We compare patterns of electoral rule choice in two periods, that following the First World War in Western Europe and that following the end of the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe. Heretofore, scholars have studied these two instances of electoral rule choice separately and have come to quite different conclusions about the implications of strategic behavior of the relevant actors. In the case of early 20th Century Western Europe, Rokkan and later Boix cast the choice of electoral rules as a result of coordinated strategic behavior by established parties in reaction to increasing support for new parties of the left. In contrast, recent analyses of the post-Cold War period in Central and Eastern Europe suggest that while all political actors acted strategically, an extreme lack of information prevented them from making choices that served their self-interest in the long run. Indeed, many party leaders supported electoral rules that later eliminated them from politics. We argue that uncertainty was a major factor in both periods of electoral rule design, so that political elites often made serious miscalculations of the effect of particular electoral rules on their own future success. A reanalysis of the Boix data suggests that efforts to explain the choice of electoral rules as a coordinated response by established parties to electoral threat must be viewed with skepticism, since uncertainty made success or failure almost impossible to predict. Instead, any strategic behavior was short-term at best, reflecting the largest party's most recent experience in the preceding election.

Is political behavior shaped by culture or institutions? The potato famines of the nineteenth century were long attributed to Irish indolence. The Stalinist system was blamed on a Russian proclivity for autocracy. Muslim men have been accused of an inclination to terrorism. Is political behavior really the result of the cultural environment, or does the vast range of human political action stem more from institutional and structural constraints? This important new book carefully examines the role of institutions and civic culture in the establishment of political norms. Authors Jackman and Miller methodically refute the Weberian cultural theory of politics and build in its place a persuasive case for the ways in which institutions shape the political behavior of ordinary citizens. Their rigorous examination of grassroots electoral participation reveals no evidence for even a residual effect of cultural values on political behavior, but instead provides consistent support for the institutional view. Before Norms speaks to urgent debates among political scientists and sociologists over the origins of individual political behavior, and is recommended for students and scholars of those fields.

Why is government corruption more pervasive in some societies than in others? In this article we examine public choice explanations that attribute corruption to a lack of competition in either political or economic arenas or both. The principal part of our analysis draws on recently-published data about levels of corruption for a broad cross-section of countries reported for the early 1980s. We supplement this with an additional analysis of a second dataset on corruption measured during the late 1980s. Our analyses confirm that political competition affects level of corruption, but this effect is nonlinear. Corruption is typically lower in dictatorships than in countries that have partially democratized. But once past a threshold, democratic practices inhibit corruption. However, we obtained mixed results with respect to the relationship of economic competition and corruption: government size does not systematically affect corruption, but membership of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries, (OPEC) does. Finally, corruption is more pervasive in low-income countries which tend to underpay public sector employees.

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Explores the ways states build political capacity; discusses how states learn to resolve conflict politically rather than violently

An early debate in the empirical study of political democracy concerned the measurement of democracy. Initial work employed dichotomous indicators and incorporated stability into political democracy measures. Evidence accumulated showing that this approach could adversely affect analyses, particularly in the study of income inequality. Despite this, some recent studies have renewed the flawed practices. We draw upon recent work to highlight the confusion that can result when democracy and stability are confounded and the problems with dichotomous indicators. We propose that stability is analytically distinct from political democracy and should be treated as such empirically, and we suggest ways to estimate incremental effects of political democracy. We further argue that political democracy is continuous and that measures of it should reflect this. It is important that the measurement history of this construct not repeat itself.

Differences in voter turnout among industrial democracies are a function of political institutions and electoral law. Specifically, the presence of nationally competitive electoral districts provides incentives for parties and candidates to mobilize voters everywhere, thereby increasing turnout. Disproportionality in the translation of votes into legislative seats provides a disincentive to voting, which lowers turnout. Multipartyism assigns elections a less decisive role in government formation, depressing turnout. By generating more decisive governments, unicameralism provides a clearer link between elections and legislation, increasing turnout. Finally, mandatory voting laws produce a disincentive to not vote. Empirical analyses of average voter-turnout levels in the 1970s and 1960s across 19 democracies are consistent with these expectations, although Switzerland and the United States appear to be outliers. The results have major implications for the way we interpret national differences in voter-turnout rates.

Previous articleNext article No AccessCommentary and DebateComment on Hodge on Class AwarenessMary R. Jackman, and Robert W. JackmanMary R. Jackman Search for more articles by this author , and Robert W. Jackman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 93, Number 2Sep., 1987 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/228753 Views: 5Total views on this site Copyright 1987 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

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Estimates of the extent to which Third World countries have experienced slower rates of growth than those in the industrialized West since i960 indicate a weak relation between initial wealth and subsequent economic growth that follows an inverted U-shape pattern: while the lowest growth rates are found among the poorest countries of the Third World, the highest growth rates are found not in the industrialized West, but in the wealthiest Third World countries. Drawing on contending arguments associated with modernization and dependency perspectives, the relationship between foreign investment and growth within the Third World is examined. Results undermine the idea that foreign investment inhibits growth, suggesting instead that flows of foreign investment may facilitate growth, especially among the initially wealthier countries of the Third World.

Journal Article Racial Inequalities in Home Ownership Get access Mary R. Jackman, Mary R. Jackman University of Michigan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert W. Jackman Robert W. Jackman Michigan State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Social Forces, Volume 58, Issue 4, June 1980, Pages 1221–1234, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/58.4.1221 Published: 01 June 1980