We estimate the effects of the arrival of 2.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey as of the end of 2015 on the labor market outcomes of natives, using a difference-in-differences IV methodology. We find that the migrant influx has strong adverse effects on native workers in the informal sector, particularly on temporary wage workers, less-educated and young workers, women who are part-time employed and self-employed, and workers in agriculture and construction. At the same time, it has favorable effects on complementary workers in the formal sector; wage employment and wages of men in the formal sector increase -particularly in manufacturing. Increases in product market prices and capital investment in the treatment regions contribute to the rise in labor demand in the formal sector. The migrant impact on native men's total employment is null, whereas it is more adverse for women primarily because the migrant influx does not raise their employment in the formal sector -unlike for men. The adverse effects on the most vulnerable groups in the labor market and the rise in consumer prices imply that poverty might increase among these native groups.
Introduction. Part 1: Determinants of Immigration. Demographic Developments and Complementarities: Ageing, Labor and Migration. Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU. Migration Trends in an Enlarging European Union. Part 2: Determinants of Integration. Comparing Integration Policies and Outcomes: Turks in the Netherlands and Germany. The Turkish Community in Austria and Belgium: The Challenge of Integration. The Educational Attainment of Turkish Migrants in Germany. Gender Dynamics in the Context of Turkish Marriage Migration: The Case of Belgium. Political Participation and Associational Life of Turkish Residents in the Capital of Europe. Conclusion.
The European Commission awarded a contract in November 2005 to a consortium composed of the TARKI Social Research Institute (Hungary), CASE, Center for Social and Economic Research (Poland) and CEPS to analyse the socio-economic developments and the process of structural reforms in what were then four candidate countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey. The objective was to identify the major challenges in the current demographic, social and economic context that could be considered relevant in determining the capacity of these countries to function in the European Union. This study presents the findings for Turkey and consists of an analytical section and a statistical annex. The other country reports and synthesis report are published separately in this same series.
Turkiye’nin 1996’da AB ile yaptigi Gumruk Birligi, imalattaki ithalat penetrasyonunu ciddi oranda arttirirken, Turkiye’nin dis ticaretinde AB’nin payini ayni oranda etkilemedi. Bu calisma, bu canlanmanin Turkiye’deki imalat sektorunun uretim ve endustriyel yapisinda ve rekabetci davranisinda onemli bir etkiye sahip olup olmadigini incelemektedir.
In the debate about Turkish EU membership and free movement of labour it is often overlooked that the EU cannot exercise a zero migration policy even if permanent safeguards were used. Even under the currently prevailing strict regime, there is an annual net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 35,000 people. Any slowdown or suspension in Turkey’s accession process is likely to lead lower growth and higher unemployment in Turkey. Moreover, the reform process might slow down or be partially reversed. The consequence of such a combination would be drastically higher number of potential migrants. A considerable proportion of them would be finding their way into the EU – as experience has shown irrespective of legal restriction. It is thus possible that if Turkey loses the membership perspective, the EU may end up having more immigrants than under a free movement of labour regime with a prosperous EU member Turkey. Moreover, the composition of this migration would be less conducive for the EU labour markets - and - for integration in the host societies. The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no a priori reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience.
This is an econometric study aimed at estimating the eventual immigration from Turkey to the EU when Turkey becomes a full member and restrictions on labor mobility are removed. The findings suggest that a successful accession period with high growth reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. The study warns that lower growth and higher unemployment associated with a suspension in Turkey’s accession process may produce more immigrants than a successful membership.
This study analyzes growth, employment and productivity in the Turkish manufacturing industry with respect to industry and size, and scrutinizes the sensitivity of firms—with respect to the economic environment—depending on firm size. Panel data techniques are used in the analyses.
According to the authors many Europeans believe that if Turkey were to become an EU member state there would be large numbers of Turks immigrating to EU. It is estimated that there are approximately 3,6 million Turkish nationals living abroad of which about 3,2 million are in European countries. Some studies predict a flow of migrants (between 1.3 to 2.7 million) from Turkey to the EU until 2030. The authors argue that prospects of EU accession will not eliminate immigration from Turkey; however, the context, the number and the composition of Turkish immigration will be very different than what it has been so far. Given the importance of the EU as an anchor in Turkish politics and for the economy, it is quite likely that migration might be greater and of a more difficult sort if the prospects of membership is lost.
In the debate about Turkish EU membership and free movement of labour it is often overlooked that the EU cannot exercise a zero migration policy even if permanent safeguards were used. Even under the currently prevailing strict regime, there is an annual net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 35,000 people. Any slowdown or suspension in Turkey's accession process is likely to lead lower growth and higher unemployment in Turkey. Moreover, the reform process might slow down or be partially reversed. The consequence of such a combination would be drastically higher number of potential migrants. A considerable proportion of them would be finding their way into the EU - as experience has shown irrespective of legal restriction. It is thus possible that if Turkey loses the membership perspective, the EU may end up having more immigrants than under a free movement of labour regime with a prosperous EU member Turkey. Moreover, the composition of this migration would be less conducive for the EU labour markets - and - for integration in the host societies. The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no a priori reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience.
In the debate about Turkish EU membership and free movement of labour it is often overlooked that the EU cannot exercise a zero migration policy even if permanent safeguards were used. Even under the currently prevailing strict regime, there is an annual net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 35,000 people. Any slowdown or suspension in Turkey’s accession process is likely to lead lower growth and higher unemployment in Turkey. Moreover, the reform process might slow down or be partially reversed. The consequence of such a combination would be drastically higher number of potential migrants. A considerable proportion of them would be finding their way into the EU – as experience has shown irrespective of legal restriction. It is thus possible that if Turkey loses the membership perspective, the EU may end up having more immigrants than under a free movement of labour regime with a prosperous EU member Turkey. Moreover, the composition of this migration would be less conducive for the EU labour markets - and - for integration in the host societies. The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no a priori reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience.
Using industry level panel data, we study how increasing openness to international markets, including the customs union with EU, have affected the structure and performance of Turkish manufacturing industries over the 1980-1999 period, with special emphasis on the market disciplining role of imports. We find that changes import penetration did not reduce (output-) concentration in concentrated industries, while for the less concentrated industries it had a mildly significant negative impact. It was also observed that changes in import penetration had a significant positive, rather than negative, effect on price-cost margins (PCM) with a one-year lag in high PCM industries; while for the low PCM industries current changes in import penetration had again a significant positive impact on profit margins. Thus, imports do not seem to provide discipline for either the low or high PCM industries.
Turkey’s customs union with the European Union in 1996 increased considerably import penetration in manufacturing while not significantly affecting the share of EU in Turkey’s trade. The study analyzes whether this impetus had a marked impact on the productive and industrial structure of manufacturing in Turkey, and on its competitive behavior.