INTRODUCTION:The purpose of this study is to examine how time of day affects injury risk of railroad maintenance of way employees and signalmen (roadway workers). Railroads reported 15,654 serious roadway worker injuries between 1997 and 2014. Roadway workers primarily work outdoors on or near railroad tracks and frequently encounter hazardous conditions. To avoid closing an active rail line during peak hours, railroads sometimes require roadway workers to work at night. Previous studies of roadway worker injury have not adequately accounted for exposure to time of day effects, nor have they investigated the human factors issues contributing to roadway worker injury. METHOD:The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) database of injury reports provided data for circadian rhythm models of the odds of fatal and nonfatal injuries. The FRA database and fatal injury investigation reports also permitted an analysis of the circumstances and the human factors issues associated with injuries that occur at different times of day. RESULTS:Odds of injury increased during nighttime work. The odds of nonfatal injury for both roadway worker crafts rose above 9:1 in the early morning hours. The relative odds of a fatal injury also increased significantly at night. A human factors analysis suggested that during all three shifts most nonfatal injuries involve workload, but workload was not identified as a factor in fatal injuries. CONCLUSIONS:Nighttime work is more hazardous for roadway workers than daytime work. Several factors related to fatigue and other conditions appear to increase the risk of injury during the outdoor, nighttime work required of roadway workers. PRACTICAL APPLICATION:For practical reasons, nighttime roadway work is sometimes unavoidable. Therefore, new practices for nighttime work must be developed to adequately address fatigue and protect roadway workers from harm.

The authors applied signal detection theory to model the impact of five grade-crossing safety factors to understand their impact on driver decision making. The safety factors were improving commercial motor vehicle (CMV) driver safety through federal regulations, increasing locomotive conspicuity with alerting lights, increasing locomotive conspicuity with reflectors, increasing sight lines, and improving warning device reliability. The authors estimated sensitivity and bias for eight warning devices associated with each safety factor. The authors also calculated the proportion of variance accounted for by each safety factor and device type to examine the reliability of each on grade-crossing safety. Driver decision making improved due to the warning device type and the introduction of the safety factor. Of the two, warning devices exerted the most impact because they encouraged drivers to stop at grade crossings. Regulations to improve CMV driver safety, alerting lights, sight lines, and reflectors were generally equally effective in improving grade-crossing safety. A comparison of the results from the descriptive model to that produced by a more traditional accident analysis suggest that examination of accident frequency alone may minimize the impact of important safety factors and emphasizes the need to consider accident frequency with respect to human behavioral metrics.

This report concerns two issues: 1) whether color vision is necessary for locomotive crews who work on railroads where the signal system is either completely redundant with regard to signal color and signal orientation or the signal system only uses signal orientation; 2) what criteria should the railroad industry use for a valid, reliable, and fair field test of color vision. These two sets of issues are discussed together because they both relate to Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA’s) Medical Standards Guidelines for locomotive engineers (49 CFR 240, Appendix F) and conductors (49 CFR 242, Appendix D) and to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations (NTSB 2013-18 and 2013-19) that FRA establish a field test for color vision for railroad employees who fail standard tests of color vision such as pseudoisochromatic plate tests. In the event that FRA considers reviewing its regulations regarding color vision, this information will be relevant and useful.

On December 1, 2013 four passengers on a Metro North passenger train in New York City died and 70 were injured as the result of an over speed derailment [1]. Subsequently, it was announced by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that the locomotive engineer operating the train had sleep apnea [2]. Five NTSB recommendations following rail accidents since 2009 [3-7] have called for medical screening of safety-critical employees for sleep apnea. This short communication provides data on the prevalence and treatment of sleep apnea in three groups of safety-critical railroad employees in order to provide an estimate of the magnitude of this problem for the railroad industry. Table 1 is a summary of data on sleep apnea in railroad employees from three surveys conducted between 2006 and 2009 [8-10] by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The surveys collected information on railroad worker patterns of sleep and work in daily diaries as well as information about demographics and health. The surveys included the following yes/no questions: “Do you have sleep apnea?” and “Are you receiving medical treatment for your condition?” The surveys were conducted by mail with the assistance of railroad labor unions and were random samples of each labor union population. All surveys were approved by the Office of Management and Budget as required by U.S. law.

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) believes that, in addition to process and technology innovations, human-factors-based solutions can significantly contribute to improving safety in the railroad industry. To test this assumption, FRA implemented the Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C³RS) The overall evaluation is intended to provide knowledge about how C³RS can be implemented successfully, its impact on safety and safety culture, and the conditions necessary for long-term viability The demonstration site that was studied in depth successfully implemented C³RS, which positively impacted safety culture, as shown in the survey and interview data. The peer review team (PRT) implemented some corrective actions. The demonstration site learned that the process of involving senior management in reviewing and implementing corrective actions was not simple and so took action to improve it. Across sites, the railroads saw the value of analyzing trends as opposed to looking only at individual cases. Some of the railroads began using continuous improvement experts to assist with their analysis.

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) believes that, in addition to process and technology innovations, human-factors-based solutions can significantly contribute to improving safety in the railroad industry. To test this assumption, FRA implemented the Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3 RS), which includes the following: Confidential reporting; Root-cause analysis problem solving by a Peer Review Team (PRT) comprising labor, management, and FRA representatives; Implementation and review of corrective actions, some locally and others with the help of a Support Team made up of senior managers; Tracking the results of change; and Reporting the results of change to employees. Demonstration pilot sites are currently at Union Pacific Railroad (UP), Canadian Pacific Railway (CP), New Jersey Transit (NJT), and Amtrak. FRA is sponsoring a rigorous evaluation of C³RS functioning with regard to three important aspects: 1. What conditions are necessary to implement C³RS successfully? 2. What is the impact of C³RS on safety and safety culture? 3. What factors help to sustain C³RS over time? The evaluation is organized into baseline, midterm, and follow-up time periods at each site. Two sets of findings are presented here. The first set consists of baseline findings at one demonstration site (Site A), using the following data sources: (1) interviews with workers, managers, and other stakeholders and (2) other project documents, such as meeting notes and newsletters. The second set consists of findings across all demonstration sites and is based on interviews from all sites.

The Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Office of Railroad Policy and Development believes that, in addition to process and technology innovations, human factors-based solutions can make a significant contribution to improving safety in the railroad industry. This belief led FRA to implement the Confidential Close-Call Reporting System (C3RS), which includes voluntary confidential reporting of near-miss events to a neutral third party; root-cause- problem solving by a Peer Review Team (PRT) composed of labor, management, and FRA representatives; implementation of corrective actions; tracking of the results of change; and reporting of the results of change to employees. Demonstration pilot projects are underway at Union Pacific Railroad (UP), Canadian Pacific Railway (CP), New Jersey Transit (NJT), and Amtrak. C3RS also embodies the risk reduction and system safety principles espoused by FRA's Office of Railroad Safety that supplement conventional regulatory oversight and enforcement activities. FRA is also sponsoring a rigorous evaluation of three important aspects of C3RS functioning: (1) What conditions are necessary to implement C3RS successfully? (2) What is the impact of C3RS on safety and safety culture? (3) What factors help to sustain C3RS over time? This report is published to provide the public and government and industry decision makers with the evaluation’s findings. The findings here cover the midterm analysis of C3RS at one demonstration site (Site “A”) and are based on data collected and analyzed using five data sources: interviews with workers, managers, and other stakeholders; railroad newsletters; corporate safety data; corrective action data; and redacted Multiple Cause Incident Analysis (MCIA) results from a third party.

This report uses signal detection theory (SDT) to model motorists’ strategies at grade crossings in order to understand the factors that influence such decisions and to establish a framework for evaluating the impact of proposed countermeasures. This report is intended to update and expand the original analysis conducted by Raslear (1996), which examined the effectiveness of grade crossing warning devices and determined whether their effectiveness was due to variations in the signal-to-noise ratio (sensitivity), bias to stop, or a combination of these two components of signal detection theory. This report documents the results of four empirical and theoretical tests of the SDT model to understand how different warning devices and countermeasures influenced drivers’ decisions at grade crossings in the 21 years from 1986 (as reported by Raslear) to 2007 (the most current year available when this effort began). In the first analysis, the authors compare accident data from 2007 with that from 1986 and describe the necessary adjustments to their assumptions in setting up the model. In the second analysis, the authors apply this revised framework to a more detailed historical analysis of driver at grade crossings. The third analysis describes the authors' test of the robustness of the SDT model and their application of SDT to predict the effect of proposed countermeasures and safety factors. The fourth analysis was based on a theoretical model to test the predictive abilities of the SDT framework through performance by an ideal observer. While the previous analyses examine the empirical changes in sensitivity and bias over time and with changes in the grade crossing environment, the analysis of the ideal observer posits theoretical mechanisms for those changes and compares theoretical outcomes with actual outcomes.

Objective: The objective of this report is to provide a comprehensive description of fatigue in US railroad workers employed in safety-sensitive positions. Methods: Five survey studies were conducted between 2006 and 2011 on maintenance of way employees, signalmen, dispatchers, train & engine (T&E) employees, and T&E employees engaged in passenger service. These studies were reanalyzed and compared with regard to work schedules and sleep patterns. Fatigue exposure was determined by analysis of work schedules and sleep patterns with a fatigue model, the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST). Results: Twelve different schedules of work exist in the five groups of railroad employees. Work schedules largely determine sleep patterns, which, in turn, determine fatigue exposure. T&E crews and dispatchers have the highest fatigue exposure, but these two groups have considerably less fatigue exposure than T&E crews who were involved in accidents. Passenger service T&E employees have the least fatigue exposure, even though the distribution of work time is highly similar to that of T&E employees. This difference in fatigue exposure may be due to the greater predictability of work for the passenger service T&E. Human factor accident probability and the cost of human factor accidents increase with fatigue exposure. The risk (probability x cost) of a human factor accident increases exponentially with fatigue exposure. Conclusions: A methodology has been developed for studying the work schedules and sleep patterns of railroad workers. This methodology allows for the collection of data which makes it possible to identify differences in sleep patterns as a function of both work group and work schedule. Future work on fatigue in occupational groups should focus on similar methods to expand our knowledge of the role of work schedules on sleep, fatigue, and accident risk.

In 2007, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) launched C3RS, the Confidential Close Call Reporting System, as a demonstration project to learn how to facilitate the effective reporting and implementation of corrective actions, and assess the impact of reporting close call events on safety. This paper describes some of the challenges and remedies in establishing effective problem identification and corrective actions processes when setting up an event reporting system like C3RS.

This report presents the results of a study to validate the AutoSleep sleep prediction algorithm, which is a component of the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST). Researchers collected work and sleep data from 41 locomotive engineers by using actigraphy and daily log books and compared these data with AutoSleep predictions developed according to the log-book–recorded work periods. Comparison of the actigraphy data with model predictions on a minute-by-minute basis found an overall agreement between the two 87 percent of the time. Application of Signal Detection Theory to the data indicates that AutoSleep is biased toward underestimating daily sleep. These findings validate the sleep prediction algorithm of FAST and validate its utility for assessing fatigue risk created by typical railroad schedules.

The Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Office of Railroad Policy and Development believes that, in addition to process and technology innovations, human factors-based solutions can make a significant contribution to improving safety in the railroad industry. This led FRA to implement the Confidential Close-Call Reporting System (C³RS), which includes voluntary confidential reporting of near-miss events and root-cause-analysis problem solving by a team composed of labor, management, and FRA; implementation of corrective actions; tracking the results of change; and reporting of the results of change to employees. FRA is also sponsoring a rigorous evaluation of three important aspects of C³RS functioning: (1) What conditions are necessary to implement C³RS successfully? (2) What is the impact of C³RS on safety and safety culture? (3) What factors help to sustain C³RS over time? This report is part of a series of Research Results published to provide the public with the evaluation’s findings. Two sets of findings are presented. The first set, the baseline of C³RS at one demonstration site, was obtained using two data sources: worker, manager, and other stakeholder interviews; and railroad newsletters. The second set of findings uses interviews conducted at the first three demonstration sites.

The Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Office of Railroad Policy and Development believes that in addition to process and technology innovations, human factors-based solutions can make a significant contribution to improving safety in the railroad industry. To test this assumption, FRA implemented the Confidential Close-Call Reporting System (C3RS), which includes (1) voluntary confidential reporting of close-call events by employees and root-cause-analysis problem solving by a Peer Review Team (PRT) composed of labor, management, and FRA; (2) identification and implementation of corrective actions; (3) tracking the results of change; and (4) reporting the results of change to employees. Confidential reporting and joint labor-management-FRA root-cause problem solving are the most innovative of these characteristics for the railroad industry. FRA is sponsoring a rigorous evaluation of C3RS to examine three important aspects of C3RS functioning: (1) What conditions are necessary to implement C3RS successfully? (2) What is the impact of C3RS on safety and safety culture? (3) What factors help to sustain C3RS over time? Some key findings were (1) a 31-percent improvement in cars moved between incidents; (2) improved labor-management relationships and employee engagement within the PRT and out in the field; and (3) a reduction in discipline cases.

The purpose of this effort was to apply signal detection theory to descriptively model the impact of five grade crossing safety factors to understand their effect on driver decision making. The safety factors consisted of: improving commercial motor vehicle driver safety through federal regulations, increasing locomotive conspicuity with alerting lights, increasing locomotive conspicuity with reflectors, increasing sight lines, and improving warning device reliability. We estimated d’ and β for eight warning devices associated with each safety factor using data from the Federal Railroad Administration’s Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Accident/Incident database and Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory. We also calculated ω 2 for each safety factor and device type to examine the reliability of each independent variable on grade crossing safety. The analysis indicated that the first four safety factors listed above were generally equally effective in improving grade crossing safety. Warning device reliability (which pertained to active warning devices only) still contributed to improvements in grade crossing safety, but the effects were more muted. Grade crossing devices (and particularly active warning devices) are an important safety tool because they increase drivers’ inclinations to stop, and this bias to stop has a greater impact than improving the driver’s ability to detect the train.