Cecile Fabre’s Through a Glass Darkly offers a compelling account of the ethics of espionage drawn from both interpersonal morality and democratic and cosmopolitan political theory. Yet the spying that her theory finds permissible or prohibited does not map onto the spying that states undertake and that international law either explicitly or implicitly authorizes. That law allows or tolerates significant spying to promote compliance with diverse international legal regimes as well as advance other important public order values — well beyond that allowed under Fabre's theory. This disconnect represents a challenge for her theory and ideal theory generally. This essay identifies these gaps and considers alternative approaches to addressing them. It argues that the political morality of spying should be explored through institutional moral reasoning that takes account of the actual practices, expectations, and institutions that states have created; it then offers a set of criteria for the international political morality of espionage. The essay concludes with a discussion of a key feature of all espionage, namely the secrecy of the methods used — as opposed to their goal of find others’ secrets. International law is both pushing transparency in many areas yet still allowing secret conduct by states, and these practices should also inform a theory of espionage.

Investor accountability in international investment law (IIL) has been gaining increasing traction in recent years. Most visibly, some states have included investor obligations in their investment treaties, while others have made them part of their model treaties. While highly significant for the substance of IIL, these duties need adequate procedural tools to enforce them. Otherwise, investor obligations will be only decorative features of investment treaties without any legal meaning. The oft-discussed option of counterclaims is limited insofar as it may only be launched after an investor has made a claim against a state. As a result, it is important to identify other potential pieces of the procedural infrastructure for investor accountability. This article analyses three such methods: indirect actions that link an investor's access to arbitration to its compliance with legal rules and standards, whether in domestic or international law; direct actions by states against investors; and direct actions by individuals against investors. In each case, we assess the existing legal landscape of arbitral and treaty practice, the most promising legal avenues for advancing that method of accountability, and potential challenges to these avenues. Given the procedural focus of the negotiations for ISDS reform taking place at UNCITRAL Working Group 3, it is a particularly opportune time for this exploration of these options.

International law is central to the interpretation of both of the Brexit-related treaties. The TCA explicitly requires the parties and any dispute settlement body to interpret it according to the rules of interpretation of public international law, notably the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The WA, and thus the Protocol, by specifying that any of its provisions concerning Union law or concepts must be interpreted in accordance with EU law (including the case law of the CJEU), implies that its many provisions not concerning EU law will need to be interpreted by the default rules of treaty interpretation, namely those of the VCLT. This chapter provides a brief overview of those rules and some of their implications for these two instruments. It focuses on Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, which concern the interpretation of treaties.

International law informs, and is informed by, concerns for global justice. Yet the two fields that engage most with prescribing the normative structure of the world order – international law and the philosophy of global justice – have tended to work on parallel tracks. Many international lawyers, with their commitment to formal sources, regard considerations of substantive (and not merely procedural) justice as ultra vires for much of their work. Philosophers of global justice, in turn, tend to explore the moral commitments of international actors without grappling with the international legal doctrine or institutions. In recent years, however, both disciplines have begun to engage with one another more. This discussion among international lawyers and philosophers addresses the promises of and challenges to interdisciplinary approaches to global justice. The contributors consider the added value of philosophical inquiry to issues facing international law practitioners or scholars, the salience of of international law for political philosophy, and the methodological distinctions between the two fields. The contributors also identify promising lines and examples of interdisciplinary scholarship.

As discussions on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement deepen and gather momentum at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), this article delves into a specific and fundamental issue: the requirement that adjudicators in investment disputes are and remain independent and impartial. It begins by explaining the principle of independence and impartiality in international courts and tribunals, with a focus on arbitral institutions. The article then highlights a range of specific concerns that the present system of investor-State arbitration raises in respect of independence and impartiality. Finally, it provides a comparative analysis of how different reform proposals presently discussed within UNCITRAL Working Group III would fare in terms of delivering a dispute resolution mechanism that ensures independence and impartiality. Rather than providing one specific solution, this article assesses the different options discussed, with the aim to help both policy-makers considering reform and other stakeholders and scholars.

International investment law and domestic law governing foreign investment strongly influence one another and indeed operate in a relationship of co-dependency or interoperability. Yet the flows between the two bodies of law, and their respective modalities of influence, remain generally unexplored in international legal theory. To shed light on this important phenomenon, this article traces the ways in which international investment law can affect the content of domestic investment law, using theories of international law compliance as a lens for such an understanding. It then proposes a set of pathways by which domestic law can influence the content of international investment rules. International law thus depends upon national law not only for its implementation but for its very content. Indeed, the regime of investment law will not tolerate significant discrepancies between the two. An appreciation of this dynamic is critical to evaluating the prospects of improvements to international investment law and can inform the ongoing discussions among stakeholders to this end.

Despite a common agenda of normative analysis of the international order, philosophical work on international political morality and international law and legal scholarship have, until recently, worked at a distance from one another. The mutual suspicion can be traced to different aims and methodologies, including a divide between work on matters of deep structure, on the one hand, and practical institutional analysis and prescription, on the other. Yet international law is a key part of the normative practices of states, has a direct effect on state behavior, and, as a methodological matter, can contribute to good theorizing on matters of international ethics. Recently, philosophical work has demonstrated a greater engagement with the moral aspects of international law. One strand of scholarship has treated the rules of international law as a proper subject for philosophical inquiry. Another has used international legal rules to support moral arguments about aspects of the international order. Future dialogue and cooperation would benefit both fields, in particular on the challenges to global cooperation from nationalism and on strategies for allocating responsibilities among global actors for rectifying global harms.

The legal regime regulating cross-border investment gives key rights to foreign investors and places significant duties on states hosting that investment. It also raises distinctive moral questions due to its potential to constrain a state’s ability to manage its economy and protect its people. Yet international investment law remains virtually untouched as a subject of philosophical inquiry. The questions of international political morality surrounding investment rules can be mapped through the lens of two critiques of the law – that it systemically takes advantage of the global South and that it constrains the policy choices of states hosting investment. Each critique contains certain moral and empirical assumptions that deserve further attention. The distributive justice implications of international investment rules are also relevant to scholars of global distributive justice. The aim of the analysis is to develop an interdisciplinary agenda – among law, philosophy, and social science – for inquiry into the justice of investment law and reform of its unjust elements.

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 27, Issue 1 p. 107-135 Survey Article Survey Article: Global Investment Rules as a Site for Moral Inquiry† Steven R. Ratner, Corresponding Author Bob.Goodin@anu.edu.au Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Correspondence: Email: Bob.Goodin@anu.edu.auSearch for more papers by this author Steven R. Ratner, Corresponding Author Bob.Goodin@anu.edu.au Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Correspondence: Email: Bob.Goodin@anu.edu.auSearch for more papers by this author First published: 25 December 2018 https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12177Citations: 3 †I appreciate comments from Toni Erskine, David Lefkowitz, Carmen Pavel, and Laura Valentini, and research assistance from Drew Kramer. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume27, Issue1March 2019Pages 107-135 RelatedInformation

International humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) are the product of lawmaking processes that are not captured in the black-letter doctrine of sources under which Article 38 of the ICJ Statute is the rule of recognition for international law. Despite efforts by certain institutional players and scholars to place these two regimes squarely within Article 38, both remain distinct in terms of how actors determine whether a purported rule is a legal rule. These distinctions constitute a challenge to the idea of a unified rule of recognition and argue instead for looking for indicators (not rules) about a norm's legal status. More important, IHL and ICL demonstrate not merely the futility, but the hazards, of a unified rule of recognition. For the purpose of a concept of sources is to ground the legitimacy of international law and, consequently, create the conditions for respect for and compliance with it. In that case, we need to treat any doctrine of sources as a tool, and not an end in itself. Such a move requires that we do precisely what traditional doctrine seems to reject – to link the identification of a rule as law not only with the context in which it is formed (including its subject area), but with the context in which the norm is invoked. I conclude with thoughts about the ethical sources of IHL and ICL, a topic neglected in scholarship on sources.

The last decade has witnessed a series of criticisms from states, NGOs, and scholars of international investment law’s rules and procedures. Running in parallel, and for a longer period, political philosophers have developed theories about what would constitute a just international economic order. Yet international law and philosophy have not directly engaged with one another regarding the justice of international investment law. This article attempts to breach that gap by analyzing the key critiques of investment law from the perspective of theories of global justice. Philosophical approaches are useful for appraising investment law because they offer a rigorous framework for thinking carefully about where investment law should be going; because rules that align with our sense of justice are more likely to be respected; and because these inquiries force lawyers to be more honest about the moral assumptions they already make in defending or attacking international investment law. Two of the main critiques of investment law—a systemic critique and a policy-space critique—are analyzed from the perspective of distributive justice. A third, institutional, critique is examined from perspectives within legal philosophy concerning procedural justice and the rule of law. The piece concludes with a series of suggestions for integrating the legal and philosophical discussions regarding investment law.

European Journal of International Security The European Journal of International Security (EJIS) will publish rigorous, peer-reviewed theoretical, methodological and empirical papers at the cutting-edge of security research. Welcoming high quality research from around the world, EJIS will cover all areas of international security publishing papers that significantly advance scholarship through original analysis of a salient policy issue, the exploitation of new data, and/or the innovative development and application of theory. Editor-in-Chief Timothy Edmunds, University of Bristol

This paper considers the implications of Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin's On Complicity and Compromise (OUP, 2013) for our understanding of international law. That volume systematizes and evaluates individuals’ ethical choices in getting (too) close to evil acts. For the law of nations, these concepts are relevant in three critical ways. First, they capture the dilemmas of those charged with implementing international law, e.g., Red Cross delegates pledged to confidentiality learning of torture in a prison. Second, they offer a rubric for understanding when a state may use coercion against certain actors, e.g., international law's rules for when one state may use force against another based on the latter's ties to terrorist acts. Third, they offer a moral grounding for many international obligations of states based on the need to avoid their own complicity in others' wrongs, e.g., by not expelling refugees to a state persecuting them or by preventing private actors from committing human rights abuses. In the case of the last two, the law reflects decisions by states about how much complicity they will tolerate – either complicity by others or complicity by the states themselves. From the perspective of an international lawyer concerned with promoting the rule of law internationally, Lepora and Goodin's framework helps us appreciate the moral basis behind certain legal rules. To the extent we can see legal rules, international or domestic, as morally acceptable and just and not merely the product of power politics, we increase the prospects for compliance with them. A moral acceptable approach to complicity within the law can have more buy-in than a rule without such a moral grounding. Equally important, international law's approach to complicity helps our understanding of morality itself by marking some clear lines in the sand.

With the UN's attention to individual accountability for human rights abuses now well into its third decade, this paper appraises the added value of a UN role and the best methods for accomplishing it. The paper argues that human rights fact-finding is an especially important task for the UN and considers, based on past practice, the factors that contribute to successful fact-finding as well as the pitfalls for the UN to avoid in the future. Some of the insights are based on the author's membership in the Secretary-General Group of Experts for Cambodia and the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka. This paper was originally delivered as the John P. Humphrey Lecture in Human Rights at McGill University in September 2014.

Academic discourse on global justice is at an all-time high. Within ethics and international law, scholars are undertaking new inquiries into age-old questions of building a just world order. Ethics – within political and moral philosophy – poses fundamental questions about responsibilities at the global level and produces a tightly reasoned set of frameworks regarding world order. International law, with its focus on legal norms and institutional arrangements, provides a path, as well as illuminates the obstacles, to implementing theories of the right or of the good. Yet despite the complementarity of these two projects, neither is drawing what it should from the other. The result is ethical scholarship that often avoids, or even misinterprets, the law; and law that marginalizes ethics even as it recognizes the importance of justice. The cost of this avoidance is a set of missed opportunities for both fields. This article seeks to help transform the limited dialogue between philosophers and international lawyers into a meaningful collaboration. Through a critical stocktaking of the contributions of the two disciplines, examining where they do and do not engage with the other, it offers an appraisal of the causes and costs of separation and an argument for an interdisciplinary approach.

The International Committee of the Red Cross casts itself as both a unique protector of individual victims of war and a special guardian of the body of international humanitarian law. It manages and reconciles these two roles through a complex, unconventional strategy that includes secret communications with warring parties, ambiguity in conveying its legal views to them, and, at times, a complete avoidance of legal arguments when persuading actors to follow international rules. This modus operandi not only challenges some standard views about the methods used by actors seeking to convince law violators to comply with norms; it also opens the door to a richer theoretical understanding of legal argumentation in that process of persuasion. The resulting construct consists of a matrix of inputs that determine how a persuading entity will deploy legal arguments and outputs that convey the dimensions of the resulting argumentation. Both the theory and the ICRC's work suggest that entities concerned with compliance would often do best to settle for a target to act consistently with a norm rather than to internalize it. They also raise difficult moral questions about whether compliance with international law is the optimal goal if it has adverse consequences for the values an institution seeks to uphold.