People attribute higher truth to information they have previously been exposed to. This “truth effect” is resistant to many interventions aimed to reduce it. In three preregistered experiments, we explored whether processing largely unknown information in the form of questions could counteract repetition-induced truth. In Experiment 1 (N = 100), participants judged the truth of repeated and unrepeated sentences. Half of the participants processed sentences in declarative form and the other half processed them in interrogative form during exposure and judgment. A significant interaction between sentence repetition and sentence form emerged, with a significant truth effect in the declarative condition but not in the interrogative. Experiment 2 (N = 325) introduced an additional interrogative condition presenting sentences as questions only during the exposure phase. Compared with the declarative condition, the truth effect was greatly reduced, but still significant, in both interrogative conditions. Experiment 3 (N = 235) employed a within-participant design to manipulate both repetition and sentence form. We confirmed that the truth effect was substantially reduced for interrogative sentences. Additionally, repetition had a smaller effect on certainty about truth judgments for interrogative compared with declarative sentences. We discuss how these findings inform theoretical accounts of the truth effect and their implications for debiasing strategies.

Despite their apparent benevolence, positive stereotypes have negative effects on person and group perception. However, little is known about how exposure can intensify these negative consequences. In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 240) we investigated the effect of exposure on believability and moral condemnation of positive stereotypes. In Experiment 1, participants rated the truth value of positive stereotypes, which were either previously encountered or not during an exposure phase. Repeated positive stereotypes were perceived as more true than unrepeated ones, indicating a truth effect. In Experiment 2, we replicated the truth effect and further found that exposure to stereotypes reduced their moral condemnation, indicating a moral-repetition effect. Extending the truth effect and moral-repetition effect research to positive stereotypes, our findings emphasize the need to raise awareness of the impact of exposure on reinforcing the believability and moral condemnation of stereotypical beliefs.

Judgements of trustworthiness based on facial features have mainly been investigated by presenting faces in isolation. However, real-life situations often involve contextual cues. Here, we review our work showing that judgements of trustworthiness from faces are influenced by contextual threat. Individuals are judged as less trustworthy when their faces are surrounded by threatening, as opposed to neutral or merely negative, contexts. Delving into the mechanisms underlying face-context integration, our work reveals that the bond between trustworthiness and threat goes beyond mere stimuli congruency, suggesting that threatening contexts alter person evaluation by conveying information of adaptive significance. We propose an inferential approach to face-context integration, where faces and contexts are encoded relationally: modifying this relational encoding, via verbal or emotional cues, results in changes in face-context integration. We conclude by outlining the significance of embracing the impact of contextual cues in shaping impressions from faces.

Several social media employ or consider user recruitment as defense against misinformation. Yet, it is unclear how to encourage users to make accurate evaluations. Our study shows that presenting the performance of previous participants increases discernment of science-related news. Making participants aware that their evaluations would be used by future participants had no effect on accuracy. Lastly, monetary rewards have the largest effect on accuracy. Our study provides support for the idea that a person’s motivation is an essential component of their propensity to be vigilant online and that it is possible to devise strategies to strengthen this motivation.

Impressions of others are formed from multiple cues, including facial features, vocal tone, and behavioral descriptions, and may be subject to multimodal updating. Four experiments ( N = 803) examined the influence of a target’s face or voice on impression updating. Experiments 1a-1b examined whether behavior-based impressions are susceptible to updating by incongruent information conveyed by the target’s face, voice, or behavior (within-participant manipulation). Both faces and voices updated impressions with comparable strength, but less than behaviors. Experiment 2, contrasting faces and voices only (between-participants manipulation), showed that voices outperformed faces regardless of how impressions were formed (i.e., via behavioral vs. nonbehavioral information). Experiment 3 found no difference when comparing faces and voices in a within-participant design and controlling for stimulus attractiveness. Our work highlights the importance of multimodal cues for impression updating and shows that the relative power of faces and voices depends on contextual factors.

People judge repeated statements as more true than new statements: a truth effect. In three preregistered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people predict others’ truth judgments to be more biased by repetition than their own: a bias blind spot for the truth effect. In Experiment 1, using uncertain but moderately plausible statements, participants predicted repetition to increase truth judgments in general. There was no significant difference between predictions for the self and others. Experiment 2 used implausible statements and found a significant bias blind spot: participants predicted a larger effect of repetition for others than for themselves. Experiment 3 considered again moderately plausible statements, but this time in a larger sample of participants. Critically, we compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants’ predictions for the self and others. This experiment replicated the bias blind spot. Importantly, participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect. Finally, predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related to each other. Overall, the results highlight that although people assume repetition to influence their truth judgments, they generally underestimate the effect’s magnitude, particularly for themselves.

Social targets' eyes are a rich source of information: partners with dilated and constricted pupils are perceived positively and negatively, respectively. Here, we tested whether observed pupil size influences the ascription of humanity. In Study 1 (n = 198) participants were asked to attribute positive uniquely human and non-uniquely human traits to ingroup (i.e., university students), derogated (i.e., homeless people) and non-derogated (i.e., Dutch) targets whose pupils varied in size. Results showed higher attribution of uniquely human traits to targets with dilated (vs. constricted) pupils, whereas no difference based on pupil size emerged on the attribution of non-uniquely human traits. The effect was stronger for non-derogated (vs. derogated and ingroup) targets. In Study 2 (n = 117) participants were asked to attribute positive uniquely human and non-uniquely human traits and emotions. Results replicated the effect of pupil size on trait attribution, especially for outgroup (vs. ingroup) members. The effect of pupil size was not qualified by emotions type (uniquely human vs. non uniquely human). Taken together, our findings show that pupil size is interpreted as a cue to attribute humanity to social targets.

Research on face perception has established that faces surrounded by threatening contexts are perceived as less trustworthy. Moreover, recent studies revealed that such a face-context integration effect is moderated by the nature of the relational qualifier connecting the face and the context: presenting a face as belonging to either the perpetrator or the victim of the threatening context changes its perceived trustworthiness. Here, we asked whether relational qualifiers can also be extracted from subtle facial cues. In two preregistered studies (N = 225), we tested whether face-context integration is qualified by facial emotions. In Experiment 1, faces appeared with either happy or fearful emotional expressions in threatening contexts (vs. no context). Facial emotions moderated face-context integration: The negative impact of contextual threat on attributed trustworthiness showed stronger for happy than fearful faces. In Experiment 2, participants judged the emotional stimuli on both trustworthiness and smartness. Emotions altered face-context integration when judging trustworthiness but did not alter smartness judgments. Moreover, participants' tendency to judge happy faces in threatening contexts as less trustworthy correlated with their belief that the target face belonged to the criminal on the scene. The impor-tance of considering relational encoding when studying person perception is discussed.

Prior research has shown that the face's width-to-height ratio (fWHR) and the voice's pitch influence social perception. Yet, the relative contribution of either cue has been largely unexplored. We examined the simultaneous effects of fWHR and pitch on social evaluations. Experiment 1 (N = 102) tested how such cues shaped global impressions. Experiment 2 (N = 121) tested fWHR and pitch's effect on behavioural affiliative intentions, framing social interaction as a physical or an intellectual competition. Experiment 3 (N = 57) assessed whether variations in fWHR and pitch could influence trait attribution (i.e., physical formidability and intelligence). Individuals with large faces or low-pitched voices elicited negative impressions, positive behavioural intentions in a physical competition, and the attribution of stronger formidability but lower intelligence. Across the studies, cues exerted independent effects. The implications of these findings for research on cross-modal social perception are discussed.

Past research indicates that people judge repeated statements as more true than new ones. An experiential consequence of repetition that may underly this "truth effect" is processing fluency: Processing statements feels easier following their repetition. In three preregistered experiments (N = 684), we examined the effect of merely instructed repetition (i.e., not experienced) on truth judgments. Experiments 1-2 instructed participants that some statements were present (vs. absent) in an exposure phase allegedly undergone by other individuals. We then asked them to rate such statements based on how they thought those individuals would have done. Overall, participants rated repeated statements as more true than new statements. The instruction-based repetition effects were significant but also significantly weaker than those elicited by the experience of repetition (Experiments 1 and 2). Additionally, Experiment 2 clarified that adding a repetition status tag in the experienced repetition condition did not impact truth judgments. Experiment 3 further showed that the instruction-based effect was still detectable when participants provided truth judgments for themselves rather than estimating other people's judgments. We discuss the mechanisms that can explain these effects and their implications for advancing our understanding of the truth effect.

Stimuli that relate to the self tend to be better liked. The Self-Referencing (SR) task is a paradigm whereby one target categorised through the same action as self-stimuli (i.e. possessive pronouns) is preferred over an alternative target categorised through the same action as other-stimuli. Past studies on the SR showed that valence could not fully account for the observed effect. Here we explored self-relevance as a possible explanation. Across four studies (N = 567), participants selected self-relevant and self-irrelevant adjectives to be used as source stimuli in a Personal-SR task. In that task, the two classes of stimuli were paired with two fictitious brands. We measured automatic (IAT) and self-reported preferences, and identification with the brands. Experiment 1 showed that the brand paired with positive self-relevant adjectives became more positive than the one paired with positive self-irrelevant adjectives. Experiment 2 confirmed this pattern with negative adjectives, and Experiment 3 ruled out the effect of a self-serving bias in the adjectives selection. Experiment 4 showed that the brand related to negative self-relevant adjectives was preferred over the brand related to positive self-irrelevant adjectives. We discussed the implications of our results and the potential mechanisms that might explain self-driven preferences.

Recent work showed that the attribution of facial trustworthiness can be influenced by the surrounding context in which a face is embedded: contexts that convey threat make faces less trustworthy. In four studies (N = 388, three preregistered) we tested whether face-context integration is influenced by how faces and contexts are encoded relationally. In Experiments 1a to 1c, face-context integration was stronger when threatening stimuli were attributable to the human action. Faces were judged less trustworthy when shown in threatening contexts that were ascribable (vs. non-ascribable) to the human action. In Experiment 2, we manipulated face-context relations using instructions. When instructions presented facial stimuli as belonging to the "perpetrators" of the threatening contexts, no difference with the control (no-instructions) condition was found in face-context integration. Instead, the effect was reduced when faces were presented as "victims." We discussed the importance of considering relational reasoning when studying face-context integration.

Recently, crowdsourcing has been proposed as a tool for fighting misinformation online. Will internet users listen to crowdsourced fact-checking, and how? In this experiment we test how participants follow others’ opinions to evaluate the validity of a science-themed Facebook post and examine which factors mediate the use of this information. Participants observed a post presenting either scientific information or misinformation, along with a graphical summary of previous participants’ judgements. Even though most participants reported not having used information from previous raters, their responses were influenced by previous assessments. This happened regardless of whether prior judgements were accurate or misleading. Presenting crowdsourced fact-checking however did not translate into the blind copying of the majority response. Rather, participants tended to use this social information as a cue to guide their response, while also relying on individual evaluation and research for extra information. These results highlight the role of individual reasoning when evaluating online information, while pointing to the potential benefit of crowd-sourcing-based solutions in making online users more resilient to misinformation.

The face is a powerful source to make inferences about one's trustworthiness. Recent studies demonstrated that facial trustworthiness is influenced by the level of threat conveyed by the visual scene in which faces are embedded: untrustworthy-looking faces are more likely judged as untrustworthy when shown in threatening scenes. Here, we explore whether this face-context congruency effect is specific to the negative pole of the threat-trust domain. Experiment 1 (N = 89) focused on the differential impact of positive vs. negative face-context congruency within the domains of threat and trust. Negative congruency (i.e. untrustworthy-looking faces in threatening contexts) led to more extreme attributions as opposed to positive congruency (i.e. trustworthy-looking faces in reassuring contexts). Experiment 2 (N = 120) replicated these findings by further showing their domain-specificity. The negativity bias was found in the threat-trust domain, but not when extroverted- vs. introverted-looking faces appeared in happy vs. sad context scenes. Experiment 3 (N = 154, pre-registered) replicated the pattern observed in Experiment 1 while controlling for the extent to which both threatening and reassuring context stimuli were related to the human action. We discussed the theoretical implications of these results for understanding how contextual information is integrated into the evaluation of facial trustworthiness.

Research has shown that pupil size shapes interpersonal impressions: Individuals with dilated pupils tend to be perceived more positively than those with constricted pupils. Untested so far is the role of cognitive processes in shaping the effects of pupil size. Two pre-registered studies investigated whether the effect of pupil size is qualified by partner’s attention allocation inferred from gaze orientation. In Experiment 1 (N=50) partners with dilated pupils were more liked when gazing toward the participant, but less liked when gazing toward a disliked other. Experiment 2 (N=50) unveiled the underlying mechanism of the pupil-gaze interplay. Pupillary changes led to inferences about the feelings held by the partner towards the gazed target: larger the pupils signaled positive feelings. Crucially, target identity moderated the response of the participants (i.e., liking toward the partner). This work shows the importance of considering the interplay of affective and cognitive eye-signals when studying person perception.

Disinformation about science can impose enormous economic and public health burdens. A recently proposed strategy to help online users recognise false content is to follow the techniques of professional fact checkers, such as looking for information on other websites (lateral reading) and looking beyond the first results suggested by search engines (click restraint). In two preregistered online experiments (N = 5387), we simulated a social media environment and tested two interventions, one in the form of a pop-up meant to advise participants to follow such techniques, the other based on monetary incentives. We measured participants' ability to identify whether information was scientifically valid or invalid. Analysis of participants' search style reveals that both monetary incentives and pop-up increased the use of fact-checking strategies. Monetary incentives were overall effective in increasing accuracy, whereas the pop-up worked when the source of information was unknown. Pop-up and incentives, when used together, produced a cumulative effect on accuracy. We suggest that monetary incentives enhance content relevance, and could be combined with fact-checking techniques to counteract disinformation.

Plant-based meat alternatives have grown tremendously in recent years, with an unprecedented increase in vegan and meat-sounding labelled products appearing on European Union shelves. However, a regulation clarifying what the "vegan" label means and if "meat-sounding" names should be allowed when referring to plant-based foods is still lacking. Led by opposite reasons, both vegetarian and meat producers' associations are demanding to fill this legal void. Our paper contributes to this debate by providing the results of two online experiments that measures how consumers perceive plant-based meat substitutes based on vegan vs. meat -sounding labelling. The results of the first study showed that meat-sounding labels applied to plant-based food altered perceived healthiness, but not other characteristics of the product. The second study indicated that vegan labelling exerted a negative effect on the consumers' perception of tastiness and healthiness, and willingness to buy of plant-based foods. Importantly, these effects were moderated by the consumers' attitudes towards meat-eating and veganism. In line with these results, we propose that the explicit use of the "vegan" label might be counterproductive to increase the sales of plant-based foods, and that the biasing impact of meat -sounding labels on plant-based food's perception is weak.

Research has shown that faces and voices shape impression formation. Most studies have examined either the impact of faces and voices in isolation or the relative contribution of each source when presented simultaneously. However, only a few studies have questioned whether and how impressions formed via one source can be updated due to incremental information gathered from the alternative source. Yet, cross-modal impression updating is key to shed light on person perception. Thus, we tested whether positive and negative face- and voice-based impressions could be updated by inconsistent cross-modal information. In Experiment 1 (N = 130), we tested whether face-based impressions could be updated by (in)consistent voices. In Experiment 2 (N = 262), we compared face-to-voice and voice-to-face impression updating. In Experiment 3 (N = 242), we favoured a more direct comparison of the two types of stimuli (i.e., the co-occurrence of both cue types when the new information is revealed). Results showed that voices have the greatest updating impact and that the updating effect of faces was halved when voices co-occurred for a second time. We discussed these results as evidence of the dynamical evolution of cross-modal impressions.

People are often reluctant when it comes to approaching novel food. This behavioural tendency falls under the label of food neophobia. Prior research based on mere exposure indicated that novel foods are more likely approached when perceived as more familiar. The present paper proposes a strategy to increase the perceived familiarity of ethnic food that is not based on direct exposure, but instead, on comparative thinking. Across three pre-registered studies (n = 649), the impact of a comparison focus manipulation on familiarity, perceived closeness, and intention to try ethnic foods was tested. Participants were presented with ethnic recipes and asked to highlight the ingredients that made the recipe alike vs. different from known food. Study 1 revealed that focusing on similarities increased the perceived familiarity of an ethnic food relative to a no-comparison condition, but not to a difference condition. As the latter non-significant comparison was likely due to the specific features of the ethnic food considered, in Studies 2 and 3 a mixed design was adopted. Each participant was asked to process two different ethnic recipes, one assigned to a no-comparison focus task and the other to a comparison focus (similarity vs. difference) task. Results demonstrated that the food assigned to the comparison task increased in familiarity and perceived closeness, whereas the effect did not emerge on behavioural intentions. Crucially, this was true only when the comparison focus was on the similarities with Italian recipes. These findings provide useful insights for future research within the context of food-behaviour change.

Past research indicates that people judge repeated statements as more true than new ones. An experiential consequence of repetition that may underly this “truth effect” is processing fluency: processing statements feels easier following their repetition. Here, we examine the effect of merely instructed (i.e., not experienced) repetition on truth judgments, which we compared to the effect of factual repetition. In two preregistered experiments (N=468), we found a larger truth effect for factual repetition compared to instructed repetition. However, we also found a non-experiential contribution to truth judgments: statements instructed to be repeated were judged more true than those instructed to be new. Experiment 2 further clarified that adding a repetition status tag in the factual repetition condition did not impact truth judgments. Moreover, for both experienced and instructed repetition, the effect on truth was qualified by subjective recognition. We discuss the mechanisms that can explain the impact of instructed repetition on truth and its implications for a better understanding of the truth effect.