Abstract Given its dependence on space-derived information and an increase in potential adversary threats to space assets, the United States has taken a number of steps in recent years to protect its national security interests in space. Most visibly, it created a distinct military service for space, the United States Space Force. This chapter considers US national space policy and the way in which it addresses deterrence in the space domain and describes measures to shape the international space environment in a manner conducive to US interests. While realism provides the context for understanding US competition with adversaries such as Russia and China in space, other theories can be more useful in understanding specific international engagements. These include complex interdependence with respect to like-minded allies and partners in space exploration, and constructivism with respect to the creation of international norms of behavior. As the chapter shows, this suggests analytical eclecticism as a pragmatic approach to understanding US international activities in space.

Theories of deterrence and geopolitics have been applied to space activities for many decades, with linkages to nuclear competition during the Cold War. Despite common usage in U.S. policy documents and statements, it is not always clear how the concepts of deterrence and geopolitics should be applied. This article reviews deterrence theory as applied to space, to include the challenge of China, and the increasing use of commercial space assets for military purposes. Both topics are of interest to policy-makers and hence their inclusion. This is followed by a discussion of geopolitics in space, to include the works of Everett C. Dolman, Daniel Deudney, and Bleddyn Bowen, as well as the nascent application of critical geopolitical perspectives to space. The article observes that the international approach being taken by the United States in space does not align with the theories of either Dolman or Deudney. On the other hand, current U.S. military space doctrine is consistent with the propositions of Bowen, with the U.S. Space Command focused on supporting terrestrial combatant commands as opposed to controlling the space domain per se. Applications of deterrence and geopolitics to cooperation and competition in space are necessarily grounded in material realities, e.g., geography, military forces, technologies, and economic power, but the beneficial development of space requires both State power and international constraints on that power. For the United States, and ideally all spacefaring States, the successful application of deterrence and geopolitics to the exploration and use of space would be a peaceful and stable space environment in which cooperation among likeminded States would flourish even as adversarial States continued to pursue their own, competing, interests in space.

The International Space Station (ISS) has been the largest and most visible international space cooperation project for decades. The program began in the 1980s during the Cold War, incorporated Russia after the end of the Cold War, and has sustained permanent human occupancy in low Earth orbit for over 20 years. Although political support among the partners appears solid, it is uncertain how many more years the Station will be able to operate technically. The operating costs of the Station for the United States and international partners are considerable and have been increasing as the facility ages. These costs impose a constraint on the willingness and ability of international partners to participate in new human exploration efforts, such as Artemis, the European Space Agency (ESA) Lunar Village concept, and the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) plans of China and Russia. Given the central importance of the ISS to international human spaceflight cooperation today, what are the possible alternative futures for crewed space missions in a post-ISS world? States and private sector actors could work to extend the ISS, participate in the Chinese Space Station, create multiple, smaller government and private human-tended platforms, focus on human missions to the Moon and Mars, or even cease participation in human space exploration altogether. This paper examines these alternatives futures, assesses the attractiveness and practicality of the alternatives to spacefaring states, and seeks to identify the key areas of technical, economic, and policy uncertainty that will shape the post-ISS era of human space exploration.

Space activities and infrastructure today are critical to international security and the global economy. The space domain is not, however, subject to sovereign control by international law. Like other shared domains, such as the high seas, the polar regions, and arguably cyberspace, space is a domain in which State and non-State actors interact beyond national borders. Given global dependence on space-derived information and an increase in potential adversary threats to space assets, States have taken a number of steps in recent years to protect their national interests in space. Despite its importance and increasing global attention, international cooperation and competition in space is a relatively under theorized topic in international relations. Conversely, international relations theories are not widely used in the development of United States (U.S.) national space policy and the practice of space diplomacy, from a U.S. perspective. The intent of this article is to address this rift between theory and policy by briefly describing major theories of international relations and where they can shed light on how and why States engage in cooperation and competition in space. The article addresses the major schools of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, with applications to space activity. No single theory fully describes the U.S. policy approach to international space activities. Different theories, applied to the same situation, can, however, provide useful perspectives to both theorists and policy-makers. This suggests the use of a mixed, pragmatic approach, referred to as “eclectic theorizing” in international relations literature, as a promising avenue for further research.

Given global dependence on space-derived information and an increase in potential adversary threats to space assets, States have taken a number of steps in recent years to protect their national interests in space. Theories of deterrence and geopolitics have been applied to space activities for many decades, going back to the linkages between space and nuclear competition in the Cold War. This article examines U.S. space policy and practice through the lenses of deterrence and geopolitics to shed light on how and why the United States engages in cooperation and competition in space. Deterrence and geopolitics in space share a common concern with human motivations, perceptions, fears, and desires, but with a difference of emphasis. In the case of deterrence, the focus is on influencing the mind of the adversary. For geopolitics in space, the minds of allies and partners are perhaps even more important to the behavior of States. The benefit of norms is not that they can, by themselves, prevent bad State behavior, but that they can strengthen coordinated responses from States that wish to uphold them. For the United States, and ideally all spacefaring States, the successful application of deterrence and geopolitics to the exploration and use of space would be a peaceful and stable space environment in which cooperation among likeminded States would flourish even as adversarial States continued to pursue their own, competing, interests in space.

The global community is threatened by several kinds of disorder, including regional instabilities on land and the high seas (e.g., Ukraine, South China Sea). In addition, developing Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities are creating new tensions in space. This article discusses similarities and differences between the maritime and space domains, governance, and how international cooperation in these domains could contribute to international stability. Current difficult questions related to the exercise of the right of self-defense in space are addressed with suggestions for future research. In light of the increasing importance and globalization of space activities, new norms of behavior in space need to be developed by like-minded national to create a more stable and secure international order.

The development of GPS and other GNSSs, such as the Russian GLONASS, the European Galileo, and China’s BeiDou, has resulted in new capabilities available for PNT in space. This paper reviews on-going efforts at NASA to implement U.S. PNT policy and engage international partners in the pursuit of compatibility and interoperability among these systems. The objective is to develop a multi-GNSS SSV to support space users between Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), and eventually into Cislunar space. Key international engagements include bilateral discussions, such as those that led to the 2004 U.S.-European Union Agreement on GPS-Galileo Cooperation, and on-going multilateral discussions at venues such the United Nations (UN) International Committee on GNSS (ICG) and the GNSS Provider’s Forum. Benefits to space users will include improved capabilities for on-board autonomous PNT, and better resilience to potential disruptions to GNSS signals.

The United States has been engaged in multiple activities to enhance international stability and ensure the sustainability of space activities. This includes multilateral activities within the United Nations such ash the “Group of Government Experts” to study transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) for outer space activities. The European Union has been leading talks on a possible international space code of conduct and the United States is supportive of the process. However, European efforts have not been successful in securing support from space powers such as India and Brazil, much less China and Russia. Codes and TCBMs cannot be a substitute for the capabilities necessary to deter potential adversaries and meet U.S. alliance commitments. In fact, the viability of any such codes may rely on the development of deterrence-related capabilities, for example space situational awareness to attribute hostile acts in space. The United States and its allies should take measures to improve the resilience of space systems across the spectrum of conflict. Improving resilience can consist of both “material” and “non-material” solutions. The former include measures such as hardening space and ground systems against physical and cyber attacks. The latter can include development of alternative means of mission performance, such as the use of allied or commercial systems.

Protecting Apollo sites is laudable. Making them U.S. National Parks is not.

Fifty years ago, the Space Age was not yet five years old hut the broad outlines of US interests were visible. The year 1962 saw the first US human orbital flight by John Glenn on a converted Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Telstar 1 demonstrated the first transatlantic television, telephone, and fax transmissions by an active satellite. The United Kingdom became the third country to operate a satellite with the US launch of Ariel 1. Later that year, both Telstar 1 and Ariel 1 were seriously damaged when the United States detonated a 1.4-megaton nuclear device 250 miles over the Pacific Ocean in what was titled the Starfish Prime test. The Glenn flight and the Starfish Prime test respectively represented the civil and military bookends of US interests that were to shape international, commercial, and scientific activities. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Fifty years later, the United States is facing new challenges and opportunities in integrating its civil, commercial, and national security interests in a dynamic global environment. Space activities today play critical roles in US national security, economic growth, and scientific achievements. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is an integral part of several critical infrastructures and enables functions ranging from survey and construction, to farming, finance, and air traffic management--not: to mention supporting US military forces worldwide. The International Space Station represents a unique collaborative partnership between the United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia. International cooperation, commerce, and international security discussions could be used to reinforce each other in ways that would advance US interests in the sustainability and security of military and civil activities. The past five years have seen the emergence of new threats to US activities, threats that are different from those of the Cold War and which have their own distinct dynamics. Some threats are intentional and others are accidental. In some cases, threats come from a known nation state while in others, it is impossible to attribute responsibility due to a lack of full space situational awareness to support intelligence needs. In 2007, without prior notification, China tested a high altitude anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) against one of its old weather satellites. This test created tens of thousands of pieces of orbital debris and increased the risk of collision and damage to many satellites operating in low Earth orbit, including the International Space Station, for many years. In 2009, there was an accidental collision over the Arctic between a defunct Russian Kosmos communications satellite and an active Iridium communications satellite that added even more orbital debris to low Earth orbit. North Korea, faced with multiple UN sanctions, has continued developing ballistic missile capabilities under the guise of peaceful launches. Iran continues to jam commercial satellite broadcasts in order to prevent foreign reports of domestic unrest from reaching its population. There have been reports of attempts at unauthorized access to US civil scientific satellites, e.g., Terra and Landsat in 2007 and 2008, but the source of these attempts has not been confirmed. Threats to the sustainability of activities today come not from a single superpower but from a much more diverse group of actors whose motivations can range from deliberate to ambiguous and even accidental. The global community is a dynamic one with new capabilities and new entrants. Europe is building its own version of GPS, titled Galileo, and has long been a leading supplier of international commercial launch services with its Ariane family of launch vehicles. China has flown several astronauts, becoming only the third country with independent human access to space. China is constructing a laboratory and has demonstrated unmanned rendezvous and docking operations in preparation for a fully manned station in 2020--about the time the International Space Station may be ending its operations. …

China has engaged in a steady, long-standing effort to build and strengthen its space capabilities, achieving progressively more ambitious milestones and staking its claim as a major space power. It is also increasingly engaging in cooperative efforts. A number of issues must be weighed, however, before the USA should consider any collaboration with it. These include the essentially military nature of China’s space program, the fact that China’s intentions in space and decision-making process are far from ‘transparent’, and the way it uses its space activities to pursue foreign policy goals. While the latter could be useful in, e.g., reducing tensions on the Korean peninsular through a space-services-for-giving-up-missiles tradeoff, and while there is scope for collaboration in space science missions, there are no compelling reasons for the USA to pursue cooperation in human spaceflight with China.

Mark Twain once said that "History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme."

With space now crucial to such a wide range of activities on Earth, the USA must ensure the sustainability of its efforts, a task that involves technological feasibility and political will. Near-term challenges include US human access to space and the Shuttle transition, funding NASA sufficiently in a time of recession, and rebuilding the country's space industrial base. Longer-term challenges will be better protecting the space environment (including the electromagnetic spectrum) from overcrowding and the effects of space weather and NEOs, and defining responsibilities for distributing climate change data and recognition of property rights for the commercial development of in-space resources. As an aid to dealing with these challenges the USA must ask itself whether there is a human future in space and seek to answer the question in the course of human and robotic exploration beyond Earth.