Construal-level theory (CLT) proposes that psychological distance influences the level of abstraction at which something is mentally construed: Things perceived as less probable (likelihood) or further away from the here (spatial distance), now (temporal distance), or self (social distance) are thought about more abstractly. In this international multilab study, we tested four basic hypotheses derived from core assumptions of CLT and explore potential moderators and boundary conditions of the effects. Participants ( N = 11,775) from 27 countries and regions were randomly assigned to one of four experimental protocols focused on different types of psychological distance (temporal, spatial, social, or likelihood), and each experiment manipulated psychological distance (close vs. distant). The protocols for temporal distance ( n = 2,941) and spatial distance ( n = 2,973) were direct replications of Liberman and Trope (Study 1) and Fujita et al. (Study 1), respectively. The remaining two protocols were paradigmatic replications, applying to social distance ( n = 2,926) and likelihood ( n = 2,936). The effects of psychological distance on construal level for the four present studies were as follows (positive effects are consistent with hypotheses): temporal, d = 0.08, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [0.003, 0.16] (effect in original study: d = 0.92); spatial, d = 0.04, 95% CI = [−0.03, 0.11] (effect in original study: d = 0.55); social, d = −0.27, 95% CI = [−0.34, −0.19]; and likelihood, d = 0.03, 95% CI = [−0.05, 0.11]. Pretests indicated that valence and abstraction were confounded in response options on the outcome measure. Controlling for this confound eliminated the hypothesis-inconsistent effect of social distance, d = 0.006, 95% CI = [−0.05, 0.07]. These findings provide limited evidence for the predictions of the theory and present a critical challenge for CLT.

Our aim was to examine how people communicate their true and false intentions. Based on construal-level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), we predicted that statements of true intentions would be more concretely phrased than statements of false intentions. True intentions refer to more likely future events than false intentions, and they should therefore be mentally represented at a lower level of mental construal. This should be mirrored in more concrete language use. Transcripts of truthful and deceptive statements about intentions from six previous experimental studies (total N = 528) were analyzed using two automated verbal content analysis approaches: a folk-conceptual measure of concreteness (Brysbaert et al., 2014) and linguistic category model scoring (Seih et al., 2017). Contrary to our hypotheses, veracity did not predict statements' concreteness scores, suggesting that automated verbal analysis of linguistic concreteness is not a viable deception detection technique for intentions.

Amit et al. (2013) concluded that social distance can influence communication preferences: People prefer communicating with closer others using pictures (which are more concrete) and more distant others using words (which are more abstract). We conducted two high-powered preregistered experiments to assess this claim. First, we performed a close replication (N = 988) of Amit et al. (2013, Experiment 2) in which we also manipulated the presence of a potential confound we detected in the original instructions. The original effect successfully replicated using the original instructions but was reduced nearly to zero after the removal of the confound. Moreover, we demonstrate that the effect obtained with the original instructions likely relies on a different mechanism (comfort with sending personal pictures to close and distant contacts) than that posited in the original study (preference for concrete and abstract communication). Second, we performed a conceptual replication (N = 1,280) in which we attempted to address methodological limitations of the original study and our close replication. The results of this conceptual replication were inconsistent with those of the original study and suggested an overall effect size near zero. Our results suggest that social distance has little or no influence on communication medium preferences.

Deception research has been criticized for its common practice of randomly allocating senders to truth-telling and lying conditions. In this study, we directly compared receivers’ lie-detection accuracy when judging randomly assigned vs. self-selected truth-tellers and liars. In a trust-game setting, half of the senders (n = 16) were instructed to lie or tell the truth (random assignment), whereas the other half (n = 16) chose to lie or tell the truth of their own accord (self-selection). We hypothesized that receivers (N = 200) would discriminate more accurately between self-selected liars and truth-tellers when using a feeling-focused (vs. detail-focused) detection strategy, and discriminate more accurately between randomly assigned liars and truth-tellers when using a detail-focused (vs. feeling-focused) detection strategy. Accuracy rates did not vary as a function of veracity assignment or detection strategy, failing to support the claim that random assignment of liars and truth-tellers alters the detectability of deception.

Based on a functional approach to credibility judgments, the authors hypothesize that receivers’ judgments of senders’ credibility involve an evaluative dimension (i.e., good–bad) and are associated with approach and avoidance tendencies. In three experiments (total N = 645), participants (receivers) judged the credibility of suspects (senders) denying involvement in a mock theft. While watching or reading the message, receivers performed an approach-related (arm flexion) or an avoidance-related (arm extension) motor action. Although receivers’ affective evaluations of senders (good–bad) correlated strongly with credibility judgments in all three experiments, the results of the arm position manipulation were mixed. In Experiment 1, receivers in an arm flexion (vs. arm extension) state judged the sender as more credible, but only when informed beforehand about the upcoming credibility judgment. In Experiment 2 and 3, however, there was no evidence of an arm position effect on credibility judgments. A cross-experimental meta-analysis indicated a small and non-significant effect of the manipulation, Hedges’ g = 0.07, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.22]. Multiple interpretations of the results are discussed.

C. J. Wakslak, Y. Trope, N. Liberman, and R. Alony (2006), Seeing the forest when entry is unlikely: Probability and the mental representation of events, Journal of experimental psychology: General, examined the effect of manipulating the likelihood of future events on level of construal (i.e., mental abstraction). Over seven experiments, they consistently found that subjectively unlikely (vs. likely) future events were more abstractly (vs. concretely) construed. This well-cited, but understudied finding has had a major influence on the CLT literature: Likelihood is considered to be one of four psychological distances assumed to influence mental abstraction in similar ways (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Contrary to the original empirical findings, we present two close replication attempts (N = 115 and N = 120; the original studies had N = 20 and N = 34) which failed to find the effect of likelihood on construal level. Bayesian analyses provided diagnostic support for the absence of an effect. In light of the failed replications, we present a meta-analytic summary of the accumulated evidence on the effect. It suggests a strong trend of declining effect sizes as a function of larger samples. These results call into question the previous conclusion that likelihood has a reliable influence on construal level. We discuss the implications of these findings for construal level theory, and advise against treating likelihood as a psychological distance until further tests have established the relationship.

Our aim was to examine how people communicate their true and false intentions. Based on construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), we predicted that statements of true intentions would be more concretely phrased than statements of false intentions. True intentions refer to more likely future events than false intentions, they should be mentally represented at a lower level of mental construal. This should be mirrored in more concrete language use. Transcripts of truthful and deceptive statements about intentions from six previous experimental studies (total N = 528) were analyzed using two automated verbal content analysis approaches: a folk-conceptual measure of concreteness (Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman, 2014) and linguistic category model scoring (Seih, Beier, & Pennebaker, 2017). Contrary to our hypotheses, veracity did not predict statements’ concreteness scores, suggesting that automated verbal analysis of linguistic concreteness is not a viable deception-detection technique for intentions.

True and false intentions (i.e., lies and truths about one's future actions) is a relatively new research topic, despite the high societal value of being able to predict future criminal behavior (e.g., in the case of an alleged terrorist attack). The current study examined how true and false intentions are mentally represented - the knowledge of which can aid the development of new deception detection methods. Participants (N = 151) were asked either to form a true intention about a future task (i.e., retrieve objects from an office) or to form a false intention about the same task (i.e., prepare a cover story about retrieving objects from an office) to conceal their actual intention (i.e., leave a secret note in the office). The schema consistency of the task was manipulated by presenting participants with a list of office supplies (schema-consistent) or random objects (schema-inconsistent) to be retrieved from the office. The abstractness of mental construal was operationalized as the number of categories used by participants to organize the task-relevant objects into thematic groups. We predicted, based on construal level theory (CLT) and action identification theory, that participants would mentally represent true intentions more concretely (i.e., use a larger number of categories) than false intentions, particularly for schema-inconsistent (versus schema-consistent) future tasks. The results of the study lend no support for these predictions. Instead, a Bayesian analysis revealed strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. The findings indicate that predictions from CLT do not readily translate into deception contexts. The results are discussed in light of recent failed attempts to apply CLT to research on true and false intentions, and highlight the need for alternative approaches to the topic.

Abstract The aim of this study was to examine how people mentally represent and depict true and false statements about claimed future actions—so‐called true and false intentions. On the basis of construal level theory, which proposes that subjectively unlikely events are more abstractly represented than likely ones, we hypothesized that false intentions should be represented at a more abstract level than true intentions. Fifty‐six hand drawings, produced by participants to describe mental images accompanying either true or false intentions, were rated on level of abstractness by a second set of participants (N = 117) blind to the veracity of the intentions. As predicted, drawings of false intentions were rated as more abstract than drawings of true intentions. This result advances the use of drawing‐based deception detection techniques to the field of true and false intentions and highlights the potential for abstractness as a novel cue to deceit.

The aim was to examine how people mentally represent alleged future actions-their true and false intentions. In two experiments, participants were asked to either tell the truth (i.e., express true intentions) or lie (i.e., express false intentions) about performing future tasks. Drawing on Construal Level Theory, which proposes that psychologically distant events are more abstractly construed than proximal ones, it was predicted that liars would have more abstract mental representations of the future tasks than truth tellers, due to differences in hypotheticality (i.e., the likelihood of the future tasks occurring). Construal level was measured by a video segmentation task (Experiment 1, N = 125) and preference for abstract or concrete descriptions of tasks (Experiment 2, N = 59). Veracity had no effect on construal level. Speaking against our initial predictions, the data indicate that true and false intentions are construed at similar levels of abstraction. The results are discussed in the light of Construal Level Theory and the emerging psycho-legal research on true and false intentions.