Countries around the world are enacting climate policies such as coal phase-outs, aviation taxes and renewable energy support. These policies often overlap with a wider multi-jurisdictional carbon-pricing system like the EU's Emissions Trading System. We develop a general framework to study how effectively such 'overlapping climate policies' can help combat climate change-depending on their design, location and timing. We find that some policies are truly complementary, while others backfire by raising aggregate emissions. At a conceptual level, our model encompasses the market design of most carbon-pricing systems used in practice and a wide range of popular unilateral climate policies.

Adopted in 2023, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a significant component of the European Union's ambitious decarbonization strategy under the European Green Deal. This article questions the output effectiveness of the CBAM in achieving its stated objective, prevention of carbon leakage, while demonstrating its impact effectiveness as an instrument for advancing the global diffusion of carbon pricing. Empirical evidence for carbon leakage remains sparse, and implementation challenges might limit the capacity of the CBAM to counteract leakage even where it occurs. Nonetheless, the CBAM has already demonstrated a powerful spillover effect by incentivizing the acceleration of carbon pricing roadmaps across EU trade partners, suggesting that trade-related climate measures can effectively encourage global climate action. As the EU navigates the complexities of operationalizing the CBAM, it must balance several tradeoffs to maintain this important spillover effect. If successful, the CBAM could catalyze a virtuous cycle of carbon pricing adoption, reinforcing its potentially pivotal role in the EU's toolbox to manage the environment-trade nexus.

How does market power affect the rate of pass-through from marginal cost to the market price? A standard intuition is that more competition makes prices more “cost-reflective” and thus raises cost pass-through. This paper shows that this intuition is sensitive to the common assumption in the literature that firms’ marginal costs are constant. If firms have even modestly increasing marginal costs, more intense competition actually reduces pass through. These results apply to the “normal” case where pass-through is less than 100%. They have implications for competition policy and environmental regulation.

As part of its Green Deal, the European Union has advanced a ‘Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism’ (CBAM). Reflective of a trend towards greater use of coercive trade measures to advance environmental and other policy objectives, the CBAM would extend carbon pricing to imported goods with the aim of limiting carbon leakage. Theoretical enquiry into this type of policy approach—known as border carbon adjustments (BCAs)—suggests economic and environmental benefits, but typically discounts the role of legal and practical constraints on BCA design and implementation. In this paper, we show why the BCA design commonly featured in past research—basing the adjustment level on default carbon intensities—runs counter to the economic logic of carbon pricing by distorting the incentives for emissions abatement. Requiring producers to demonstrate their actual carbon intensity captures additional economic benefits of carbon pricing and improves the overall legal prospects of a BCA, but adds to its administrative complexity and creates risk of avoidance practices such as ‘resource shuffling’. What emerges is a more nuanced understanding of BCAs that highlights the challenges when transitioning from theory to practice.

Climate change has risen to board level on the corporate agenda. Under pressure from institutional investors, companies are reformulating their strategies for a low-carbon world. A novel aspect of the emerging corporate response is that executive compensation is being linked to climate performance. This article examines the different ways that climate-linked incentive pay is used at European and U.S. energy majors, and it develops a framework—aimed at companies in “hard-to-decarbonize” sectors—to understand the benefits, challenges, and key design options. It also makes recommendations on how this organizational practice might be refined over time.

This paper studies a social planner who chooses countries' carbon prices so as to maximize global welfare. Product markets are characterized by firm heterogeneity, market power, and international trade. Because of the market-power distortion, the planner's optimal policy is second-best. The main insight is that optimal carbon prices may be highly asymmetric: zero in some countries and above the social cost of carbon in countries with relatively dirty production. This result obtains even though a uniform global carbon price is always successful at reducing countries' emissions. Competition policy that mitigates market power may enable stronger climate action.

To mitigate concerns about carbon leakage and industrial competitiveness, cap-and-trade systems have typically relied on the free allocation of carbon allowances to trade-exposed sectors. The European Union’s Green Deal raises the prospect of free allocation being replaced by a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) on imported products. This paper provides a simple framework to analyze the competitiveness support provided by these policy instruments. It shows how the rate of carbon leakage can be a “sufficient statistic” to determine the output and profit impacts of the switch to a CBAM. High-leakage sectors will prefer the CBAM while low-leakage sectors will prefer free allocation.

Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. This paper introduces a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different conventional generation technologies. We consider two policy instruments, a wholesale price cap and a capacity payment, and show which combinations of these instruments induce socially-optimal investment by the market. Our analysis yields a rationale for a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality—even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load. In extensions, (i) we show how increasing variable renewables penetration can enhance the need for a capacity payment under a novel condition called “imperfect system substitutability”, and (ii) we outline the socially-optimal design of a strategic reserve with a targeted capacity payment.

Economic policy and shifts in input market prices often have significant effects on the marginal costs of firms and can prompt strategic responses that make their impact hard to predict. We introduce generalized linear competition (GLC), a new model that nests many existing theories of imperfect competition. We show how firm-level cost pass-through is a sufficient statistic to calculate the impact of a cost shift on an individual firm's profits. GLC sidesteps estimation of a demand system and requires no assumptions about the mode of competition, rivals' technologies and strategies, or equilibrium. In an empirical application to the US airline market, we demonstrate GLC's usefulness for ex ante policy evaluation and identify the winners and losers of climate-change policy. We also show how GLC's structure, under additional assumptions, can be used for welfare analysis and to endogenize the extent of regulation.

ABSTRACT As part of the European Green Deal, the EU is considering the introduction of a Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) on imports as an alternative to free allocation of emission allowances to reduce the risk of carbon leakage under the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). While a BCA for exports is not categorically excluded, it is less likely to be consistent with World Trade Organisation rules and therefore less likely to be proposed than an import-only BCA. In this paper, we show that replacing free allocation by an import-only BCA would weaken the competitiveness of EU producers in foreign markets. Free allocation also helps support the cost competitiveness of domestic products that are exported to non-EU markets. Therefore, a move to import-only BCAs does not necessarily make redundant the continued use of free allocation to help safeguard overall industrial competitiveness. While combining an import BCA with free allocation for exports can increase the risk of legal challenges, such risks may be reduced with an appropriate design. More broadly, policymakers need to navigate a complex trade-off between competitiveness support, a stronger carbon price signal, and extra fiscal revenue. Key policy insights A BCA on imports levels the playing field in domestic EU markets but does not provide competitiveness support to exports Therefore, a move to an import-only BCAs does not obviate the need for free allocation to safeguard overall industrial competitiveness While combining an import-only BCA with free allocation for exports increases the risk of legal challenges, such risks may be reduced with an appropriate design

Since the 2015 Paris Agreement, climate change – and wider environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues – have risen to board-level on the corporate agenda. Under increasing pressure from institutional investors, companies are reformulating their strategies for a climate-constrained world. A novel aspect of the emerging corporate response is that executive compensation is being linked to climate targets. At the world’s largest energy companies, climate metrics now make up 8% of CEO’s short-term incentive plans. This paper explains the case for corporate climate action, summarizes the use to date of climate-linked management incentives, and presents a framework for understanding their benefits and design challenges.

The transition to a low-carbon power system requires growing the share of generation from (intermittent) renewables while ensuring security of supply. Policymakers and economists increasingly see a capacity mechanism as a way to deal with this challenge. Yet this raises new concerns about the exercise of market power by large players via the capacity auction. We present a new modelling approach that captures such strategic behaviour together with a set of ex ante empirical estimates for the new Irish electricity market design (I-SEM)—in which a single firm controls 44% of generation capacity (excluding wind). We find significant costs of strategic behaviour, even with new entry: In our baseline scenarios, procurement costs in the capacity auction are around 150-400 million EUR (or 40-100%) above the competitive least-cost solution. From a policy perspective, we also examine how market power can be measured and mitigated through auction design.

Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different generation technologies. We consider two policy instruments, a wholesale price cap and a capacity payment, and show which combinations of these instruments induce socially-optimal investment by the market. Changing the price cap or capacity payment affects investment only in peak generation plant, with no equilibrium impact on baseload or mid-merit plant. We obtain a rationale for a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality – even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load. In extensions, we show how increasing renewables penetration enhances the need for a capacity mechanism, and outline an optimal design of a strategic reserve with a discriminatory capacity payment.

Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different generation technologies. We consider two policy instruments, a wholesale price cap and a capacity payment, and show which combinations of these instruments induce socially-optimal investment by the market. Changing the price cap or capacity payment affects investment only in peak generation plant, with no equilibrium impact on baseload or mid-merit plant. We obtain a rationale for a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality– even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load. In extensions, we show how increasing renewables penetration enhances the need for a capacity mechanism, and outline an optimal design of a strategic reserve with a discriminatory capacity payment.

Global gas markets feature two types of suppliers: piped gas and LNG exporters. Pipelines have a high degree of “asset specificity” : once built, they are physically bound to a particular route. LNG is transported by tanker, with a choice of export markets. Put simply: LNG is mobile, pipelines are not. This paper uses game-theoretic modelling to show how its commitment to serving a single market confers a strategic advantage on piped gas. By “overinvesting” in its own market, a pipeline exporter can induce LNG rivals to shift sales to their other markets. The model helps understand competition between Russian piped gas and Qatari LNG. It shows how Russia’s dependence on Europe can be good news for gas buyers, why these nonetheless strongly benefit from diversifying into LNG imports, and how the Herfindahl index of imports can mismeasure “supply security”. The paper also discusses Russia’s evolving gas export strategy, including gas deals with China.

We present an integrated framework to understand the emissions impact of unilateral overlapping policies within a carbon-pricing system. Internal carbon leak-age captures emissions displacement within the system (e.g., due to greater product imports from a neighbouring country). The waterbed effect captures the policy's interaction with the system's overall emissions cap. Current market rules in the reformed EU ETS, California's carbon market and RGGI feature punctured waterbeds that allow overlapping policies to affect aggregate emissions. We present simple formulae to estimate internal carbon leakage for different types of policy such as a carbon price floor (perhaps with a border tax adjustment), an energy efficiency program, and renewables support. The sign and magnitude of the climate benefit from an overlapping policy varies widely depending on its design, location and timing. Punctured waterbeds raise the stakes: well-designed overlapping policies can be much more climate-effective but others now backfire.

Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different generation technologies. We consider two policy instruments, a wholesale price cap and a capacity payment, and show which combinations of these instruments induce socially-optimal investment by the market. Changing the price cap or capacity payment affects investment only in peak generation plant, with no equilibrium impact on baseload or mid-merit plant. We obtain a rationale for a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality – even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load. In extensions, we show how increasing renewables penetration enhances the need for a capacity mechanism, and outline an optimal design of a strategic reserve with a discriminatory capacity payment.

We present an integrated framework to understand the emissions impact of unilateral overlapping policies within a carbon-pricing system. “Internal carbon leakage” captures emissions displacement within the system (e.g., due to greater product imports from a neighbouring country). The waterbed effect captures the policy's interaction with the system's overall emissions cap. Current market rules in the reformed EU ETS, California's carbon market and RGGI feature “punctured” waterbeds that allow overlapping policies to affect aggregate emissions. We present simple formulae to estimate internal carbon leakage for different types of policy such as a carbon price floor (perhaps with a border tax adjustment), an energy efficiency program, and renewables support. The sign and magnitude of the climate benefit from an overlapping policy varies widely depending on its design, location and timing. Punctured waterbeds raise the stakes: well-designed overlapping policies can be much more climate-effective but others now backfire.

The EU carbon price lies well below estimates of the social cost of carbon and “target-consistent” carbon prices needed to deliver ambitious targets such as the 40% reduction target for 2030. In light of this, the UK introduced a carbon price floor (CPF) for its electricity sector in 2013 and the new Dutch Government has recently made a similar commitment, while successive French Governments have called for an EU-wide CPF. This paper analyzes the impacts and design of a power-sector CPF, both at the EU and national level, using a political-economy approach. We find a good case for introducing such a price-based instrument into the EU ETS. We suggest that a CPF should be designed to “top up” the EUA price to €25-30/tCO2, rising annually at 3-5% above inflation, at least until 2030. We argue that the new EU Market Stability Reserve enhances the value of a CPF in terms of delivering climate benefits, and discuss the potential for a regional CPF in North-West Europe. We also review international policy experience with price floors (and ceilings).