Developments in nanobionics promise to provide people with a range of impairments (including physical disabilities and neural conditions) with new treatments or functional prosthetic devices. In this chapter we wish to explore some of the ways in which individuals offered these new technologies may experience them in relation to their self-understanding and engagement with the world, and some of the ways in which the availability of these nanotechnologies may shape societal understanding of people who have impairments and the value of medical nanobionics. Drawing on theoretical work in phenomenology, we ask whether those medical nanotechnologies that are external or 'wearable' may differ in their ethical and social significance from those that are internal or implantable; how use of implantable devices may shape our self-understandings; whether the developments in these technologies may yield new modes of human perception and sensory experience; and whether these amount to 'transhuman' transcendence of human limitations or more familiar extension and gradualist change in the human condition.
Despite the amount of public investment in nanotechnology ventures in the developed world, research shows that there is little public awareness about nanotechnology, and public knowledge is very limited. This is concerning given that nanotechnology has been heralded as 'revolutionising' the way we live. In this paper, we articulate why public engagement in debates about nanotechnology is important, drawing on literature on public engagement and science policy debate and deliberation about public policy development. We also explore the significance of timing in engaging the public, and we make some suggestions concerning how to effectively engage publics. Our conclusions indicate the significance of scientific researchers, policy makers and representative consumer groupings in public reasoning towards a better public policy framework for debate about technological development.
This thesis examines the behaviour known as deliberate self-harm in young women who are victims of parental incest. I am interested in identifying the impact and significance of incest in childhood on the development of young women’s agency and the significance of self-harming behaviour in that development. I argue that central to understanding the relationship between self-harm and incest is the notion of the self and the social and relational context in which it develops. The theoretical framework I employ to explain the development of self draws upon work in developmental psychology and feminist philosophical discourse on selfhood. My examination of the relationship between deliberate self-harm and incest explores the interaction between the three facets of an incestuous relationship: the sexual abuse of a child by her parent. The analysis of this interaction begins by articulating the significance of the relationship between parent and child on the child’s development. I contend that when a parent sexually abuses his child, he threatens his child’s attachment to him. Because this connection is integral to her psychological development, the child will try to remain in relationship with her parent despite his abuse of her, and will therefore develop complex, and sometimes contradictory, responses to the harm of incest that protect this attachment. I argue that deliberate self-harm should be understood in part as an attempt to remain connected to her abusive parent because of the importance of this relationship to the child’s developing sense of selfhood. To further illuminate the implications of incest on self-development, I articulate some of the psychological impacts of shame as it operates within an oppressive relationship such as parental incest involving a child. I attempt to show that the shame engendered by incest communicates to the child that she is an inferior and an inadequate moral agent, an agent unworthy of being treated respectfully by others. Because she is developmentally vulnerable, this shame profoundly shapes her understanding of herself, her responsibility and her agency. In light of such disturbances to the child’s sense of self, I critically analyse the popular conception of deliberate self-harm as primarily a coping strategy used to deal with the effects of sexual trauma. I argue that this is not the best way to