This paper develops a phenomenological account of hallucinations and delusions as disorders of temporal synthesis rather than as "positive symptoms" or simple perceptual-cognitive failures. Drawing on Henri Bergson's philosophy of memory-perception synthesis, I argue that psychotic phenomena represent specific breakdowns in the living processes through which consciousness ordinarily integrates past, present, and future into coherent temporal experience. Hallucinations emerge through ungrounded actualization of memorial content without proper temporal framing, while delusions represent false synthetic frameworks that restore apparent coherence while losing connection to shared reality. By retrieving Bergson's original insight that "there is no perception which is not full of memories," this analysis demonstrates how Eugène Minkowski's selective appropriation of Bergsonian concepts redirected phenomenological psychiatry away from memorial processes toward an exclusive focus on temporal flow and vital contact. Contemporary phenomenological psychiatry continues this "forward bias," emphasizing protention and desynchronization while underemphasizing the active, creative role of memory in temporal constitution. Through phenomenological analysis integrated with Merleau-Ponty's embodied phenomenology and Gadamer's hermeneutic insights, and grounded in first-person accounts of psychotic experience, the paper proposes understanding recovery as temporal reconstruction and suggests therapeutic approaches based on rebuilding memory-perception synthesis.

BACKGROUND:Research suggests that most mental health conditions have their onset in the critically social period of adolescence. Yet, we lack understanding of the potential social processes underlying early psychopathological development. We propose a conceptual model where daily-life social interactions and social skills form an intermediate link between known risk and protective factors (adverse childhood experiences, bullying, social support, maladaptive parenting) and psychopathology in adolescents - that is explored using cross-sectional data. METHODS:N = 1913 Flemish adolescent participants (Mean age = 13.8; 63% girls) were assessed as part of the SIGMA study, a large-scale, accelerated longitudinal study of adolescent mental health and development. Self-report questionnaires (on risk/protective factors, social skills, and psychopathology) were completed during class time; daily-life social interactions were measured during a subsequent six-day experience-sampling period. RESULTS:Registered uncorrected multilevel linear regression results revealed significant associations between all risk/protective factors and psychopathology, between all risk/protective factors and social processes, and between all social processes and psychopathology. Social processes (social skills, quantity/quality of daily social interactions) were uniquely predicted by each risk/protective factor and were uniquely associated with both general and specific types of psychopathology. For older participants, some relationships between social processes and psychopathology were stronger. CONCLUSIONS:Unique associations between risk/protective factors and psychopathology signify the distinct relevance of these factors for youth mental health, whereas the broad associations with social processes support these processes as broad correlates. Results align with the idea of a social pathway toward early psychopathology, although follow-up longitudinal research is required to verify any mediation effect.

Research increasingly highlights the importance of social disconnectedness for the development of psychosis. However, the perspective of individuals with psychosis remains largely underexplored. At present, there is also no comprehensive view of the role of social processes throughout different phases of psychosis development. The current study aims to investigate 1) how individuals with a psychotic disorder experience social disconnection and 2) the role of social disconnection We conducted two focus groups, with individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (N = 8). The data were analyzed using interpretative phenomenological analysis. We structured the data according to three phases: pre-psychotic early life, development of psychotic symptoms and recovery. The first phase included following themes: "developing distrustful views of others through childhood interpersonal adversity" and "growing up socially isolated". The second phase had three themes: "increasing separation between common and individual reality perception", "struggling to share psychotic experiences due to stigma" and "losing relationships due to feeling misunderstood and decreased social functioning". The final phase encompassed: "accepting psychosis diagnosis through social support", "grounding influence of others" and "finding purpose through social integration". In general, individuals with psychosis viewed social disconnectedness as a highly important factor for understanding and treating psychosis.

What might be the value of the often rather abstract theoretical reflections of philosophy for understanding the concrete and lived experience of various forms of madness? And is there something contained within the transgressive forms of mad experience that could be of special relevance for philosophy? Are these two distinctively human domains of activity and experience only externally and contingently related, perhaps only the affair of the wandering philosopher with idiosyncratic interests; or might there also be a more intrinsic or even essential affinity between them? If so, then what, if any, would be the difference between philosophical reflection and amazement regarding the basic categories of human existence (e.g., the nature of reality, self, identity, truth, free will, . . .) and the kind of hyperreflexive interrogation of these foundational issues that we find in madness? This broad set of questions formed the initial impetus and topics of discussion of the first edition of the Too Mad to be True conference held in Museum Dr Guislain in Ghent (Belgium) in 2021, an international conference dedicated to exploring the various links and intersections between philosophy and madness. The contributions of the current special issue on The Philosophies of Madness that grew out of this conference have all developed these questions further, applying them in two broadly distinctive ways.

The Experience sampling method (ESM) has the potential to support person-centered care of psychotic disorders. However, clinical implementation is hampered by a lack of user involvement in the design of ESM tools. This qualitative study explored the perspective of nine people with lived experiences of psychosis. Participants re-ported a need to monitor a diverse range of daily-life experiences and indicated that ESM should allow for personalization to be clinically useful. While participants recognized the potential of ESM to increase awareness and control over their mental health, concerns were voiced about the validity and burden of monitoring one's own mental health.

Experiences of sudden and abrupt insight, sometimes termed aha-experiences, are often reported during psychosis. The aha-experience is described as a radical and sudden restructuring, realization or change in understanding. Based on personal experience, we argued that alongside this aha-experience exists theanti-aha-experience. The anti-aha-experience refers to an experience of sudden insight that does not fit within one's framework, convictions or worldview and has an undermining effect. We have conceptualized psychosis as a dialectic of aha- and anti-aha-experiences and argue that a dialectic tension between aha- and anti-aha experiences undermines a stable personal perspective. In this study, we set out to investigate whether individuals with lived experience of psychosis do indeed report forms of sudden insight, and particularly if they report aha- and anti-aha-experiences, and the dialectic between them. We therefore conducted 21 in-depth interviews and 6 focus groups with individuals with lived experience of psychosis and analyzed the transcripts using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. The findings show that these phenomena are indeed often reported and could play a significant role in psychosis. Integrating these phenomena into our understanding of psychosis could help to better grasp the lived experience of individual patients and additionally inform other forms of research on psychosis.

BACKGROUND:Experiences of psychosis are often assumed to be strange, bizarre, or incomprehensible. The aim of this article is to offer a new step towards a better understanding of how the psychotic process affects a prereflective background.METHODS:We use concepts from the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein to clarify the first-person perspective on psychosis of one of the authors.RESULTS:We describe the early psychotic process as breaking down the "nest of propositions," shaking the scaffolds of our language games. Hereby, the prereflective background that forms our existential orientation in the world is fundamentally altered. We identify different aspects of this process: a dialectic of aha and anti-aha experiences, the experience of groundlessness, and blind spots. Acknowledging and exploring the depth and impact of this process on a person's world may be a first step towards resolving their isolation and suffering. Philosophy can facilitate such an exploration, while interpersonal activation may offer structure and trust in the world, helping the patient to find solid ground in action and interaction.CONCLUSION:This article combines a philosophical approach with a first-person perspective on psychosis to illuminate aspects of psychosis that have not been described or elaborated on before. We argue that psychosis entails an experience of existential groundlessness. Our view has implications for treatment of and recovery from psychosis.