Human hunter-gatherer groups were commonly thought to be broadly egalitarian, with increasingly formal hierarchical social structures hypothesized to spread following the introduction of agriculture. However, this view is being challenged by mounting evidence for social hierarchies in several foraging populations. Nonetheless, the processes by which such hierarchies emerge, and whether human hierarchies are homologous with non-human systems of dominance, remains unclear. Here we examine the role of prestige, the tendency to freely confer status and influence on skilled or esteemed individuals and a proposed component of human-unique cultural psychology, in generating unequal patterns of social influence. Through a combination of cultural evolutionary modelling, human experimentation, and evolutionary simulations, we find that human prestige psychology generates highly unequal influence hierarchies, and that the "prestige sensitivity" we measure empirically in human participants closely matches the predictions of our evolutionary simulations, suggesting it is an evolved psychological adaptation. Nonetheless, unlike non-human dominance hierarchies, the processes involved are non-coercive, being driven by individuals freely seeking high quality information. We thus conclude that social hierarchies plausibly have a deep evolutionary history in our lineage, with prestige enabling hierarchies to be mutually beneficial as opposed to coercive.

Reviving Gould and Lewontin's critique of adaptationism, Singh's subjective selection favors truth over useful simplification. Nonetheless, while psychologically plausible, its explanatory power remains limited. Moreover, by treating evolved psychology as fixed, it neglects gene-culture coevolution. The result is a vision of cultural evolution whose expansiveness risks outpacing its scientific utility.

Cultural evolutionary theory has shown that social learning is adaptive across a broad range of conditions. While existing theory can account for why some social information is ignored, humans frequently under-utilise beneficial social information in experimental settings. One account of this is epistemic vigilance, whereby individuals avoid social information that is likely to be untrustworthy, though few experiments have directly tested this. We addressed this using a two-player online experiment where participants completed the same task in series. Player one provided social information for player two in the form of freely offered advice or their actual answer (termed "spying"). We manipulated the payoff structure of the task such that it had either a cooperative, competitive, or neutral incentive. As predicted, we found that under a competitive payoff structure: (i) player one was more likely to provide dishonest advice; and (ii) player two reduced their use of social information. Also, (iii) spied information was more influential than advice, and (iv) player two chose to spy rather than receive advice when offered the choice. Unexpectedly, the ability to choose between advice and spied information increased social influence. Finally, exploratory analyses found that the most trusting participants preferred to receive advice, while the least trusting participants favoured receiving no social information at all. Overall, our experiment supports the hypothesis that humans both use and provide social information strategically in a manner consistent with epistemic vigilance.

Author-paid publication fees, often associated with so-called “gold” open access journals, lead to the corruption of science by incentivizing the publication of low-quality research and exacerbate inequalities between institutions that are prestigious and well-funded and those that are less so. Pressures to pay article processing fees on the part of funding agencies and university libraries waste research funding and stymie efforts to establish more sustainable publishing systems. We recommend a total abandonment of author-paid publication fees for academic research, the publication of which is typically a public good yet serves to enrich publishers while degrading research outputs. Alternative approaches related to “green” and “diamond” open access are cautiously recommended, as is a refocusing on society-run journals. We encourage the search for alternative models for evaluating and publicizing scientific research, including the formal modelling of competing approaches.

Collating the neural traits possessed by taxa provides valuable evidence about brain evolution. However, to get the full scientific benefit, we must pair it with an understanding of the selection pressures driving brain complexity. This can be achieved by considering the heterogeneity of the animal's environment alongside the reliability of information. A complex environment selects for a complex brain.

Abstract Conformist transmission is a transmission bias, or social learning strategy, that disproportionately favours popular cultural variants. Over the past 40 years it has received a great deal of attention, both theoretical and empirical. Here the authors provide an overview of the current state of this literature, including what conformist transmission is; how it relates to other similar terms; how it can be operationalized mathematically; its adaptive value; the impact it has upon cultural evolutionary dynamics; and the evidence for and against it in humans and other species. The authors conclude by identifying gaps in current theory and limitations of experimental work. In particular, the authors emphasize the need for theory that accounts for demonstrators with inconsistent preferences and the need for empirical work to carefully distinguish between conformist tendencies and conformist evolutionary dynamics.

The environmental complexity hypothesis suggests that cognition evolves to allow animals to negotiate a complex and changing environment. By contrast, signal detection theory suggests cognition exploits environmental regularities by containing biases (e.g. to avoid dangerous predators). Therefore, two significant bodies of theory on cognitive evolution may be in tension: one foregrounds environmental complexity, the other regularity. Difficulty in reconciling these theories stems from their focus on different aspects of cognition. The environmental complexity hypothesis focuses on the reliability of sensors in the origin of cognition, while signal detection theory focuses on decision making in cognitively sophisticated animals. Here, we extend the signal detection model to examine the joint evolution of mechanisms for detecting information (sensory systems) and those that process information to produce behaviour (decision-making systems). We find that the transition to cognition can only occur if processing compensates for unreliable sensors by trading-off errors. Further, we provide an explanation for why animals with sophisticated sensory systems nonetheless disregard the reliable information it provides, by having biases for particular behaviours. Our model suggests that there is greater nuance than has been previously appreciated, and that both complexity and regularity can promote cognition.

Theories of how humans came to be so ecologically dominant increasingly centre on the adaptive abilities of human culture and its capacity for cumulative change and high-fidelity transmission. Here we revisit this hypothesis by comparing human culture with animal cultures and cases of epigenetic inheritance and parental effects. We first conclude that cumulative change and high transmission fidelity are not unique to human culture as previously thought, and so they are unlikely to explain its adaptive qualities. We then evaluate the evidence for seven alternative explanations: the inheritance of acquired characters, the pathways of inheritance, the non-random generation of variation, the scope of heritable variation, effects on organismal fitness, effects on genetic fitness and effects on evolutionary dynamics. From these, we identify the open-ended scope of human cultural variation as a key, but generally neglected, phenomenon. We end by articulating a hypothesis for the cognitive basis of this open-endedness. How did human culture become ecologically dominant? Morgan and Feldman re-examine existing theoretical accounts and propose that, contrary to previous belief, cumulative change and high transmission fidelity are not unique to human culture.

While humans are highly cooperative, they can also behave spitefully. Yet spite remains understudied. Spite can be normatively driven and while previous experiments have found some evidence that cooperation and punishment may spread via social learning, no experiments have considered the social transmission of spiteful behaviour. Here we present an online experiment where, following an opportunity to earn wealth, we asked participants to choose an action towards an anonymous partner across a full spectrum of social behaviour, from spite to altruism. In accordance with cultural evolutionary theory, participants were presented with social information that varied in source and content. Across six conditions, we informed participants that either the majority or the highest earner had chosen to behave spitefully, neutrally or altruistically. We found an overall tendency towards altruism, but at lower levels among those exposed to spite compared with altruism. We found no difference between social information that came from the majority or the highest earner. Exploratory analysis revealed that participants' earnings negatively correlated with altruistic behaviour. Our results contrast with previous literature that report high rates of spite in experimental samples and a greater propensity for individuals to copy successful individuals over the majority.

The maintenance of cross-cultural variation and arbitrary traditions in human populations is a key question in cultural evolution. Conformist transmission, the tendency to follow the majority, was previously considered central to this phenomenon. However, recent theory indicates that cognitive biases can greatly reduce its ability to maintain traditions. Therefore, we expanded prior models to investigate two other ways that cultural variation can be sustained: payoff-biased transmission and norm reinforcement. Our findings predict that both payoff-biased transmission and reinforcement can enhance conformist transmission's ability to maintain traditions. However, payoff-biased transmission can only sustain cultural variation if it is functionally related to environmental factors. In contrast, norm reinforcement readily generates and maintains arbitrary cultural variation. Furthermore, reinforcement results in path-dependent cultural dynamics, meaning that historical traditions influence current practices, even though group behaviours have changed. We conclude that environmental variation probably plays a role in functional cultural traditions, but arbitrary cultural variation is more plausibly due to the reinforcement of norm compliance.

Mate choice is a fitness-relevant decision, that can be informed by the mate choices of others. Such mate-choice copying has been documented across multiple species, including humans. However, so has copying in many other contexts. As such, the exent to which mate-choice copying is underpinned by the same psychological mechanisms as copying in other contexts remains unclear. To test these hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment (recruiting from M-Turk, n = 165) to examine whether human mate choice copying is prestige and/or conformist biased (both of which are documented in other domains), and whether it differs between men and women. If mate choice copying is underpinned by broad-context mechanisms, we predict it will be similar in men and women, with both groups also exhibiting prestige-biased and conformist transmission. Our results match these predictions, exhibiting no evidence of a difference in mate-choice copying between men and women, and evidence of prestige-biased and conformist transmission. These results suggest that mate choice copying is the product of adaptive, broad-context copying mechanisms.

The density of epidermal ridges in a fingerprint varies predictably by age and sex. Archaeologists are therefore interested in using recovered fingerprints to learn about the ancient people who produced them. Recent studies focus on estimating the age and sex of individuals by measuring their fingerprints with one of two similar metrics: mean ridge breadth (MRB) or ridge density (RD). Yet these attempts face several critical problems: expected values for adult females and adolescent males are inherently indistinguishable, and inter-assemblage variation caused by biological and technological differences cannot be easily estimated. Each of these factors greatly decreases the accuracy of predictions based on individual prints, and together they condemn this strategy to relative uselessness. However, information in fingerprints from across an assemblage can be pooled to generate a more accurate depiction of potter demographics. We present a new approach to epidermal ridge density analysis using Bayesian mixture models with the following key benefits:•Age and sex are estimated more accurately than existing methods by incorporating a data-driven understanding of how demographics and ridge density covary.•Uncertainty in demographic estimates is automatically quantified and included in output.•The Bayesian framework can be easily adapted to fit the unique needs of different researchers.

Abstract Human adaptation relies on the multigenerational transmission and accumulation of both skills and knowledge. Nonetheless, there is currently no agreement on which factor, or combination of factors, explains our peculiar ability to do so. Theoretical and empirical work, however, has identified many candidates that operate at both the individual and population levels. This chapter starts by giving a brief overview of these factors that support cultural transmission before highlighting the relative lack of research on the cultural transmission of skills. The chapter characterizes skills as behaviours that rely on fine motor control and knowledge as mental states that guide behaviours. Many behaviours require both complex knowledge and skilled actions to be effective. Nonetheless, the chapter argues that the field of cultural evolution has largely studied the transmission and evolution of knowledge, as opposed to skill, raising the possibility that it presents an incomplete picture of human adaptation. Drawing on evidence from anthropology and economics, the chapter suggests that the cultural evolutionary dynamics of skill are likely to differ from those of knowledge. Specifically, it argues that (i) skills are less reliant on language for transmission than is knowledge; (ii) skills are more costly to transmit than knowledge; (iii) skills are transmitted along different pathways than is knowledge, and are more often limited to vertical transmission; and (iv) as a result, skills are likely to evolve more slowly than does knowledge. The chapter concludes that a full picture of human adaptation requires an increased focus on skill, alongside knowledge.

The past 2 Myr have seen both unprecedented environmental instability and the evolution of the human capacity for complex culture. This, along with the observation that cultural evolution occurs faster than genetic evolution, has led to the suggestion that culture is an adaptation to an unstable environment. We test this hypothesis by examining the ability of human social learning to respond to environmental changes. We do this by inserting human participants (n = 4800) into evolutionary simulations with a changing environment while varying the social information available to individuals across five conditions. We find that human social learning shows some signs of adaptation to environmental instability, including critical social learning, the adoption of up-and-coming traits and, unexpectedly, contrariness. However, these are insufficient to avoid significant fitness declines when the environment changes, and many individuals are highly conformist, which exacerbates the fitness effects of environmental change. We conclude that human social learning reflects a compromise between the competing needs for flexibility to accommodate environmental change and fidelity to accurately transmit valuable cultural information.

Academic journals provide a key quality-control mechanism in science. Yet, information asymmetries and conflicts of interests incentivize scientists to deceive journals about the quality of their research. How can honesty be ensured, despite incentives for deception? Here, we address this question by applying the theory of honest signaling to the publication process. Our models demonstrate that several mechanisms can ensure honest journal submission, including differential benefits, differential costs, and costs to resubmitting rejected papers. Without submission costs, scientists benefit from submitting all papers to high-ranking journals, unless papers can only be submitted a limited number of times. Counterintuitively, our analysis implies that inefficiencies in academic publishing (e.g., arbitrary formatting requirements, long review times) can serve a function by disincentivizing scientists from submitting low-quality work to high-ranking journals. Our models provide simple, powerful tools for understanding how to promote honest paper submission in academic publishing.

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01089-6.

Prestige-biased social learning (henceforth “prestige-bias”) occurs when individuals predominantly choose to learn from a prestigious member of their group, i.e. someone who has gained attention, respect and admiration for their success in some domain. Prestige-bias is proposed as an adaptive social-learning strategy as it provides a short-cut to identifying successful group members, without having to assess each person’s success individually. Previous work has documented prestige-bias and verified that it is used adaptively. However, the domain-specificity and generality of prestige-bias has not yet been explicitly addressed experimentally. By domain-specific prestige-bias we mean that individuals choose to learn from a prestigious model only within the domain of expertise in which the model acquired their prestige. By domain-general prestige-bias we mean that individuals choose to learn from prestigious models in general, regardless of the domain in which their prestige was earned. To distinguish between domain specific and domain general prestige we ran an online experiment (n = 397) in which participants could copy each other to score points on a general-knowledge quiz with varying topics (domains). Prestige in our task was an emergent property of participants’ copying behaviour. We found participants overwhelmingly preferred domain-specific (same topic) prestige cues to domain-general (across topic) prestige cues. However, when only domain-general or cross-domain (different topic) cues were available, participants overwhelmingly favoured domain-general cues. Finally, when given the choice between cross-domain prestige cues and randomly generated Player IDs, participants favoured cross-domain prestige cues. These results suggest participants were sensitive to the source of prestige, and that they preferred domain-specific cues even though these cues were based on fewer samples (being calculated from one topic) than the domain-general cues (being calculated from all topics). We suggest that the extent to which people employ a domain-specific or domain-general prestige-bias may depend on their experience and understanding of the relationships between domains.

Social learning enables adaptive information acquisition provided that it is not random but selective. To understand species typical decision-making and to trace the evolutionary origins of social learning, the heuristics social learners use need to be identified. Here, we experimentally tested the nature of majority influence in the zebra finch. Subjects simultaneously observed two demonstrator groups differing in relative and absolute numbers (ratios 1 : 2/2 : 4/3 : 3/1 : 5) foraging from two novel food sources (black and white feeders). We find that demonstrator groups influenced observers' feeder choices (social learning), but that zebra finches did not copy the majority of individuals. Instead, observers were influenced by the foraging activity (pecks) of the demonstrators and in an anti-conformist fashion. These results indicate that zebra finches are not conformist, but are public information users.