In this article, we offer a critical theory of the internet grounded in Marcuse's dialectical theory of technology, starting from what we contend to be the fundamental and indispensable core of his thinking: the dialectic between eros and technological rationality. We proceed below in three parts: First, we critically reconstruct Marcuse's dialectic of eros and technological rationality to set the stage for our discussion of the internet. Second, we use Marcuse's distinction between technology and technics to interrogate the internet as a material reflection of the social process out of which it emerged. Under conditions of advanced industrial civilization, it is not surprising that the internet appears as a material reflection of technological rationality. In the final section, we seek to answer the questions raised by the preceding sections: If the internet frustrates our need for erotic connection, rendering desire onedimensional, would an erotic technology of liberation include the internet? If so, would that internet look anything like what it does now?

In this article, we reconceptualise ecofascism by tracing its roots back to their colonial origin, and in doing so provide firmer ground on which to confront it. First, we outline contemporary literature on ecofascism and isolate three areas of confusion: the actions that constitute it, the most relevant actors, and the theoretical genealogy that best explains it. Second, we offer our own conception of ecofascism by reading Aimé Césaire's conception of fascism as colonial categories and tactics that “boomerang” back into the colonial core alongside the “racial capitalocene” framework. This juxtaposition illuminates colonialism and eco fascism as inextricably interconnected phenomena. Thus, we reconceive of ecofascism as the culmination of the colonial logics of extractivism, dehumanisation, and racialised violence finally made legible to and felt by the colonial core. Finally, we articulate forms of confrontation that contest the conditions of possibility for ecofascism as such.

Though a growing number of voices in public discourse are expressing reservations about the new space race and its implications, inherently political questions have remained largely untouched by political theorists: Who is space for and for whose benefit? What are the ideological presumptions and functions of private space exploration? To confront this astro-aporia, we proceed in four parts. First, we develop a typology of two broad positions that predominate in contemporary criticism of space exploration: those who are “space pessimists” and those who are “space neutral”; second, we critique those two positions for relying on an instrumental rationality that cedes too much ground to the logic of instrumentalizing and exploiting that which is deemed non-human nature; third, we examine the linked material and ideological forces fueling the current space race and its enthusiastic supporters; and finally, we formulate a dialectical position that remains critical of space exploitation as it is currently undertaken, but on grounds other than mere utility, thus offering a way to reorient the discussion toward a critical theory of space. From this perspective, space's meaning-making role for humanity can be understood as good and should be held in common, rather than being either abandoned or plundered.

Abstract: This article stages a critical dialogue between Theodor Adorno and Frantz Fanon, arguing that their writings on negative dialectics and (non)identity thinking reveal the political non-identity of negative dialectics itself. First, we contend that Adorno and Fanon's negotiations of the violence inherent in identity thinking is paramount to their respective oeuvres. Second, we address criticisms of Adorno and Fanon's political response to the violence of identity thinking: that Adorno is an elitist conservative and Fanon an identitarian lover of violence. Finally, we interrogate how both exhibited their radically democratic commitment to the people's self-creation through their work on radio.

Only recently has Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality begun to be read as a genealogy rather than a variation on the social contract tradition. This article argues that reading Rousseau as a genealogist not only clarifies his analysis of amour-propre’s inflammation, but also illuminates a conception of freedom achieved through the continuous political practice of shaping of amour-propre. In the first section of this article, I situate this conception of freedom against two separate but relevant bodies of Rousseau scholarship: those who read him as a genealogist, and those who emphasize the ambiguities of amour-propre. Next, I look to The Social Contract’s passages on censorship and court of honor in order to evaluate their roles as institutions that forestall the inflammation of amour-propre. Finally, I examine the social institutions that citizens actively participate in as they practice their freedom: the festivals, dances, balls and games described in The Letter to D’Alembert and Considerations on the Government of Poland. It is in these institutions that we see the political implications of Rousseau’s genealogical system manifest: because his genealogy illuminates the human tendency toward vice, the cultivation of virtuous citizenship appears as a constant struggle rather than an idealist achievement.

The Frankfurt School’s considerable indebtedness to Marx’s historical materialism and Weber’s reflections on the “disenchantment of the world” make for an unexpected critical resource for thinking ...

Mary Shelley's Frankenstein has been read and reread for decades as a cautionary myth about science. The interpretation is well known: a gentler, gradualist science is preferable to the aggressive Enlightenment rationality that spawned the Creature. However, I argue in this essay that such a distinction between "safe" and "dangerous" science is largely effaced in the novel itself. By reading Frankenstein alongside Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, I aim to demonstrate that Shelley levels a radical critique of how modern science mediates our moral world by dissolving the boundaries between civilization and nature, enlightenment and barbarism.

Adorno and Horkheimer’s legacy is incomplete without reference to their infamous political quietism. To thinkers such as Habermas, this was the unfortunate consequence of their alleged evacuation of reason. Attending to the treatment of Nietzsche in Dialectic of Enlightenment illuminates the distinct irony of such charges. Here, in their most popular book, Nietzsche is presented as precisely that which they praised him for warning against elsewhere: an advocate of cruelty animated by a reactionary morality. I contend that this exaggeration is not accidental, but rather illustrative; the authors present a consciously hyperbolized version of Nietzsche in order to articulate how he made possible his own misappropriation, and to distinguish themselves sharply from Nietzsche given their disagreements about the necessity of reason. Ultimately, however, even though Adorno and Horkheimer performatively differentiate themselves from the nihilism they saw in Nietzsche, their alternative would ironically be subject to precisely the same charges of irrationalism and political aporia that they sought so desperately to avoid.

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Chapter 5 White Bear and Criminal Punishment How Far is too Far? Sid Simpson, Sid SimpsonSearch for more papers by this authorChris Lay, Chris LaySearch for more papers by this author Sid Simpson, Sid SimpsonSearch for more papers by this authorChris Lay, Chris LaySearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):David Kyle Johnson, David Kyle JohnsonSearch for more papers by this author First published: 21 November 2019 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119578291.ch5 AboutPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShareShare a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Summary Every day, Victoria Skillane wakes up bewildered. She has no idea where she is, but nevertheless has to run for her life from masked assailants while zombielike onlookers refuse to intervene. We later learn that she's the centerpiece of 'White Bear Justice Park.' The question is, what about this could be called just? In this chapter, we look to different theories of punishment in order to discern whether or not Victoria's punishment is justified. Does she deserve it? Does her sentence deter people? Beyond these questions, we confront the most unsettling question raised by this episode of Black Mirror: why do people enjoy watching her suffer so much? Black Mirror and Philosophy: Dark Reflections RelatedInformation

The work of Immanuel Kant has been foundational in modern democratic peace theory. His essay Toward Perpetual Peace gives three prescriptions for attaining peace between democracies: republican institutions, a pacific union between states, and an ethos of universal hospitality. Contemporary democratic peace theory, however, has warped the Kantian framework from which it draws inspiration: the third prescription has been gradually substituted for commerce and trade. I argue that this change in emphasis produces tensions between Perpetual Peace and the body of democratic peace theory literature it spawned. Moreover, I contend that a look back at Kant's essay sheds light on why this transformation occurred. Finally, I use this new look back at Perpetual Peace to reformulate the relationship between peace, democracy, and commerce so as to offer a new perspective on the democratic peace theory/capitalist peace theory debate.