This article seeks to assess the legal legacy of one of British India’s most significant emergency acts: Act XI of 1857, also known as the State Offences Act. Although introduced during the Indian Uprising of 1857, it will be argued that the extra-judicial provisions contained in this act exerted a strong influence on the legal character of post-1857 ‘special’ or exceptional colonial criminal legislation, an influence that continued to be reflected in the punitive emergency laws set in place in post-colonial India. The long-term historical significance of Act XI will be illustrated by examining some of the more notable pieces of punitive or repressive legislation enacted in colonial and post-colonial India, namely the Murderous Outrages Act of 1867, the 1915 Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act of 1919, the Defence of India Act, 1962, and, more recently, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985.

This article examines the East India Company's Bengal Regulation 10 of 1804, a legal statute that enabled martial law to be enforced by the in British colonial India. The use made of this little studied yet significant emergency regulation, its perceived legal deficiencies, and in particular, the discord that arose between the military and civil authorities over how and who should be administer it will be discussed with reference to the promulgation of martial law by the British during the Cuttack Uprising of 1857, the Indian "Mutiny" or Revolt of 1857, and in response to the civil unrest in the Punjab during 1919. While martial law was itself ring fenced by legislation that determined the legal grounds for its inauguration and for its cessation, the implementation of martial law by the British military forces in India was marked by the absence of law.

The Indian Uprising of 1857 was the largest colonial insurrection the British had to face in the nineteenth century. Indian troops of the Bengal Native Army rose up in revolt, as did many Indian civilians, making 1857 both a military mutiny and a civil rebellion. This paper examines how the British authorities stationed at Benares (the modern city of Varanasi) managed to see off the multiple threats to their local governance. Not only were these dangers overcome, but Benares itself was to play a vital role in ensuring that the British possessed the military resources needed to defeat the insurgency.

Standard historical accounts of the Indian Revolt of 1857-58 give the impression that superiority on the battlefield accounted for the ability of the British to defeat their Indian adversaries. Yet, to focus solely on the military campaigns ignores the intricate and multifaceted nature of the British response to the Revolt. Aside from armed force, a number of counter-insurgency strategies were used to suppress rebellion in the countryside. This paper assesses the intent and effectiveness of these measures by looking at how officials responded to the outbreak of large-scale and protracted rural insurgency in the districts of the Benares Division. It is argued that these measures achieved a far greater degree of success in curtailing acts of rural insurgency than the use of military force.