In a short-term longitudinal study, stories told about novel creatures conveyed information varying in its capability for differentiating. Depending on the context, a bodily feature could be functionally undifferentiated (FUF), meaning that its subtypes (e.g., eyes of two forms) shared a generic function (“seeing”), or functionally differentiated (FDF), meaning that each subtype’s function was unique to it (e.g., only a “hooded eye” could “see in a sandstorm”). 5- to 6-year-olds who heard 8 stories, but not those who heard only 4, cited FDFs more than FUFs in a pair-justification test of judged similarity; and their delayed recall of specific story events was greater when FDFs rather than FUFs were involved. In the absence of direct instruction, young children show sensitivity to the degree of differentiation afforded by feature-function relations.

Sixty-five children between the ages of 3 and 6 years of age were tested on their recollection of changed impressions. It was found that impressions updated with determinate information were easier to recall than impressions updated with indeterminate information; impressions changed when trickery was involved were easier to recall than impressions changed when it was not; and although younger children recalled less than older ones did, overall, the effects of informativeness and trickery on recall were similar in both age groups. These findings cannot be accounted for fully by the proposal that younger children have more difficulty than older ones in representing 1 item in 2 different ways simultaneously. Instead, they support the argument that children's degree of success in recalling outdated impressions depends on the means available to distinguish an initial from an updated impression and order the 2 correctly with respect to each other, temporally. This interpretation of the findings draws attention to an aspect of early cognitive development that entails temporal memory processes and is implicated in performance on a variety of tasks.

This study was designed to test whether calling to mind an initial belief and presenting information that challenges that belief affects the extent to which preschoolers will modify it. The belief that was challenged in a controlled demonstration concerns the effect of the size of an object on its sinking speed (holding weight constant). In addition, children's belief about the effect of weight on sinking speed (holding size constant) was examined, a belief that was confirmed in a demonstration. The final belief about size for those who received nothing but empirical demonstrations was less likely to be compatible with the demonstration than the final belief of those in two other conditions. Children in the other conditions were given the opportunity in the context of interviews to form expectations about how size and weight separately relate to sinking speed, in addition to receiving the demonstrations. An interview either directly preceded the demonstration for the variable concerned (coordinated sequence) or did not (uncoordinated sequence). The tendency for the final belief about size to be compatible with the demonstration was related more strongly to age in the condition with an uncoordinated sequence than in either of the other conditions. Some children among those whose final belief about the effect of size on sinking speed was compatible with the demonstration also refined their belief about the effect of weight, suggesting that these two beliefs may cohere as a system. These findings show that a relatively short experimental procedure can be an effective means of bringing about some refinement of a young child's beliefs.

This study asks whether knowledge of the functional properties of a referent for a new name influences children's first guesses about whether that name refers to an object or a substance. Recent work on children's categorization suggests that children differentiate concrete objects from nonsolid substances and that their initial hypotheses about the meanings of new words are affected by this knowledge of ontological categories. In addition, some research has suggested that children approach new words with a set of biases that constrain the possible meanings of those words. Most of this work has presented children with new names in the absence of explicit information about the functional characteristics of new referents. Our hypothesis was that if children are shown the functional properties of referents, they should use that information in making their first guesses about the meanings of new words. Seventy-two 3- and 4-year-olds were shown new items with new names and were tested on their extension of each new name either to a similarly shaped item made of a different material or to a differently shaped item made of the same material. Some subjects were shown a ''shape-linked'' function, some a ''substance-linked'' function, and some no function at all. One third of the subjects heard the new names presented with count syntax, one third with mass syntax, and one third with neutral syntax. Results suggest that children do not rely on a single source of information in extending new names, but, rather, draw on various kinds of information, including the perceptual characteristics of the entities themselves and the syntax of the input.

seventh century Bc; one to Frederick II, then King of Sicily, in the thirteenth century AD; and one to James IV, King of Scotland, in the fifteenth century AD. There is a lack of reliable contemporary testimony, and accounts of these experiments could be fabulous, invented for reasons either jocular or malicious. Nevertheless, the experiment has been done, by the Moghul Emperor Akbar in India in the sixteenth century AD. Three apparently reliable contemporary accounts can be adduced. The outcome of the experiment, though, is obscure.

British Journal of Developmental PsychologyVolume 6, Issue 4 p. 372-375 Landmarks and the coordination and integration of spatial information Herbert L. Pick Jr., Herbert L. Pick Jr. Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USASearch for more papers by this authorDaniel R. Montello, Daniel R. Montello Arizona State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorSusan C. Somerville, Susan C. Somerville Arizona State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Herbert L. Pick Jr., Herbert L. Pick Jr. Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USASearch for more papers by this authorDaniel R. Montello, Daniel R. Montello Arizona State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorSusan C. Somerville, Susan C. Somerville Arizona State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: November 1988 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835X.1988.tb01111.xCitations: 9AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume6, Issue4November 1988Pages 372-375 RelatedInformation

Three experiments showed that starting at about 4 years of age children take into account alternative possibilities in reasoning about the location of a hidden object. The children had to infer from event sequences they observed which of several locations might contain a hidden toy and which locations definitely could not. In Experiment 1, there were always two possible places (in an array of four), and 4- and 6-year-old children were quite successful in identifying the two possible locations. In Experiment 2, the number of possibilities varied from one to three (in an array of six), and 4- and 6-year-olds appropriately adjusted the number of locations they chose as the number of possibilities varied, indicating that they could determine how many possibilities were compatible with information they had. In addition, they chose the correct locations (which were always ones the experimenter had visited) over incorrect locations that the experimenter had also visited and over incorrect locations that she had not visited at all. Experiment 3 extended the research to 2 1 2 -, 3-, and 4-year-old children, using an analog of Sperling's partial report technique to evaluate knowledge of alternative possibilities from single searches. Even the 2 1 2 - year-olds showed some logical reasoning, but only the 4-year-olds gave evidence of considering more than one possibility.

WELLMAN, HENRY M.; SOMERVILLE, SUSAN C.; REVELLE, GLENDA L.; HAAKE, ROBERT J.; and SOPHIAN , CATHERINE. The Development of Comprehensive Search Skills. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1984, 55, 472-481. 2 studies of young children's comprehensive search skills are reported. The first examined 2Y2-, 3Y2-, and 4Y2-year-olds' ability to conduct nonredundant comprehensive searches of small lidded trash cans. The 2Y2-year-olds achieved comprehensive search only in a lids-open condition, where lids of the cans automatically stayed open (once searched), creating an external record of which locations had been searched. The 3/2-year-olds and 4Y2-year-olds were more able to search comprehensively and nonredundantly in a variety of conditions. The second study examined 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' ability to find 5 Easter eggs hidden on a large playground. Eggs were hidden in 2 clusters as the child watched-3 eggs on 1 side of the playground, 2 on the other. Children did not minimize distance in their search paths for finding the eggs. However, they did minimize traverses of the playground, that is, they tended to find all eggs in 1 cluster before searching in the other. Results were discussed in relation to a 3-stage description of the development of comprehensive search strategies where comprehensive search develops out of (a) early forms of search persistence, followed by (b) comprehensive search based on sighting procedures, and finally (c) planned efficient searches.

Thirty‐two 3 and 32 4‐year‐olds were tested on two tasks which required them to infer the location of a concealed object. In the hiding tusk the child watched while an object was hidden and then attempted to find it; in the finding tusk the child watched while one object was found and then attempted to find a duplicate of it in the same place. Each sequence of events that the child watched ruled out two of the four locations in a linear array as possible hiding places for the object, but did not specify which of the remaining two contained it.The children did use the information conveyed by the sequences of events to decide where to search. Older children generally did better than younger children both in their first choices and in their second choices when the first, although correct, did not locate the object. However, neither age group made the correct choice of a second location consistently. This suggested that the children encountered mnemonic or logical difficulties, or both, because of the fact that two locations were equally compatible with a given sequence of events.

Summary Preschool children have been shown to engage in deliberate memory procedures, but can toddlers? Mothers were instructed to present deliberate reminding tasks (e.g., "Remind me to get milk at the store") to their 2-, 3-and 4-year-olds (10 each), in the course of their everyday activities. Unprompted deliberate reminding of high-interest tasks was frequent, both for short (five minute) and long (four- to eight-hour) delays. Even two-year-olds remembered such tasks 80% of the time. The results indicate an early development of a deliberate set to remember in toddlers.

CULTICE, JOAN C.; SOMERVILLE, SUSAN C.; and WELLMAN, HENRY M. Preschoolers' Memory Monitoring: Feeling-of-Knowing Judgments. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1983, 54, 1480-1486. The memory-monitoring abilities of 4and 5-year-olds were investigated using a recall-failure, judgment, recognition sequence involving personal names. Children were shown color photographs of other children and adults, varying in familiarity, and asked initially to recall their names. Feeling-of-knowing judgments and judgments about whether the child had seen the person were obtained in all cases where naming failed. Both types of judgment were found to predict subsequent recognition performance, indicating accurate memory monitoring. Signal detection analyses revealed sensitivity and lack of bias in the monitoring activities of both age groups. These results demonstrated that preschoolers possess basic monitoring abilities that are important for the development of subsequent skills such as the allocation of mnemonic effort.

ion of Individual Styles from the Drawings of Five-Year-Old Children Jeffrey L. Hartley, Susan C. Somerville, Daniela von Cziesch Jensen, and Cindy C. Eliefja Arizona State University HARTLEY, JEFFREY L.; SOMERVILLE, SUSAN C.; JENSEN, DANIELA VON CZIESCH; and ELIEFJA, CINDY C. Abstraction of Individual Styles from the Drawings of Five-Year-Old Children. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1982, 53, 1193-1214. 3 experiments investigated whether 5-year-old children exhibit individual artistic styles. Lay adults judged, or learned to classify, representative sets of drawings obtained from 3 children in 2 collection periods, 9 months apart. In experiment 1, adults' similarity ratings of pairs of drawings indicated that there was some cohesiveness in the sets of same-artist drawings. Experiments 2 and 3 examined adults' ability to learn the children's styles using a category abstraction paradigm. evidence obtained for 2 of the 3 children was clear cut. Adults who learned to classify 6 or 9 (but not 3) exemplars, drawn by these children in the first collection period, were able to recognize new exemplars from both the same and the later collection periods. They were also able to select appropriate, abstract descriptions of these children's styles from a list. evidence was less convincing, in all respects, for recognition of the third child's style. Overall, these studies provided experimental support for the notion that young children possess recognizable styles. results were consistent with a conceptualization of artistic styles as ill-defined concepts. Artistic is an elusive quality. It cannot defined by reference to a set of critical features (Hartley & Homa 1981) or by the seductively simple notion that is the rather than the of creative expression (Finch 1974; Goodman 1978). Nevertheless, the concept of a characteristic of an individual artist or of a group of artists is used universally in the appreciation of art. Devotees, caricaturists, mimics, and critics of a given artist or school possess information about which enables them, among other things, to recognize previously unseen in that style. fact that recognized adult artists possess individual styles has been demonstrated experimentally (Hartley & Homa 1981; Tighe 1968; Walk 1967; Walk, Karusaitis, Lebowitz, & Falbo 1971). Lay adults possess distinctive handwriting styles (Indow, Kobayashi, & Dewa 1975) and also, presumably, characteristic painting or drawing styles. At what age do the drawings of a budding artist acquire enough consistency and individuality to establish a recognizable style? It has been suggested that children as young as 5 exhibit individual styles (Gardner 1980; Harris 1950; Lark-Horovitz, Lewis, & Luca 1973; Mendelowitz 1963). Some have claimed, furthermore, that the scribbles of much younger children are also distinguishable (Schaefer-Simmern 1976). These claims have been based on detailed inspection of the children's drawings for such aspects as composition, use of color, attention to shape and detail, and the pattern or manner of execution. question of whether and on what grounds young children might said to possess individual artistic styles was the focus of the present studies. Traditional investigations of children's art have relied on one or more expert adults judging drawings by a large number of children or judging many drawings by order of the first two authors' names was determined by the toss of a coin since each contributed equally to the research. This research was supported by a faculty grant-in-aid to the second author from Arizona State University. We are grateful to the director of the Child Study Laboratory, Kathleen Ritchie, for her assistance and to the individual children and parents who cooperated with our requests for drawings. Thanks are expressed to Rosann Messana, Gary Graham, Vicky Johnson, and Alexis Pie for their help in running subjects and compiling data. We would also like to thank Robert J. Sternberg and an anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. Requests for reprints should sent to either Susan C. Somerville, Psychology Department, Arizona State University, rempe, Arizona 85287, or Jeffrey L. Hartley, Psychology Department, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine 04011. [Child Development, 1982, 53, 1193-1214. @ 1982 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc. All rights reserved. 0009-3920/82/5305-0021$01.00] This content downloaded from 157.55.39.208 on Fri, 14 Oct 2016 04:17:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1194 Child Development one or more children well known to them (e.g., Gardner 1980; Lark-Horovitz et al. 1973; Mendelowitz 1963). present studies adopted a different approach. Initially, representative sets of drawings were obtained from three 5-yearolds. Then lay adults, who had no information about the children, made judgments about the drawings or were tested on their ability to learn to classify drawings by artist. experimental procedures examined children's artistic styles as perceived by many lay adults. They were not designed to provide direct information about the children's graphic abilities or communicative intentions. Overall, developmental psychologists have paid comparatively little attention to artistic in their investigations of children's drawings. Instead the emphasis has been on drawings as indicators of intellectual ability (Goodenough & Harris 1950; Harris 1963), of spatial concepts (Phillips, Hobbs, & Pratt 1978; Piaget & Inhelder 1967), or of more general aspects of the development of representational skills (Freeman 1980; Goodnow 1977; Kellogg 1969). Developmental discussions of artistic typically have dealt with changes common to all children (e.g., Kellogg 1969; Richards & Ross 1967) or with very specific issues such as sex-role stereotyping (Lott 1979) or children's tendencies to use archaic versus traditional styles (Simon 1976). Recently, however, a more comprehensive analysis of artistic development has been provided by Gardner (1973, 1980). He defined an artist as .. an individual who has gained sufficient skill in the use of a medium to able to communicate through the creation of a symbolic object (Gardner 1973, p. 25). One major developmental prerequisite for artistic development is thus the capacity to create and appreciate symbols, a capacity attained in the infant's second year (Piaget 1951, 1954). From a careful analysis of the development of artistic skills in a variety of media, Gardner (1973, 1980) concluded that, with some qualifications, it is reasonable to consider the young child an artist. For drawings, in particular, there is abundant evidence that 3-year-old children employ graphic activity to represent experience, and there are also signs of these representational skills in the preceding 12-18 months (Gardner 1980; Piaget & Inhelder 1967). Furthermore, the basic elements and rules for drawing are progressively mastered in the fourth and fifth years (Freeman 1980; Goodnow 1977; Kellogg 1969). According to Gardner (1980), the real flowering of the child's art is between 5 and 7 years: The 5to 7-year-old has achieved some formal aspects of drawing-a sense of balance, harmony, composition-as well as an appreciation of the fact that drawing may used to represent aspects of the world (p. 218). What qualifications to this view are required? Young children make less deliberate and less conventional attempts to convey meaning in their art than adults. They are also relatively uninclined (perhaps unable) to assess the effectiveness of their efforts in this regard. Thus the 3to 7-year-old may understand the representational potential of graphic work but will not aware of the communicative traditions and idioms known to an older child or adult. For reasons similar to these, Gardner (1980) suggested that the 5to 7-year-old child is capable of only first-draft artistry rather than the directed artistry of an adult. Although there are clearly limitations to the artistic achievements of a young child, these in no way preclude the possibility that individual children possess characteristic and recognizable drawing styles. In what follows we provide a conceptual and empirical approach to the question of individual artistic styles in both children and adults. A Conceptual and Empirical Approach to Artistic Styles Although philosophers, artists, critics, and psychologists differ in their approaches to the definition of (e.g., Finch 1974; Gardner 1980; Goodman 1976, 1978; Hartley & Homa 1981), there is general agreement that (or technique), subject matter, and expression (or intended meaning) should all considered components of style. For example, Finch (1974) stated that style is any factor pertaining to form, subject, or meaning which is sufficiently constant in a group of art to establish a relationship among the works (p. 4). Similarly, Goodman (1978) argued that style comprises certain characteristic features both of what is said and of how it is said, both of subject and of wording, both of content and of form (p. 27). Of the three components of style, is often seen as the most reliable cue to an artist's identity. By themselves, . . . subject matter and meaning are usually inadequate gauges. . . Form usually betrays identifying characteristics-style-no matter what the subject and meaning may be (Finch 1974, p. 4). Goodman (1978) has also pointed out that . . not This content downloaded from 157.55.39.208 on Fri, 14 Oct 2016 04:17:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

A summary of memory-related quasi-naturalistic research is presented and the important features and requirements of using such an approach with toddlers is discussed.