LRIT is a requirement for the following on international voyages, all passenger ships, cargo ships over 300 tons, and mobile offshore drilling units. A ship is required to transmit its ship identity, location and date and time of its position, which is reported automatically to its flag administration at least four times a day or on demand. Data through the LRIT is available only to recipients who are entitled to receive such data. These include contracting governments so that they receive information about ships, which have indicated their intention to enter a port facility or a place under their jurisdiction and contracting governments to receive information about ships navigating with a distance of 1000 nautical miles from the coast, and also the SAR and persons

This chapter addresses four major implications of climate change for national security and defence forces, especially navies. First, there is the need for militaries to do what they can to reduce their own impact on causes of climate change by reducing greenhouse emissions from their vehicles, ships and aircraft, and by introducing greater use of renewable energy. Second, climate change will impact on the roles and missions of military forces. They will be called upon to play a greater and even more routine role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, both domestically and overseas. Third, climate change acts as a ‘threat multiplier’ by exacerbating existing risks caused by social, economic and/or political tensions. It has the potential to contribute to instability and conflict even in situations not previously considered at risk. Last, there is the impact on defence infrastructure, activities and preparedness through sea-level rise, extreme heat, storm surges and drought. However, climate change also has a positive consequence for defence forces by providing a useful vehicle for promoting cooperation between defence forces, even between those which might otherwise see each other as adversaries.

Over recent years, maritime disputes have been increasingly viewed as a microcosm of Great Power competition. Some describe conflict in the seas as a potential flashpoint or arena for kinetic clashes between the Great Powers as they seek to either defend their visions of freedom of navigation or extend their security jurisdiction seaward. This timely book provides a valuable and thought-provoking overview of the different perspectives held by Asia-Pacific states in relation to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and maritime freedom of navigation. The author, Sam Bateman, is a well-known Australian expert on maritime security. Those familiar with Bateman’s work will recognize themes and observations from his earlier writings, but it is valuable to see his ideas crystallized into a broader analysis of the political and legal factors influencing legal interpretations of freedom of navigation in the Asia Pacific. Interestingly, the book steers clear of the politically loaded term “Indo-Pacific”. Bateman explains that he has used the term Asia Pacific because of its focus on East Asia and the Western Pacific, although given the interconnectedness of the seas, the Indian Ocean is not entirely neglected. Bateman also employs the term “freedoms” rather than the more conventional “freedom” of navigation. This framing is useful in a number of ways. First, it allows for the distinction between commercial shipping interests and military transit. While these two dimensions of navigation are often conflated in political rhetoric, the difference is at the heart of the varying maritime strategies and viewpoints advanced by regional states. While most states in the Asia Pacific agree on the definition of freedom of navigation for commerce, the real disagreement relates to the freedoms of warships, particularly in terms of where they can transit and the types of activities they can undertake in distinct maritime zones. Second, the book is usefully structured around legal regimes. The second chapter examines different views on navigational regimes, while the third focuses on exclusive economic zone (EEZ) issues. This reviewer found

Asia is at a dangerous moment. China is rising fast. Young, reckless North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un is engaging in territorial spats with the US president over nuclear missiles. Japan's nationalist government is remilitarising, throwing off the constitutional constraints imposed at the end of World War II. Washington is charting a different course, too- Donald Trump is the first US president to have contact with Taiwanese leaders since the 1970s, and also the first to edge his finger so firmly towards the nuclear button over North Korea. The doomsday clock has reached two minutes to midnight, as the possibility of global catastrophe looms ever closer. In this revelatory analysis, strategic expert Brendan Taylor examines the four Asian flashpoints that are most likely to erupt in sudden and violent conflict- the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. He argues that crisis can only be averted by understanding the dynamics of these global hotspots and the complex interrelations between them. Drawing on history, contemporary sources and in-depth reports to weave an analysis both pertinent and chilling, Taylor asks what the world's major powers can do to avoid an eruption of war -- and what role Australia, as both a force in this region and a historical ally of the United States, can play to change the course of this otherwise disastrous history.

Les sentiments anti-chinois sont devenus une caractéristique commune du discours des nations occidentale. Menés par les Etats-Unis et les think tanks américains, ces sentiments sont à présent propagés parmi les amis et alliés de Washington. La Chine est fréquemment désignée comme ne respectant les règles de l’ordre international, à travers par exemple les supposées restrictions sur les libertés de navigation ainsi que sur son incapacité à accepter les décisions du Tribunal arbitral dans l’affaire entre elle et les Philippines en mer de Chine méridionale. Cet acharnement sur la Chine nourrit le manque de confiance. Mais, à l’exception du Vietnam, les nations sud-est asiatiques n’ont jusqu’ici pas adopté de ligne anti-chinoise.

extract] There is nothing new about maritime crime in Southeast Asia. It has a long history, and the maritime criminals of today are mainly descendants of the marauders, pirates, and bandits of yesteryear. However, changes to the extent and nature of maritime crime have occurred over the years. The decline in fish stocks and loss of access to traditional fishing grounds, along with general economic problems, have led to unemployment and loss of income in coastal villages throughout the region. This has, in turn, forced some villagers to turn to piracy, sea robbery, and other forms of maritime crime. However, these villagers are often just "foot soldiers" organized by opportunistic businessmen or criminal gangs.

The South China Sea Disputes, pp. 125-128 (2017) No AccessCHAPTER 2.7: Cooperation or Trust: What Comes First in the South China Sea?Sam BatemanSam Batemanhttps://doi.org/10.1142/9789814704984_0029Cited by:0 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Abstract: The following sections are included: SYNOPSIS COMMENTARY China's Position Reversing the Order of Cooperation and Trust Way Forward: Back to Basics? FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails The South China Sea DisputesMetrics History PDF download

This paper addresses developments following the final arbitration ruling from The Hague, issued in July 2016, on the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines. It considers the impact on the region of U.S. responses to the ruling and analyzes Washington's interests in the South China Sea: to preserve a rules-based order, support friends and allies, and preserve freedoms of navigation. However, pursuit of these interests can have an adverse impact on relations between the U.S and China, and affect the ability of these major powers to deal with the bigger issues of North Korea and Taiwan. Calls for the Trump Administration to take a stronger stand in the South China Sea in pursuit of these interests have not always been well received in the region. As a consequence, Southeast Asian countries are increasingly hedging against further deterioration in China-U.S. relations. The paper concludes that rather than acting more strongly against China in the South China Sea, there would be benefit in the U.S. taking a more constructive role by supporting current efforts towards better cooperation between the littoral countries.

The South China Sea Disputes, pp. 419-422 (2017) No AccessCHAPTER 5.9: Good Fences or Good Neighbours: Implications for Maritime BoundariesSam BatemanSam Batemanhttps://doi.org/10.1142/9789814704984_0094Cited by:0 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Abstract: The following sections are included: SYNOPSIS COMMENTARY Good Fences or Good Neighbours? Islands and Rocks Complications Need for Changed Mindsets FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails The South China Sea DisputesMetrics History PDF download

This book is the first volume of a new series on Maritime cooperation in East Asia launched by the Brill publishing house. The series is designed to serve as a platform to promote East Asian mariti...

The ruling from the arbitral tribunal dealing with the case between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea provides opportunities for fresh approaches to building cooperation for managing the sea and activities within it. This cooperation is both a necessity and an obligation of the countries bordering the sea. However, obstacles remain, particularly the lack of trust between the various stakeholders in the sea and the way in which important areas for cooperation, such as fisheries management, environmental protection and marine scientific research, have been politicised to the extent that even cooperation in these areas cannot proceed without greater strategic trust. The objective of this paper is to put forward a set of policy implications from the ruling that might overcome these obstacles and allow the necessary cooperation to proceed despite the lack of strategic trust.