Abstract The chapter explores how companies with kleptocratic sources of wealth can secure their gains by listing themselves on the London Stock Exchange. It compares two companies from Kazakhstan, Kazakhmys and ENRC, who came to market with the aid of various accountancy firms, investment banks and lawyers. The listings of these companies not only legitimized them but entrenched the kleptocratic political economy of Kazakhstan, as the listings generated millions for the company owners, all close associates of the country’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and working under his auspices. This could not have been achieved without the help of British professional who whitewashed Kazakhmys’ history and obscured ENRC’s kleptocratic links.

The emergence and survival of 'Londongrad', despite the UK anti-money laundering regime, is an intellectual and policy conundrum. We analyse an original dataset of 2 pound billion of domestic real estate in the United Kingdom owned by elites from post-Soviet states in the period 1998-2020. Our results show an incumbency advantage: exiles are more likely to lose their property, while incumbent elites-even from hostile states such as Russia-retain theirs. Cases that appear to diverge from this rule may be explained by effective legal enabling, which allows a small number of exiles to beat the odds.

Abstract This chapter address defamation law and the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) against journalists and researchers. The authors discuss their own experience of being targeted by some of the UK’s top libel lawyers acting on behalf of two of the elites studied in this book—Mohamed Amersi and Dmitry Leus—in order to mute the findings of earlier research by threatening legal action against the publisher. The chapter shows the difference that legal enablers make and how they subtly silence critics on behalf of those who wish to keep hidden information regarding their suspicious and often kleptocratic sources of wealth.

Abstract This chapter considers the corporate intelligence sector’s provision of asset tracing, surveillance, and security services in the battles between kleptocrats and their exiles. It focuses on Arcanum Global’s relationship with the Nazarbayev regime of Kazakhstan. When the regime lost power in the country in 2022, UK corporate intelligence providers not only defended Nazarbayev allies against the new government but took action against journalists who reported on their activities. While corporate intelligence themselves claim to work with Western allies, the chapter shows how they operate as professionals for private hire, often enabling kleptocratic practices and suppressing critical reporting through legal and extra-legal means.

Abstract This chapter delves into the global expansion of finance from the aftermath of World War II to the rise of Londongrad, examining how the pivotal shifts of the postwar era took place in the contexts of the ends of empire. With the decline of the British Empire in the second half of the twentieth century, London transformed itself into a global hub of financial, legal, and related services catering to the demands of the super-rich, including citizenship and residency investment schemes, legal services, and reputation management. As these industries flourished, London emerged as a financial epicentre, benefiting from becoming a centre for both new postcolonial elites and global finance. In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to chaotic privatizations, resulting in the rapid transfer of state-owned assets into private hands. The chapter scrutinizes the trajectory of post-communist Russia and Eastern Europe more widely, while exploring London, UK Crown Dependencies, and the British Overseas Territories which became conduits for capital flight.

Abstract This chapter explores how the UK and its former colonies opened the door for corrupt capital and kleptocrats through the practice of selling passports and visas. It examines some of the corruption scandals that have involved such citizenship by investment (CBI) schemes, such as in Cyprus, where several politicians have gone on trial. In the UK, most investment visas were given to citizens of Russia and China, with little due diligence performed on applicants. The chapter emphasizes that demand for such schemes was created by such companies as Henley & Partners, which has in some instances been responsible for creating and running the programmes for a government, while at the same time working for clients who are using such schemes.

Abstract This chapter introduces the UK’s kleptocracy problem with s case study of Mohamed Amersi, a professional who made his money in the kleptocratic business environments of post-communist Eurasia and went on to become a philanthropist and donor to some of the UK’s most prestigious institutions. Amersi’s case is complex and illustrates the competing narratives about the kleptocracy problem, The chapter argues that kleptocracy is political, global, and professional. It is political because it typically involves a source of wealth in a particular country where business and politics are intertwined. It is global because the assets, status and influence of kleptocrats are often acquired in and/or via a third country or countries. It is professional because enablers in the financial, legal and other service sectors make kleptocracy possible. The chapter offers new definitions of kleptocracy and enabling and lays out the content and argument of the book.

Abstract This chapter concludes the book with its finding on the role of enablers in indulging post-communist elites in the UK. It summarizes the findings that the enabler effect is more important than the rival explanations of alliance and incumbency. The chapter refutes the notion that the state could stop kleptocrats if the government decides to do so because the power of the private sector to indulge kleptocracy is far greater than the state’s power to regulate and enforce the law. The chapter makes five theses of how the UK may stop indulging kleptocracy, which include recognizing kleptocracy as organized crime, holding corporate officers of professional services firms which enable kleptocracy criminally liable, and incentivizing the private sector and civil society to work together against kleptocracy

Abstract This chapter examines how real estate in the UK is a prime target for wealth corruptly acquired in kleptocracies. The case study features Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of Uzbekistan’s first president, who received over $1 billion in bribes from telecoms companies, most notably the Scandinavian firm Telia. Karimova invested almost a quarter of these bribes in real estate around the world, including five luxury properties in the UK. Although three were later seized by the UK authorities, two had been sold at a profit despite details of the bribery scandal being reported by the media, including the names of one of her accomplices, in whose name the properties were bought. The chapter raises questions as to the due diligence performed by the solicitor responsible for the sale and queries the effectiveness of anti-money-laundering regulations as a whole.

Abstract This chapter examines the failure of a new investigative tool, the unexplained wealth order (UWO), which was introduced in 2018 as a means to crack down on corrupt capital being brought into the UK’s real estate market. It examines two of the first UWO investigations that targeted UK properties owned by officials in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. While the Azeri exile Zamira Hajiyeva—wife of jailed banker Jahangir Hajiyev, who had clearly fallen out of political favour in Azerbaijan—lost her property, the Kazakh incumbents Dariga Nazarbayeva and Nurali Aliyev—relatives of the then president of the country, and very much in positions of power—kept theirs. The chapter shows how the incumbency advantage combined with the enabler effect to make the difference.

Abstract Chapter 4 explores the supply of professional services and postulates that an enabler effect of third parties largely in the private sector is more important in explaining the indulgence of kleptocracy than rival explanations of geopolitics (the alliance effect) and domestic politics in kleptocracies (the incumbency advantage). The enabler effect is the largely legal work done by professionals in the service of kleptocrats. The chapter outlines enabling in terms of upstream and downstream, wilful and unwitting, and compliant and noncompliant. It argues that while the supply side of the problem is complex and varied, it is possible to identify a common pattern and evaluate the power of the enabler effect across many professional service sectors.

This article discusses the phenomenon of transnational kleptocracy and explains how kleptocrats and oligarchs have been welcomed in rule-of-law settings. The paper summarises a large body of research, including our recent book, Indulging Kleptocracyprofessional indulgences

Abstract This chapter looks at the issue of political and charitable donations from individuals who have made their money in kleptocracies. It examines two individuals, firstly Dmitry Leus, a banker born in Turkmenistan but who made his money in Russia, and Liubov Chernukhin, a businesswoman whose husband served under Putin as the Russian deputy minister of finance. Leus attempted to donate to the foundation of the then Prince Charles, while Chernukhin donated extensively to the Conservative Party. The chapter questions the motivations for such donations and explores the push for such funding on behalf of the ruling Conservative Party under its then co-chairman, Ben Elliot. It was Elliot’s concierge service which offered the intimacy and access craved by these rich Russians in the UK.

Abstract This chapter examines donations to UK universities and educational institutions from kleptocratic sources, raising questions of academic freedom and integrity. The main case study focuses on Oxford University’s Nizami Ganjavi centre, which features the Azerbaijani president’s sister-in-law on its board and received an anonymous donation of £10 million. The chapter explores the potential for authoritarian regimes to launder their reputation through such partnerships, while considering their potential impact on academic freedom. Additionally, it highlights the lack of transparency and accountability in these transactions. In the absence of professional enablers, it is universities themselves that are prepared to sell their status.

Abstract This chapter explores how kleptocracies siphon money abroad, and how enablers in the UK play a key role. The chapter focuses on a case study which features a US-based public communications firm, APCO, which helped the largest bank in Kyrgyz Republic clean up its reputation by hiring several former US Senators to its board. The bank, AsiaUniversalBank, was later shown to be a money-laundering vehicle which used shell companies to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars out of the country under the corrupt presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The chapter shows how the PR firm’s hiring of the former Senators helped the bank gain legitimacy and embed itself in the global financial system.

Abstract London has long been the global safehouse for suspicious wealth from Russian and Eurasian elites. But how do UK-based professionals facilitate the passage of post-communist elites and their kleptocratic wealth into Britain? And why has a G7 economy and self-styled defender of the rules-based international order become so exposed to the oligarchs of hostile powers? The tale of the causes and consequences of the growth of ‘Londongrad’ is one of the most fascinating stories of the post–Cold War era. Indulging Kleptocracy shows how professional enablers service their post-communist elite clients by hiding, protecting, and legitimizing wealth which originates in kleptocratic environments. These indulgences include the listing of oligarchs’ companies on the London Stock Exchange, purchasing residencies through investment, and defending their wealth against orders from the National Crime Agency. Their enabling further extends to reputation laundering and influencing including buying status through philanthropy, making friends via political donations, and silencing of critics via libel action. It identifies nine services (professional indulgences) in total, each offered by Britain’s services sectors to Russia and Eurasian kleptocrats. Enriched with case studies of these indulgences, the book demonstrates how the enabler effect is far stronger than competing explanations in political economy and international relations. By tracing processes of enabling, it shows how the supply of services makes the difference—and at what consequence locally and globally.

This paper aims to provide evidence and analysis of the conveyor belt that allows Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) to rehabilitate their money in western financial centres, while inserting Nigerian material into debates about transnational kleptocracy. It fleshes out the chain of service provision going from developing countries to western boutique firms or 'rogue' providers, ultimately reaching out to the large blue-chip firms that are instrumental for the validation of PEP wealth and reputations. We use an interpretive practice tracing methodology to elucidate the steps leading to money-laundering, relying on data from a wealth of primary and secondary sources as well as a wider dataset of residential real estate purchases. On the basis of these empirical insights, we find that enabling practices cannot be neatly situated in a dichotomy of lawful and unlawful behaviour. Given that the current assumptions lack nuance, the policy response is likewise skewed, often looking to identify the 'exception to the rule' rather than appreciating the more systemic nature of the problem. Consequently, we argue that there is a need for a conceptual shift in the way professional enablers are framed and analysed, suggesting that their environment can be more helpfully divided into upstream and downstream roles.