The UK Parliament has become increasingly diverse in recent years. Yet it remains far from being descriptively representative of the population. This study investigates how women and ethnic minority candidates fare at the polls. Do they still receive lower vote shares than their counterparts? Are intersectional minority candidates doubly disadvantaged? Our research makes three contributions to the growing literature on the electoral fortunes of minority candidates. First, we assess the effects of candidate sex, ethnicity, and their intersection. Second, we consider how the sex and ethnicity of a candidate's opponent influence vote share. Third, we examine how these effects evolve across time, providing updated evidence on patterns of bias and representation in contemporary British elections. Using candidate-level data from the 2010 to 2019 UK general elections, we find no significant difference in vote share between male and female candidates. Ethnic minority candidates do receive lower vote shares, however, this is driven primarily by ethnic minority men from non-incumbent parties. Female ethnic minority candidates perform similarly to white candidates. Moreover, non-incumbent candidates gain a higher vote share when running against ethnic minority opponents. Importantly, these differences appear to be narrowing over time.

A record number of candidates contested parliamentary seats in the 2024 general election in the United Kingdom. This article discusses three key aspects that have garnered attention from both academics and practitioners studying the characteristics, motivations and experiences of candidates: gender representation, security concerns and local residency. Candidate data shows that, despite an increase in female MPs, the overall number of female candidates declined, highlighting structural barriers within party selection processes. Second, the rise in harassment, abuse and intimidation has led many candidates, particularly women, to withhold their home addresses on ballot papers, impacting their perceived local connection to voters. Finally, while localism remains a valued asset for candidates, security concerns diminish its role in contemporary campaigns. Challenges for future elections remain for political parties to address gender imbalances during the selection process, enhance candidate safety and reconsider local engagement strategies to foster a more inclusive and connected political landscape.

This study explores the role of local media consumption in shaping voter preferences for local candidates in electoral contexts. Drawing on the British Election Study (BES) data from the 2017 UK General Election, the paper examines how local media influences the preference for candidates with strong local ties. While previous research has established the electoral advantage of local candidates, this study delves deeper into the underlying mechanisms of preference formation, particularly focusing on media effects such as agenda-setting and framing. The findings reveal a nuanced relationship: although local media readership does not directly correlate with a preference for local candidates, its influence is conditional on the amount of time spent consuming media. Individuals who read local newspapers are initially more likely to prefer local candidates, but this effect diminishes as media consumption diversifies. This research highlights the complexity of voter behaviour and underscores the importance of local media in connecting political representation to geographically specific concerns. The findings contribute to the broader literature on electoral behaviour and media effects, offering insights into how localism and media environments interact to shape political preferences.

Tuition levels in the US have been rising at an above-the-inflation pace, leading to spiraling student debt levels and negative effects on students' well-being. While student outcomes of rising tuition are well known, the political reasons behind the decisions of policy makers to contain tuition increases or not remain poorly understood. In this article, we focus on electoral accountability that policy makers face for rising tuition by examining voters' reactions. Using a survey experiment with a sample of US adults (N = 1040), we show that clarity of responsibility is an important factor affecting reactions to rising tuition levels. When voters are informed about the role of the government in tuition setting, they are more likely to vote out policy makers responsible for cuts in funding. We show a similar relationship in observational data using a nationally representative survey from Cooperative Congressional Election Study. State governors' approval is lower in states where tuition levels increased recently, and the relationship is moderated by the visibility of government in tuition-setting. By demonstrating that policy makers face repercussions for rising tuition but are able to avoid blame in certain conditions, we contribute to scholarly understanding of preferences of policy makers in higher education.

An analysis of Conservative and Labour Party candidate selections reveals persistent gender disparities, with the Conservative Party nominating a significantly higher proportion of men. While various factors, such as local connections and harassment, abuse and intimidation (HAI) are cited as explanations, they fail to address systemic issues within the Conservative Party's recruitment processes and organisational culture. This article argues that the focus should shift from individual women to party structures and practices that perpetuate gender inequality. Drawing on previous research and empirical evidence, it calls for institutional reforms including the implementation of quotas and greater transparency in candidate selection. Finally, it calls for a gender-sensitive audit of party culture to address underlying barriers to women's participation in politics.

How do voters respond to a co-partisan political candidate after hearing about a serious scandal? We apply qualitative content analysis to open-ended text responses collected from survey respondents, focusing on 159 respondents who remain willing to vote for a hypothetical male candidate after learning that allegations of sexual harassment against him were settled out of court. We uncover two main strategies by which respondents explained and justified their willingness to look past the misconduct allegations. The dominant strategy was to extend moral licence to the candidate based on his prior good deeds; a second prominent strategy was to disbelieve and reject the allegations. Our findings offer new insights on why some political candidates and careers appear untroubled by even serious allegations of misconduct, and frames new research avenues on which voters might be more likely to extend moral licence and in what circumstances.

Little attention has been paid to the process of members leaving parties in order to support other parties. Party developments in the UK in the 2010s provide an opportunity to analyse the determinants of members giving up their current party and joining a rival. We examine this issue using an original panel survey of 2,679 members of the Green Party of England and Wales. Our results show that members who joined the Greens motivated by concern about social justice are more likely to leave and support Labour after Jeremy Corbyn’s election as party leader. Members who joined to protect the environment are less likely to leave. Niche parties can attract members predominantly motivated by issues traditionally represented by a mainstream party but these members are more likely to leave the party again following a position change by the mainstream party.

How do voters respond to candidates accused of sexual harassment? The literature on political scandals demonstrates that candidate characteristics, scandal type, and voter characteristics matter; as well as party affiliation. However, empirical evidence suggests that not all co-partisans react the same way. Why is this the case? Our study uses Schwartz's (1996) theory of values to hypothesise that voters prioritising 'universalism' and 'benevolence' are less likely to vote for candidates accused of sexual harassment compared to voters who prioritise 'self-enhancement' values. Using an original, mixed methods, online survey experiment (n = 704), we show that American voters do become less favourable towards candidates linked to allegations of sexual harassment; but a sizeable minority would nevertheless vote for a co-partisan candidate accused of sexual harassment. Values are an important mechanism to explain this heterogeneity. Qualitative data corroborates our findings, and helps explain why sexual harassment allegations are not always a barrier to electoral success.

Candidate characteristics have an important impact on voter choice, and scandals are found to negatively impact a political campaign. Yet the literature, with its focus on scandals such as financial and (consensual) affairs, has failed to look into how allegations of sexual assault and harassment may impact electability. This study analyzes the effect that allegations of sexual assault or harassment have on the electoral success of American politicians. Using an original survey experiment, we find that, on average, American citizens are less likely to support a candidate accused of sexual assault or sexual harassment. However, not all voters do so to the same magnitude. We find that Democrats are significantly less likely to support a candidate that faces such allegations. Republicans do not strongly penalize candidates facing allegations of sexual assault or harassment, especially if the candidate is identified as a Republican. We analyze open-ended survey responses to offer an explanation for such variation: a propensity to disbelieve women who speak out about sexual assault and harassment explains variations in why some voters may not change their opinion of a candidate based on an allegation.

This article explores the role gender plays in the harassment, abuse and intimidation (HAI) of parliamentary candidates in the UK at election time. Using data from the Representative Audit of Britain surveys (2015-2019) this article takes an intersectional approach to investigate whether trends identified in 2017 suggesting that women candidates reported more incidences of HAI and were more likely to be concerned for their personal safety as a result than men, remain apparent in the subsequent election. Results suggest that HAI is getting worse for candidates in general, and the gender gap is widening. About three in every four women experienced some levels of fear while campaigning.

Recently, the issue of harassment and intimidation of women in politics in long-established democracies has become a source of concern. Current research emphasizes that while women may be more frequently attacked, not all incidents of abuse against women in politics are of a gendered nature. This finding prompts further questions such as are women more frequently targeted because they are women and does such targeting inhibit women from fully participating in political campaigning? Using data from the Representative Audit of Britain's survey of candidates contesting the 2019 General Election, this study shows that harassment has a negative electoral effect for women, even while controlling for the visibility of the candidate. This article argues that the harassment of women candidates in the UK is gendered, both in its motives and outcomes as it forces women to modify their campaign activities in ways that diminish their chances of gaining office. Our findings contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of violence towards women in politics and gendered political violence.

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Since the COVID-19 pandemic started, there has been increasing evidence suggesting that current gendered and racially biased structures put in place to deal with the crises lead women and BAME population to be disproportionately affected by the pandemic. Yet, there is less information on how different groups respond to the pandemic in terms of compliance with the measures implemented by the government, and the role that parenthood and employment play in explaining compliance for such groups. We take insights from the literature on policy preferences and compliance to argue that gender, ethnicity, parenthood and employment are associated with high levels of worry about the consequences of the pandemic, leading to variations in compliance with social distancing measures. We test our argument using data from an original nationally representative survey. Results indicate that women and BAME respondents present important challenges to manage anxiety, stress and worry but they manifest differently in their compliance with social distancing measures. We also find that parenthood and employment affect compliance but in an unexpected direction. Together, results indicate that compliance is not only a matter of individual choice but also a matter of structural and contextual factors.

Previous empirical social science research on Covid-19 has mainly focused on predicting compliance with behavioural instructions in terms of demographics and socioeconomic determinants. In terms of political variables, trust in government and left-right political orientation has been a major focus of research. One aspect that so far appears to have been ignored is the attitudes of political elites and how they compare with the attitudes of those they represent. Based on a survey of local councillors and members of the public in England in the early phase of the lockdown, we can show that the UK government lockdown measures enjoyed overwhelming support among local elites as well as the general public. However, we can also find sources of lack of support and consensus even at this early stage: While younger and male members of the public, as well as members of the LGBT community, were less enthusiastic about the lockdown, opposition among the public is mainly based on "populist" attitudes that became prominent in the Brexit debate such as evaluations of immigration and scepticism about climate change. These sources of dissent could be expected to become more prominent as the pandemic unravels.

Support for social distancing measures was, globally, high at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic but increasingly came under pressure. Focusing on the UK, this article provides a rigorous exploration of the drivers of public support for social distancing at their formative stage, via mixed methods. Synthesizing insights from crisis management and securitization theory, thematic analysis is employed to map the main frames promoted by the government and other actors on the nature/severity, blame/responsibility, and appropriate response to the pandemic, which 'follows the science'. The impact of these on public attitudes is examined via a series of regression analyses, drawing on a representative survey of the UK population (n = 2100). Findings challenge the prevailing understanding that support for measures is driven by personal health considerations, socio-economic circumstances, and political influences. Instead, crisis framing dynamics, which the government is well-positioned to dominate, have the greatest impact on driving public attitudes.

This chapter provides an analysis of how much campaign personalisation is going on, where and why. Three elements of personal vote-seeking strategies are evaluated: campaign focus, campaign means and local constituency activities. We find that the level of institutional incentives for a personal vote is an important predictor of personalised campaigning, but also candidate-related features are important. Apart from the visibility of the candidate, the perception of electoral success and campaign intensity are strongly related to all three types of personalised campaigning. We conclude that institutional features matter but that there is still substantial heterogeneity due to candidate-related factors in one and the same electoral system. Personalised campaigning is not only incentivised by electoral systems but also the result of candidates' choices.

The use of political violence to attain political goals has long been a source of concern. Once thought to be exclusive to countries with high levels of general violence, recent evidence suggests that harassment and intimidation of political elites in the UK is more widespread than previously thought. Using data from the 2017 general election candidate survey, we find that four in every ten candidates experienced at least one type of harassment. Evidence suggests that women and young candidates are more likely to suffer from harassment and intimidation. We conclude by formulating an agenda for future research, focussing, in particular, on the perception of harassment and the effect of harassment on political careers.

Traditionally, decentralization has been linked with the stability of the party system because it helps parties to succeed in national elections. Yet, previous research has frequently obviated the intertwined nature of multilevel party competition. This research takes a closer look at parties' subnational electoral trajectories while arguing that decentralization increases the risk of new party demise by making subnational elections more attractive for all kinds of parties to compete in. The argument is tested applying survival analysis to the electoral trajectories of 1235 regional branches of political parties in 12 European countries. Results show that contrary to what has been stated previously on the literature, decentralization increases the risk of parties disappearing. This effect fades away the older and more consolidated the party becomes, and it is of particular relevance for regionalist parties. These findings have important implications for the literature on second-order elections and multilevel party competition.