The fundamental changes in power supply and increasing decentralization require more active grid operation and an increased integration of ICT at all power system actors. This trend raises complexity and increasingly leads to interactions between primary grid operation and ICT as well as different power system actors. For example, virtual power plants control various assets in the distribution grid via ICT to jointly market existing flexibilities. Failures of ICT or targeted attacks can thus have serious effects on security of supply and system stability. This paper presents a holistic approach to providing methods specifically for actors in the power system for prevention, detection, and reaction to ICT attacks and failures. The focus of our measures are solutions for ICT monitoring, systems for the detection of ICT attacks and intrusions in the process network, and the provision of actionable guidelines as well as a practice environment for the response to potential ICT security incidents.

Mitigating cybersecurity threats in power distribution grids requires a testbed for cybersecurity, e.g., to evaluate the (physical) impact of cyberattacks, generate datasets, test and validate security approaches, as well as train technical personnel. In this paper, we present a blueprint for such a testbed that relies on network emulation and power flow computation to couple real network applications with a simulated power grid. We discuss the benefits of our approach alongside preliminary results and various use cases for cybersecurity research and training for power distribution grids.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are a less obvious part of the Internet of Things with their own unique security challenges. We introduce the structure and components of typical ICS installations. We also provide an overview of a number of ICS security approaches. Contrasting these with a sampling of documented ICS security incidents highlights the relevance of this topic. Finally, this approach allows us to identify unsolved problems with respect to securing ICS.

We investigate the conditions for streaming real-time laser data with commercial off-the-shelf hard- and software. We design scheduling algorithms to work around the identified limitations. We run end-to-end tests of our resulting software to show that we can achieve streams with millisecond granularity.