into the firm's business, stressing its commercialization. What appears to be a technological edge usually rests on an organizational structure which either enables the firm to generate successive innovations, or to handle the implementation of technology more effectively than competitors. This is the only way to generate lasting technology‐related competitive advantage.

Increasingly, the success of products depends on compatibility standards. Computers need software, discs or tapes need and are needed by players, credit cards need retailers willing to accept them. Analysis of the strategies of winners and losers in major standards wars—such as those in video cassette recorders and personal computers—reveals some general lessons. The key elements are the rapid creation of a large installed base and the credibility of the standard and the introducer. Product quality is rarely crucial. Competition by technical development of the product, step by step product introduction, and reliance on acceptance by national and international standards bodies are also frequently ineffective. There are obvious lessons for current standards wars, such as those in mobile communications and satellite broadcasting.