Standardization in the field of High Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) environments, protection design and test methods is becoming increasingly important due to the increased risk to society from HPEM disruption. This paper will provide a discussion of a new International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard on High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) protection, IEC 61000-5-6. This new standard introduces the concept of a resilience-based approach to HEMP disturbance mitigation.

There are scenarios where Distributed Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) might be required to work without any steering (pilot signal) or information feedback from the power receiver. A new Sequential Phase Optimization (SPO) technique has been developed to create coherence from independent, distributed transmitters at the spatial location of a non-communicative power receiver. This would increase the efficiency of the power transfer compared to incoherent systems. The proposed technique was tested under laboratory conditions.

This article describes the development and testing of a suite of high-voltage pulse antennas for IEMI susceptibility testing. The antennas are designed to operate with pulses up to 33 kV from a common solid state double exponential pulse generator, and to be light enough to operate on a standard EMC test mast. A broadband (hyperband) antenna intended to transmit the full pulse spectrum and two resonant (mesoband) antennas to produce damped sinusoidal pulses are presented. The antennas were prototyped using full wave numerical modelling and tested in an anechoic chamber in the frequency domain and with a high voltage pulse generator.

A robust lightweight antenna for testing immunity of equipment to intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI), based on a planar Vivaldi design, is described, along with simulated and measured test results.

An antenna for testing immunity of equipment to intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) is described, along with simulated and measured test results which show a good agreement and demonstrate the high-voltage operation.

A resonant dipole antenna for testing immunity of equipment to intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) is described, along with simulated and measured test results which are in good agreement and demonstrate the high voltage operation.

Standardization of High Power Electromagnetic (HPEM), environments, protection design and test methods is becoming increasingly important particularly as the perceived risk to society from HPEM is growing. Many generic standards and some application or product specific standards are now available. This letter will provide an overview of some recent developments in HPEM standards, in particular High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) phenomena.

IEC SC 77C (EMC: High Power Transient Phenomena) has been developing high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) standards and publications to protect civil society since 1992 having begun work as a working group in 1989. The initial publications dealt with the high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), and in 1999 work began on intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). This paper briefly reviews the publications prepared in the past and identifies the most recent activities in IEC SC 77C.

The topic of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI)1 has been studied for some time [1] yet the analysis of the risk posed to electronics rich infrastructure assets on which civilized society depends has not been fully evaluated and guidance on protection, whilst available [2], has not been widely implemented.

Since the publication of the last IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY special issue on nuclear electromagnetic pulse in 1978, significant progress has been made in the development of high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) standards. The standards cover HEMP environment definition, protection requirements, and test methods. In particular, civilian standards have been developed in recent times as it is recognized that the impact of HEMP disturbances is not just a concern for the military but also a concern for the largely civilian critical national infrastructure. This paper provides a summary of the HEMP standards that are presently available in the military and civilian domains.

All types of electronic infrastructures, systems, and equipment are potentially vulnerable to Electromagnetic (EM) disruption and items which process sensitive data may be susceptible to electronic eavesdropping. These EM threat forms are not new but are an emerging technical concern for information security because of the prevalence of electronics embedded into infrastructures.Electronics within fixed information processing installations, such as data centres, office accommodation, data recovery/backup centres and telecommunications exchanges, may be particularly vulnerable especially where physical security is not adequate or well maintained. EM disruption can cause long term availability issues for processing facilities as a consequence of inadequate incident response planning. Electronic eavesdropping may cause breaches in confidentiality and integrity through untraceable losses of sensitive information.Providing protection for each and every item of equipment can be costly. It is also difficult to justify costs where the magnitude of the risk posed by EM threats is not well understood. However, experience has shown that designing in EM protection from the outset of a project is known to be cost effective.This paper discusses assessment and detection methods which can be used to help to quantify the risk and assist with generating an appropriate response to an EM initiated incident. Other technical and non technical means of providing EM protection for a fixed installation will also be discussed.This paper references published guidance and practical experience, where available.

The intentional malicious use of Electromagnetic (EM) interference as a way to compromise Information Security (INFOSEC) and commit a criminal act is an emerging technical concern. High power radio frequency generators possess the ability to disrupt, and deny service to information systems and processes by adversely affecting sensitive electronic hardware. The manifestation of such an attack form is ambiguous and open to misinterpretation and as such the attack or crime may go undetected, or be incorrectly diagnosed. Further, incorrect diagnosis of an EM disruption incident may lead to an incorrect or inappropriate response which could lead to magnification of the impact with potential cost penalties. An Electromagnetic Disruption Detection System (EMDDS) prototype has been developed similar in function to conventional cyber Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The EMDDS raises an alarm when hostile activity, EM disruption, is taking, or has taken place. This paper discusses; EM disruptive threat types; the impact on INFOSEC; the potential types of criminal activity; the merits of detection; and the application of the EMDDS to a forensic investigation and for incident response.

This paper provides a summary of two susceptibility assessments conducted by the QinetiQ EMC group.The first assessment attempted to understand the susceptibility threshold of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) computer equipment to a High Power Electromagnetic (BPEM), or High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) environment. This environment was produced using the mode stirred reverberation chamber technique.The second assessment evaluated the susceptibility threshold of COTS computer network equipment to a High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEW) environment produced within the QinetiQ HEMP bounded wave simulator.These assessments have focused on the threshold of susceptibility of computer equipment and networks with variation in technology maturity. Technology trends are established where possible. The impact of EMC compliance on computer equipment immunity is also discussed.It is considered that the data presented in this paper will be informative to those seeking to protect systems and infrastructures from Intentional and Unintentional Electromagnetic Interference (EMI).