Motivated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s project on the disaggregation of income statement expenses, we study a Korean rule change that allowed firms to withhold a previously mandated disaggregation of cost of sales (CoS). We find that after withholding, firms’ profitability increases by 1.6 percentage points. Our industry-focused results suggest that withholding affects profitability by reducing the transfer of competitive information to peer firms. We then document a range of evidence consistent with the idea that firms withhold disaggregated CoS to protect cost innovations from rivals. First, we construct a novel measure of firms’ cost-innovative potential and show that it predicts withholding and subsequent profitability gains under the voluntary disclosure regime. Second, we document efficiency gains following the withholding of disaggregated CoS. Third, our survey experiment of 1,257 U.S. public firm managers shows that they would reduce investments in process/cost innovations if they were required to disaggregate CoS. Our study highlights to standard setters and academics that CoS disaggregation entails operational consequences for firms. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, the Stanford Graduate School of Business, and the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4780 .

We study the effects of grade nondisclosure (GND) policies implemented within master of business administration (MBA) programs at highly ranked business schools. GND precludes students from disclosing their grades and grade point averages (GPAs) to employers. In the labor market, we find that GND weakens the positive relation between GPA and employer desirability. During the MBA program, we find that GND reduces students’ academic effort for a given course by approximately 4.9% relative to comparable students not subject to the policy. Consistent with our model, in which abilities are potentially correlated and students can substitute effort toward other activities in order to signal GPA-focused abilities, students participate in more extracurricular activities and enroll in more difficult courses under GND. Finally, we show that students’ tenure with their first employers after graduation decreases under GND. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4816 .

ABSTRACTI examine the effects of the U.S. Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reporting Program, which requires thousands of industrial facilities to measure and report their GHG emissions. I show that facilities reduce their GHG emissions by 7.9% following the disclosure of emissions data. The evidence indicates that benchmarking—whereby facilities use the disclosures of their peers to assess their own relative GHG performance—spurs emission reductions. Firms' concerns about future legislation appear to motivate this behavior and measurement alone (without disclosure) seems not to reduce emissions. My study highlights how mandatory GHG disclosure can create real effects for peers.

We examine how information about the diversity of a potential employer's workforce affects individuals' job-seeking behavior. We embed a field experiment in job recommendation emails from a leading career advice agency in the United States. The experimental treatment involves highlighting a diversity metric to jobseekers. Our results indicate that disclosing diversity scores in job postings leads jobseekers to click on firms with higher diversity scores, with such effects varying across jobseeker demographics. A follow-up survey provides evidence on potential explanations for why jobseekers value diversity information. We then examine how jobseekers' preferences for diversity relate to disclosure choices under the U.S. SEC Human Capital Disclosure requirement. We find that firms in industries characterized by higher jobseeker responsiveness to diversity information tend to voluntarily disclose diversity metrics in their 10-Ks under these new disclosure requirements.

In 2010, the United States mandated the reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for thousands of manufacturing facilities. Studying this rule, and focusing on facilities for which emissions information was largely not available elsewhere, I find a 7.9% emissions reduction following disclosure. I highlight the role of ‘benchmarking’. Specifically, facilities are able to assess their own, relative GHG performance once they can observe their peers' disclosures. This benchmarking facilitates emissions reductions. In contrast, I highlight uncertainty around whether measurement and reporting to the regulator alone, prior to disclosure, leads to emissions reductions. Lastly, I show that concern about future legislation partly motivates the observed responses. The main takeaway is that mandatory, granular disclosure can curb GHG emissions, and that benchmarking plays an important role in this process.