Nicholas Rescher was no stranger to the philosophy of mathematics or the philosophy of science, but his interests ranged to general epistemology and to the metaphysics of abstract objects. His epistemology combined Aristotle's insight that there are important propositions that can be known but not demonstrated with a conception of how we might intuitively apprehend such propositions. With admirable brevity, he provides a sketch of intuition as a rational capacity; a conception of its deliverances-which are specific intuitions-that allows for intuitive self-knowledge as well as for knowledge of what is external to the mind; and pragmatic criteria for choice among axiom sets. This paper traces some of his thinking about these matters and suggests how he successfully combines mathematical realism with a pragmatic theory of axiom choice in mathematics and theory choice in empirical science.

Nicholas Rescher was no stranger to the philosophy of mathematics or the philosophy of science, but his interests ranged to general epistemology and to the metaphysics of abstract objects. His epistemology combined Aristotle's insight that there are important propositions that can be known but not demonstrated with a conception of how we might intuitively apprehend such propositions. With admirable brevity, he provides a sketch of intuition as a rational capacity; a conception of its deliverances—which are specific intuitions—that allows for intuitive self-knowledge as well as for knowledge of what is external to the mind; and pragmatic criteria for choice among axiom sets. This paper traces some of his thinking about these matters and suggests how he successfully combines mathematical realism with a pragmatic theory of axiom choice in mathematics and theory choice in empirical science.

Intuitions are sometimes conceived as intellectual perceptions. They share with physical perceptions being direct and, in that way, non-inferential. Contemporary epistemologists tend to consider all knowledge dependent in some way on perception but not as requiring countenancing abstract objects. We do, however, speak of seeing truths of logic and mathematics, even if we do not view the abstracta they apparently concern as in the causal order. How, then, is knowing them possible if, as is quite plausible, knowledge depends on a causal connection between objects known and beliefs constituting knowledge of them? Much language concerning abstracta-using "seeing", "grasping", "perceiving", and the like-invites comparing the apprehension of abstract entities with the perception of concrete entities. How much like perception of the physical is apprehension of the abstract? And can an account of perception encompass both? Might intuition, taken as apprehension in the way W. D. Ross did, be a kind of intellectual perception and, if so, must there be a causal element in it after all? This paper draws on an overall account of perception to frame a theory that provides for an ontology applicable to perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and knowledge of the normative.

This paper is a critical study of Amir Saemi’s Morality and Religion in Islamic Moral Thought and Beyond: A New Problem of Evil. This book identifies and enhances resources available to conscientious Muslims for resolving normative conflicts. Saemi focuses particularly on tensions between, on the one hand, Scriptural commands and permissions and, on the other, deliverances of moral reflection. This paper first notes some representative ideas Saemi brings out from among the many classic Islamic philosophers and theologians he explicates. It then indicates the apparently central elements in his own resolution of some major conflicts faced by conscientious Muslims. These conflicts center on the issues of how to interpret theologically authoritative testimony; how, in doing so, to weight the reliability of competent human reflection; and how to balance the requirements of piety with the constraints of conscientious believers. The paper concludes with a proposal that respects the piety Saemi hopes to accommodate and the sound moral standards of conduct that, despite their tension with commands and permissions widely considered theologically binding, he argues are reasonable for conscientious Muslims.

Is any justification absolutely indefeasible? This cannot be determined without a good understanding of what defeasibility is. There are two central cases: overriding and undermining. If undermining is complete, there was no real justification to begin with, whereas overridden justification can be simply weaker than the overriding element(s). This paper explores both kinds of defeasibility and appraises the case that certain kinds of justification are overridable but not underminable. This is a quite general thesis, and the paper argues that if we take seriously the analogy between justification in the realm of belief-the traditional focus of epistemology-and justification in the practical realm-the traditional focus of moral philosophy-we can see a stronger case for the existence of certain indefeasible sources of justification.

Abstract This chapter has two main aims. First, it clarifies both Ross’s ethical intuitionism and the notions of intuition and intuitionism in ethics generally—both are variously conceived, and sometimes misconceived, in ethical literature. Second, it extends Ross’s moral theory in ways that show its strength and wide applicability in ethics, theoretical and applied. Six elements in Ross’s theory in The Right and the Good (1930) are presented and briefly assessed: the increasingly important notion of prima facie duty; the kindred concept of overall duty—“duty proper,” in one phrase Ross uses for the prevailing (“final”) duty one has when conflicting prima facie duties are accounted for; the notion—important for most intuitionists—of self-evidence; Ross’s account of intrinsic value and its relation to duty; the nature and scope of beneficence, a concept important for Ross and indeed any comprehensive ethics; and finally, Ross’s metaphysics, particularly its relation to ethical naturalism.

Abstract Belonging to a religion that has an ethic—as is usual with full-blooded religions—inclines the faithful in the religion to want their culture, government, and laws to accord with their religiously approved ethical standards. The very same people who want this, however, would resist any pressures from some other religion to impose its standards by establishing its own pattern of laws or public policies. Our founders saw this and, in contrast with many European countries, built separation of church and state into the Constitution. This essay describes a range of constitutional and legal patterns and sets the stage for later essays which propose ways to balance religious sociopolitical aspirations with democratic tolerance.

Abstract Many modern nations view healthcare as a human right that government must uphold, but Americans differ on that claim, and America does not use a single-payer healthcare system. Diverse private institutions provide much of its healthcare. Regulating healthcare, however, does not require providing it, and there are disagreements about governmental regulations, as with covid vaccines, and about government restrictions, as with abortion. This essay considers risk assessment and religious exemptions in vaccine regulation, in providing medical services, and in restricting abortion. The essay considers the appropriate language for resolution, the impact of religion and cultural patterns on discourse concerning abortion and euthanasia, and how a democracy should determine when persons appear in human development.

Abstract This book discusses how Christianity as a religion—or any religion—can coexist in harmony with democracy as an American ideal that separates church and state. The notion of a religion is complex and elastic; the notion of democracy is complex and contested. Both notions are described, and both are considered in contemporary America viewed through our founding documents, our ideals of religious liberty and social justice, and our acute day-to-day problems. Public education, business, and healthcare are all beset by the culture wars—from perceived hostility to religion in schools, to vaccine resistance, to refusing to provide religiously objectionable services, to abortion. The book reflects Audi’s decades of work on religion and politics, ethics, and philosophy of religion, but it’s written in plain language. It explains why America separates church and state, how this can benefit both religious and secular citizens, why there is nevertheless controversy about what this means, and how opposed religious and secular people can peaceably resolve differences. The main points are clarified by a multitude of cases spanning issues in schooling, doing business, and providing medical care. The book proposes standards for discussing and resolving these issues. Its final essay addresses the question whether, within those standards, America can be Christian—or religious at all—in a way that integrates religious liberty with democratic law-making and expands the common ground we need to overcome the cultural fragmentation that besets America.

Abstract Regardless of our standards for non-linguistic behavior, much that we do is done in the prevailing language we live with, say English. But there are good and bad ways to use language, and it is difficult to use it well in public discourse on controversial matters. Can we avoid misleading labels and over-simple one-liners? Can we speak with mutual respect without stumbling over matters of political correctness? Can we simplify without stereotyping? Can we use our voices and style our body language to enhance understanding and defuse tension? This essay discusses these questions and sketches various standards for achieving mutual understanding and, sometimes, thereby gaining persuasiveness.

Abstract This essay stresses that government works through individuals who have roles within it. Healthcare institutions similarly act through their role-players, and ethics imposes responsibilities on individuals both as such and as organizational role-players. Government should protect individuals, and that requires appraising risks, which in turn requires a view of the good and the bad. Judges and legislators in particular must make such value judgments, and in the spirit of Do unto others they must avoid letting their religious convictions rule them in ways they would reject if imposed by religious convictions of others. This essay develops an ethics of democratic citizenship and proposes broad standards for ascertaining common ground on which all rational citizens can stand.