Gooniyandi (Bunuban, Kimberley, north-west Australia), according to McGregor (1990a), has an ergative case-marker. Unusually, McGregor’s grammar does not identify a corresponding zero absolutive case-marker or case; nor does it discuss why there is none. This paper rectifies this lacuna and outlines the evidence against the recognition of an absolutive case-marker. The arguments concern both evidence for the absence of an absolutive case-marker, and absence of evidence for one. Thus it is possible to find ergativity in a grammatical subsystem of a language without corresponding absolutivity. I discuss some implications for the typology of ergativity, and examine conditions under which it is viable to identify an absolutive case and/or case-marker.

An early component of the auditory event-related potential (ERP), the mismatch negativity (MMN), has been shown to be sensitive to native phonemic language sound contrasts. The potential changes to this neural sensitivity from foreign language learning have only been marginally studied. The existing research seems to suggest that the MMN can adapt to foreign language sound contrasts with very target-specific training, but whether the effects are long-lasting or generalize to proper foreign language learning is yet to be investigated in a viable longitudinal study design. We therefore recorded the electroencephalography (EEG) from two groups of language officer cadets (learning either Arabic or Dari) while they listened to language sound contrasts from both languages. We recorded their EEG four times over the course of 19 months of intensive foreign language training (immediately before they started, after three weeks, after six months, and after 19 months).We did not find any language-specific effects of learning on the cadets’ MMNs to the language sound contrasts. We did, however, elicit statistically reliable MMNs to both language contrasts for both groups at most of the four times of measurement. Furthermore, we found that the Arabic learners’ MMNs to the Arabic stimuli diminished over time, and that the Dari learners’ P3a responses to the Arabic stimuli diminished over time. Correlating the participants’ MMNs with their behavioral perception of the language stimuli did not reveal any strong links between behavior and neurophysiology. However, those Dari learners whose MMNs to the Dari stimuli increased the most within the first three weeks, also received the highest grades on a listening task after 17 weeks.

The Nyulnyulan languages of the Dampier Land peninsula and western Kimberley region of Western Australia form a small genetic family of about ten languages that are both genetically close and typologically quite similar. A number of grammaticalization tendencies are shared among the languages. Some of these probably began in pre-proto-Nyulnyulan times, although they have developed in somewhat different directions, and have reached different end points. They include, among others: development of indexicals into case markers, developments within the compound verb construction, and development of case markers into verbal markers of subordination and applicatives. There are a few instances of lexical items beginning on the road to grammaticalization. For instance, the nominal buru ‘place’ has begun development into a derivational morpheme in some languages, and into a relational marker in a few. Some of these grammaticalizations appear to be regionally peculiar to Nyulnyulan languages, while others are shared with nearby languages.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) of the auditory ERP/ERF has been shown to be sensitive to both phonetic and phonological contrasts. However, potential asymmetry effects and effects of the immediate phonetic contexts on this neural sensitivity are understudied phenomena. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG), we attempted to address this lacuna by investigating native Danish listeners' MMNm to the phonological contrast between the consonants /t/ and /d/ in two different phonetic contexts in Danish: one word-initial, preserving the contrast's phonemic status, and another word-final, neutralising it. We found no support for effects of the immediate phonetic context on the MMNm. However, we observed an asymmetry effect for the phonological contrast: Hearing [t] among [d]s elicited a significantly stronger MMNm than hearing [d] among [t]s. This asymmetry effect was mirrored in a behavioural oddball-detection task showing reduced sensitivity for hearing [d] among [t]s. We discuss both psychoacoustic aspects and phonological underspecification as potential explanations.

Models of speech learning suggest that adaptations to foreign language sound categories take place within 6 to 12 months of exposure to a foreign language. Results from laboratory language training show effects of very targeted training on nonnative speech contrasts within only 1 to 4 weeks of training. Results from immersion studies are inconclusive, but some suggest continued effects on nonnative speech perception after 6 to 8 years of experience. We investigated this apparent discrepancy in the timing of adaptation to foreign speech sounds in a longitudinal study of foreign language learning. We examined two groups of Danish language officer cadets learning either Arabic (Modern Standard Arabic and Egyptian Arabic) or Dari (Afghan Farsi) through intensive multifaceted language training. We conducted two experiments (identification and discrimination) with the cadets who were tested four times: at the start (T0), after 3 weeks (T1), 6 months (T2), and 19 months (T3). We used a phonemic Arabic contrast (pharyngeal vs. glottal frication) and a phonemic Dari contrast (sibilant voicing) as stimuli. We observed an effect of learning on the Dari learners’ identification of the Dari stimuli already after 3 weeks of language training, which was sustained, but not improved, after 6 and 19 months. The changes in the Dari learners’ identification functions were positively correlated with their grades after 6 months. We observed no other learning effects at the group level. We discuss the results in the light of predictions from speech learning models.

This paper is concerned with four unusual grammatical structures in Shua ("Khoisan", Botswana). Three of these presume the exceptionality of a salient discourse entity as a thing of its type and contradict this with an assertion of non-exceptionality; the fourth presumes the typicality of the salient entity, contrasting this with a claim to exceptionality. The paper describes the formal properties and meanings of these structures, distinguishing between their coded and inferred meanings, It is argued that the coded meaning of each is of the interpersonal type. The paper further suggests that the structures represent four distinct constructions that are partly motivated, and that crucial to each is repetition of key lexical components. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Does the brain activity underlying the production of deception differ depending on whether or not one believes their deception can be detected? To address this question, we had participants commit a mock theft in a laboratory setting, and then interrogated them while they underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning. Crucially, during some parts of the interrogation participants believed a lie-detector was activated, whereas in other parts they were told it was switched-off. We were thus able to examine the neural activity associated with the contrast between producing true vs. false claims, as well as the independent contrast between believing that deception could and could not be detected. We found increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during the production of false (compared to true) claims. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.

The article investigates an unusual and poorly studied class of existential-like expressions in English, exemplified in the title. It is contended that these expressions represent a distinct grammatical sign or construction, with a distinct semantic meaning of its own that is not derivable from the meaning of the plain existential. The formal and semantic properties of this sign are examined and specified; it is suggested that the sign is not entirely arbitrary, but shows recurrent and non-random associations between its formal properties and its meanings. To fully understand it, the construction must be situated within the grammar of English; to this end, it is compared and contrasted with other constructions it enters into paradigmatic relations with. The investigation is based largely on instances garnered from language use, including literature, conversation, and electronic corpora. The investigation is framed within a usage-based grammar that presumes the importance of constant and mutual interaction between linguistic description and theory, and the theoretical importance of the rare and unusual.

Deception is an essentially social act, yet little is known about how social consequences affect the decision to deceive. In this study, participants played a computerized game of deception without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent. Participants were questioned by an opponent outside the scanner about their knowledge of the content of a display. Importantly, questions were posed so that, in some conditions, it was possible to be deceptive, while in other conditions it was not. To simulate a realistic interaction, participants could be confronted about their claims by the opponent. This design, therefore, creates a context in which a deceptive participant runs the risk of being punished if their deception is detected. Our results show that participants were slower to give honest than to give deceptive responses when they knew more about the display and could use this knowledge for their own benefit. The condition in which confrontation was not possible was associated with increased activity in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. The processing of a question which allows a deceptive response was associated with activation in right caudate and inferior frontal gyrus. Our findings suggest the decision to deceive is affected by the potential risk of social confrontation rather than the claim itself.

This experiment tests how people produce and detect deception while playing a computerized version of the dice game, Meyer. Deception is an integral part of this game, and the participants played it as in real life, without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent, and whether or when to accuse them of deception. We stress that deception is a complex act that cannot be exclusively associated with telling a falsehood, and that it is facilitated by hierarchical decision-making and risk evaluation. In comparison with a non-competitive control condition, both claiming truthfully and claiming falsely were associated with activity in fronto-polar cortex (BA10). However, relative to true claims, false claims were associated with greater activity in the premotor and parietal cortices. We speculate that the activity in BA10 is associated with the development of high-level executive strategies involved in both types of claim, while the premotor and parietal activity is associated with the need to select which particular claim to make.

Why do people with right hemisphere damage (RHD) have difficulty with pragmatics and communication? One hypothesis has been that pragmatic impairment in RHD is the result of an underlying impairment in Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to infer the mental states of others. In previous studies evaluating ToM abilities in people with RHD, researchers have used judgment tasks based on story or still cartoon stimuli. However, ToM is likely to draw on kinetic information as well, and these tasks ignore this aspect. The aim of this study was to assess ToM abilities in people with RHD using participants’ evaluations of animated films with moving geometric shapes. Participants were presented with eight films of animated triangles. Four of the films represented the triangles as intentional agents with mental states, while the other four represented the triangles as simply inanimate, though moving, objects. Films were evaluated by both button-press response and by oral descriptions. Analysis of the transcriptions revealed that participants with RHD had a reduced ability to discriminate between the film categories, and a bias toward reduced mental-state ascription in the ToM condition.

Haynes outlines a programme for using the new voxel-wise categorization technique in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) for detecting deception [ 1 Haynes J.-D. Detecting deception from neuroimaging signals– a data-driven perspective. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2008; 12: 126-127 Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (17) Google Scholar ]. The imaging methodologies he proposes are undoubtedly the best currently available. However, they depend on the existence of independent categorization of deceptive and non-deceptive intentions in each of the subjects being scanned, which is the weak point of his proposal. Valid experimental paradigms for eliciting deception are still required, and such paradigms will be particularly difficult to apply in real-life settings. Furthermore, it is known that brain activity is markedly affected by the subjects’ beliefs about the situation rather than objectivity [ 2 Gallagher H.L. et al. Imaging the intentional stance in a competitive game. Neuroimage. 2002; 16: 814-821 Crossref PubMed Scopus (444) Google Scholar , 3 Rilling J.K. et al. The neural correlates of theory of mind within interpersonal interactions. Neuroimage. 2004; 22: 1694-1703 Crossref PubMed Scopus (422) Google Scholar ]. In two such studies [ 2 Gallagher H.L. et al. Imaging the intentional stance in a competitive game. Neuroimage. 2002; 16: 814-821 Crossref PubMed Scopus (444) Google Scholar , 3 Rilling J.K. et al. The neural correlates of theory of mind within interpersonal interactions. Neuroimage. 2004; 22: 1694-1703 Crossref PubMed Scopus (422) Google Scholar ], brain activity depended on whether subjects thought they were interacting with a person or a computer, even though, objectively, the sequence of stimuli they experienced were the same in both conditions. In such cases, the state of the subject can only be confirmed by subjective report. Deception is a subjective intention rather than objective state. Consider, for example, the situation in which someone tells the truth with the subjective intent to deceive. In this example, there is no objective marker of intent. Can we rely on the reliability of subjective reports in a forensic setting to supply our independent marker of deception? Moreover, in such settings, it is well known that witnesses often disagree as to what actually happened. So, it seems highly problematical to presume that independent evidence will always be available to indicate whether a person is lying or telling the truth. In a forensic situation, we believe that the question ‘is this person being deceptive’ is not the correct one to ask, especially if we are to rely solely on measures of neural activity. Rather, we should ask questions about objective states, as in the guilty knowledge test [ 4 Ben-Shakhar G. Elaad E. The validity of psychophysiological detection of information with the Guilty Knowledge Test: a meta-analytic review. J. Appl. Psychol. 2003; 88: 131-151 Crossref PubMed Scopus (257) Google Scholar ], such as ‘has this person seen this object before’. We agree with Haynes, however, that there are important ethical issues at stake for researchers in this field. In our opinion, one of the most important of these is careful consideration of how results derived from highly controlled laboratory settings compare with those obtained from real-life scenarios, and if and when imaging technology should be transferred from the laboratory to the judicial system.

With the increasing interest in the neuroimaging of deception and its commercial application, there is a need to pay more attention to methodology. The weakness of studying deception in an experimental setting has been discussed intensively for over half a century. However, even though much effort has been put into their development, paradigms are still inadequate. The problems that bedevilled the old technology have not been eliminated by the new. Advances will only be possible if experiments are designed that take account of the intentions of the subject and the context in which these occur.

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A well known feature of many Australian Aboriginal languages is that the same verb form can mean either 'say' or 'do' (Rumsey 1990; Dixon 2002: 121). The usual interpretation is that this represents a polysemic verb with at least two distinct though not unrelated meanings. Few linguists, however, have presented arguments for this position. An exception is Knight 2004, who presents a set of arguments couched within the theoretical and methodological framework of Natural Semantic Metalanguage ( NSM) that the inflecting verb -MA i n B unuba (Bunuban, Kimberley) i s p olysemous. M any of these arguments apply to other Australian languages, including languages of the nearby Nyulnyulan family. In th is p aper I focus on the two N yulnyulan la nguages th at I have studied mo st intensively, Nyulnyul (Western Nyulnyulan) and Warrwa (Eastern Nyulnyulan), and discuss the wide range of meanings and uses of the inflecting verb form -J(I) ~ -D(I). These include the senses 'say', 'do', 'think', among other more specific senses. I present arguments for a radically monosemic account (e.g. Ruhl 1989; McGregor 1997) of this verb in its lexical uses, arguing in the process that the type of evidence adduced by Knight (2004) does not in fact argue for a polesemic story. I argue, that is, that a single core meaning is associated with the inflecting verb -J(I) ~ -D(I), and the senses 'say' and 'do' represent contextual senses or interpretations engendered by the context of use. (The same goes for the -MA verb of Bunuba.) However, this account applies specifically to the lexical uses o f t his inflecting verb; as argued in McGregor (2002), the coded meaning of the lexical verb is synchronically irrelevant to the same inflecting verb in its grammatical uses as a verbal classifier. The inadequacies o f t he NSM account a re principally in their failure to distinguish different types of meaning (core or invariant from contextual, semantic from pragmatic) and to sy stematically separate lexical from grammatical uses of the inflecting verb. A consequence of the line of approach I adopt is that the semantic meaning of lexical verbs is m uch mo re abstract th an o ften th ought; indeed, so abstract th at it is impossible to distinguish between the semantics of lexical and grammatical items in terms of the degree of abstraction.