Cooperation between individuals, a critical component of organizational and societal success, typically involves costs and benefits that accrue at different points in time. Using a series of controlled experiments, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of cooperation in an intertemporal context. Our findings demonstrate that cooperation is significantly reduced when the benefits of cooperation are shifted into the future, whereas delaying costs leads to an increase in cooperation. Our analysis of the underlying behavioral mechanisms reveals that the change in the level of cooperation can be explained by three factors: (i) a shift in the beliefs about others’ efforts, (ii) a shift in the willingness to conditionally cooperate, and (iii) an individual’s degree of impatience. We further find that injunctive norms of cooperation are unaffected by the timing of consequences, indicating that changes in behavior are due to a change in norm compliance rather than the norm itself. Implications for management practices are discussed. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support from the Center for Social and Economic Behavior at the University of Cologne and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy [Grant EXC 2126/1- 390838866] is gratefully acknowledged. F. Kölle gratefully acknowledges funding by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program [Grant 7414099]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03757 .

Some theories in economics and psychology propose that background uncertainty, which is uncertainty that is independent of a person's actual decision, can alter people's risk-taking behavior with respect to that decision. However, previous empirical research mostly relying on single experiments is inconclusive regarding the existence of this effect. Here, we systematically investigate the effect of background uncertainty on decision-making. After reviewing the literature, we argue that two types of background uncertainty should be distinguished: (a) background ambiguity, where the decision maker does not know the probability of the outcomes of the background event, and (b) background risk, where the outcome probabilities are known. We tested the hypotheses (i) that background uncertainty does affect risk-taking in the decision at hand, and (ii) the type of background uncertainty moderates that effect. In four experiments (total N =863), we induced background uncertainty (ambiguity or risk) using different methods and measured risk-taking with multiple behavioral tasks. We did not find a significant effect of background uncertainty on risk-taking behavior.

The overall expectation of introducing Canonical Workflow for Experimental Research and FAIR digital objects (FDOs) can be summarised as reducing the gap between workflow technology and research practices to make experimental work more efficient and improve FAIRness without adding administrative load on the researchers. In this document, we will describe, with the help of an example, how CWFR could work in detail and improve research procedures. We have chosen the example of “experiments with human subjects” which stretches from planning an experiment to storing the collected data in a repository. While we focus on experiments with human subjects, we are convinced that CWFR can be applied to many other data generation processes based on experiments. The main challenge is to identify repeating patterns in existing research practices that can be abstracted to create CWFR. In this document, we will include detailed examples from different disciplines to demonstrate that CWFR can be implemented without violating specific disciplinary or methodological requirements. We do not claim to be comprehensive in all aspects, since these examples are meant to prove the concept of CWFR.

To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they must deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second, they face an inter-generational conflict that stems from the higher costs for long-term mitigation measures, particularly helping future generations, compared to the short-term actions aimed at adapting to the immediate effects of climate change, benefiting mostly the current generation. We devise a novel game to study this multi-level conflict and investigate individuals' behavior in a lab experiment. We find that, although individuals reach sufficient cooperation levels to avoid adverse consequences for their own generation, they contribute more to cheaper short-term than to costlier long-term measures, to the detriment of future generations. Simple "nudge" interventions, however, may alter this pattern considerably. We find that changing the default contribution level to the inter-generational welfare optimum increases long-term contributions. Moreover, providing individuals with the possibility to commit themselves to inter-generational solidarity leads to an even stronger increase in long-term contributions. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that nudges alone may not be enough to induce inter-generationally optimal contributions.

We present z-Tree unleashed, a novel approach and set of scripts to aid the implementation of computerized behavioral experiments outside the laboratory. z-Tree unleashed enables subjects to join the experiment using a web portal that requires no software apart from a web browser. Experimenters are likewise enabled to administer their experiments from anywhere in the world. Except for z-Tree itself, z-Tree unleashed is entirely based on free and open-source software. In this paper we give a high-level overview of z-Tree unleashed’s features and benefits and its design. We also show how to set up the server and demonstrate the steps required for conducting an entire experiment. We subsequently explain how to leverage the security and routing features of a virtual private network with z-Tree unleashed, enabling servers to securely run behind routers.

Planting mangroves is a conservation activity pursuing the long-term goal of sustaining the basis for fishing activities. The decision to engage in mangrove planting requires trading off the short-run costs of planting with its long-run benefits. We report a lab-in-the-field experiment with Thai coastal villagers in which we elicit short- and long-run time preferences prior to mangrove-seed planting. We show that less present-biased participants plant more seeds, while planting is unrelated to individuals’ future discounting. Our results contribute to the debate on whether present bias is positively or negatively related to conservation behavior by showing a positive relation in a replenishment act.

Since 9/11 and particularly since the massacre at Virginia Tech University in 2007, many universities in the United States have begun installation of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems on their campuses. What sorts of claims are being made about the use of these systems and what justifications are there for installing them? How might the pervasive use of monitoring technology affect traditional values associated with university life such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, privacy, and the freedom to explore? What policies are in place to ensure that whatever benefits associated with these systems justify both tangible and intangible costs?Our analysis is partially derived from a study of university policies in the United States concerning the installation and operation of CCTV systems with the aim of gaining insight into these questions. In addition, we used a coding instrument for analyzing the corpus of policies in order to understand how the policies addressed such issues as: rationale or justification for CCTV usage, relevant personnel roles, public awareness, accountability measures, information security and data handling, routine operations of usage, and any relevant limiting measures. One aspect of our study is to interpret the corpus of policies through the lens of Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity framework which is concerned with examining the effects of new technological practices (such as the installation of CCTV systems) on one’s expectation of privacy.

This article discusses the validity of three famous approaches of strategic management – Porter’s Generic Strategies, the Outpacing Concept and Blue Ocean Strategies – by using cases from two industries: airlines and grocery retail. The discussion shows that all three concepts make important contributions to the explanation of the success and failure of existing strategies, but none of the concepts fully describes the reality. While generic and Blue Ocean strategies neglect dynamics, the outpacing approach is still too much imprisoned by the categories of Porter. As a conclusion, first ideas towards a more dynamic theory of market evolution are drawn which include aspects of Blue Ocean and Outpacing and recall a more philosophical approach.

Leading by example is considered an important means to influence followers. In most organizations, however, to influence followers, leaders use a variety of instruments. Most frequently, leaders possess the power to administer rewards or punishments to team members. Do individual rewards or punishments reinforce the impact of leading by example on team members’ contributions? Because of confounding factors, it is difficult to research leading by example using field data. Here, we investigate the effects of leading by example and the effect of rewards or punishments on contributions in controlled lab experiments. We find that both rewards and punishments are more effective in fostering contributions than leading by example as such. When leading by example comes together with reward or punishment power, it does not improve on the effects of rewards or punishments as such in increasing contributions.

Leading by example is considered an important means to influence followers. In most organizations, however, to influence followers, leaders use a variety of instruments. Most frequently, leaders possess the power to administer rewards or punishments to team members. Do individual rewards or punishments reinforce the impact of leading by example on team members' contributions? Because of confounding factors, it is difficult to research leading by example using field data. Here, we investigate the effects of leading by example and the effect of rewards or punishments on contributions in controlled lab experiments. We find that both rewards and punishments are more effective in fostering contributions than leading by example as such. When leading by example comes together with reward or punishment power, it does not improve on the effects of rewards or punishments as such in increasing contributions.