There has been extensive research on the strategic choice between supply chain centralization and decentralization. However, most research assumes complete centralization or complete decentralization but omits the commonly adopted supply chain structure of partial centralization. With partial centralization, a firm owns a portion, but not all, of its partner. To help fill this research gap, in this paper, we make a major contribution by explicitly analyzing partial centralization in a supply chain where a durable-good manufacturer owns a portion of its downstream retailer. We start with a two-period model and derive analytical equilibrium outcomes of the supply chain and its members under complete centralization, complete decentralization, and partial centralization. First, our analysis reveals that partial centralization with an appropriate portion of ownership can yield the desirable product sales pattern over periods and alleviate the time-inconsistency problem in selling durable goods. As a result, partial centralization can become the equilibrium structure for a durable-good supply chain. Second, the manufacturer's optimal ownership level in the retailer decreases in the product durability and decision horizon length, implying that complete decentralization is more likely to be the supply chain structure in equilibrium for higher product durability and longer decision horizon. Third, our extended analyses demonstrate the robustness of the main results with backward partial centralization. Moreover, partial centralization outperforms conventional strategies such as two-part tariffs that can coordinate a supply chain but not fully solve the time-inconsistency problem associated with durable goods.

In recent years, numerous e-commerce platforms have introduced private-label brands to compete with national brands of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). However, the existing literature rarely concerns the production outsourcing strategy for the platform's private brands (i.e., outsourcing to the same contract manufacturer as that of the OEM or a different contract manufacturer) and its impact on the OEM, although the outsourcing strategy is critical to the success of the private brands. In this paper, we develop a game -theoretical model to investigate the OEM's sales format selection under the outsourcing strategy of the platform and the strategic interplay between them. We show that the adoption of the common (different) contract manufacturer encourages the OEM to choose the agency (reselling) format. This preference is affected by the acceptance of private brands-as the private-brand acceptance increases, the OEM prefers to adopt the agency (reselling) format. Furthermore, we find that at equilibrium, three strategy combinations emerge. Interestingly, to cope with the outsourcing strategy, the OEM may use the reselling format instead of agency selling when the referral fee is low. Moreover, the extension section examines the impacts of the game sequences and production cost differentiation. The platform and OEM may encounter a prisoner's dilemma when they set their strategies simultaneously. Besides, the cost differentiation is an important factor driving the platform's outsourcing strategy choice.

This study considered the supply chain that two manufacturers sell green complementary products to a dominant offline retailer. We investigated whether a manufacturer (the integrated manufacturer) should add an online channel and examined how it affects channel members’ decisions and profits. We formulated the power structure as the retailer-Stackelberg model and analyzed the pricing decisions for the supply chain. The results demonstrate that the integrated manufacturer prefers not to add the online channel when online and offline market bases are comparable and the level of complementarity is moderate. The integrated manufacturer gains more power at the expense of the offline retailer and the other manufacturer (the traditional manufacturer) when the complementarity between the offline and online channel is the same as offline channels with the addition of a new online channel; furthermore, the retailer earns less, while the traditional manufacturer’s profit hinges on the complementarity between the online and offline channels. It is beneficial for the offline retailer to balance the online and offline market bases of product 1 by improving the sales environment of the physical store. The integrated manufacturer can benefit from varying their marketing actions to decrease the degree of complementarity between the retail and online channels for the two products, while the traditional manufacturer can be better off from the online channel introduction by taking steps to increase the complementarity of the two products between the offline channels.

A manufacturer commonly distributes through a set of retailers who are authorized to sell its product; demand‐enhancing services may also be provided by the manufacturer. These services may be granted to all authorized retailers ( uniform service provision) or to a favored few authorized retailers ( differential service provision). To determine when a manufacturer does—or does not—bestow equal service levels, we develop a model of one manufacturer selling through two competing retailers. We find manufacturer optimality to entail uniform service at some parametric values, while differential service is optimal at other values. Counterintuitively, with differential service, the recipient of lower service may be better off than it would be with higher service. Equally surprisingly, there are conditions for which the high‐service retailer prefers its rival to also receive a high level of service—but only if its rival is sufficiently small. While the three channel members often have different service‐provision preferences, there are also parametric values that place them in harmony with either differential or uniform service provision. Retailers sharing the cost of manufacturer‐provided service need not lessen firms’ preference confliction over the preferred service provision but can improve channel efficiency when the cost‐sharing rate is relatively low. We also investigate the effect of retailer‐provided services and the impact of service asymmetry level.

Motivated by the emergence of dominant retail platforms operating using a store-within-a-store strategy, we study the interaction of such a retailer's decision on the selling format and a manufacturer's decision on the channel selection. The dominant retailer may elect to operate as a traditional reseller or a retail platform where the manufacturer manages his own store and pays a slotting fee and a portion of the revenue to the platform. The manufacturer makes the channel selection decision between the dominant retailer and a weak reseller. A Stackelberg game with the dominant retailer being the leader is formulated, and five relevant channel options are presented. We solve sub-games and characterise the equilibrium solution of the full game. Numerical studies shed light on the roles of the slotting fee and the outcomes of some prevailing selling formats in business practice. In particular, it is shown that the demand substitution between the dominant retailer and the weak retailer is crucial in determining channel selection.

This paper investigates strategies for new market research and positioning of stores or products by competing retailers in a duopoly setting. We examine the scenario where the two retailers are considering entry into an uncertain new market that is an extension of their existing markets. The retailers must make decisions on whether or not to first conduct research about the new market's location relative to their existing markets and its size before deciding on their own positioning in it. We first study a sequential-move leader–follower setup to highlight the choice of an "innovate-or-imitate" strategy. We find when the potential new market is small, neither retailer is adequately incentivized to do research to acquire information about the new market. As the size of the new market increases, the follower is induced to do such research. When the new market is very sizable, the leader conducts research and knows the new market's location while the follower free-rides. We then examine a simultaneous-move setup, in which one retailer might decide against acquiring new market information even when the cost of doing so is low. We further observe that differentiation (e.g., in terms of products or store locations) is greater in the simultaneous-move setup than in the sequential setup.

This paper develops an integrated model for analyzing and designing structured supply contracts from the perspectives of the buyer, the supplier, and the entire supply chain in an open supply chain. We first present a flexible framework that encapsulates a wide range of contracting types that have been studied previously. We then introduce the concept of relative contract value vis-a-vis a reference alternative, which facilitates addressing explicitly both the demand uncertainty and the price uncertainty within which real supply relationships operate. To guide practitioners in designing optimal supply contracts, we derive closed-form expressions for optimal contract structure, quantity commitment and flexibility, pricing, and sharing policy as well as the conditions to maximize total supply chain profitability associated with a contract. Our research demonstrates that structured contracts consisting of several fixed and/or flexible components are capable of maximizing total supply chain profit and allocating profit between contracting parties arbitrarily.

如今的商品市场的竞争日趋激烈,包括制造商和零售商在内的商品提供者开始更加关注服务市场,例如延保.本文运用博弈论主要研究双渠道供应链下,采用不同延保策略时的延保定价和渠道利润问题.研究发现:在模型MRR中,对于制造商来说,由零售商来提供延保可获得更高的利润;对于零售商和整个系统来说,包括渠道替代性和市场规模在内的参数会决定由哪方提供延保更好.在模型3T中,对于制造商来说,由零售商来销售延保可以获得更高的利润;对于第三方提供商来说,选择零售商销售延保对自身更加有利.通过对比模型MRR和3T发现,对于制造商来说,相对于销售延保,提供延保是一个更好的选择.

Today's product market becomes more competitive. More and more products providers including the manufacturer and retailer pay more attention to the service market such as the extended warranty. We analyze and discuss the monopoly manufacturer channel under the condition that the manufacturer offers the extended warranty or the retailer does by using the game theory. Our analysis reveals that: for the manufacturer, scenario MRR-R outperforms scenario MRR-M, while for the retailers and the whole system, it depends on the parameters including the channel substitutability and the base demand.

This article considers extended warranty decisions in competing dual-channel supply chains and uses game theories to analyze three model. We also discuss scenarios when the manufacturer provides the extended warranty and when the retailer does in each model. Our analysis reveals that: 1) In model MR, scenario MR-R outperforms MR-M for the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole system. 2) In model MRR, scenario MRR-R outperforms MRR-M for the manufacturer, while scenario MRR-R outperforms MRR-M under certain conditions for the retailers and the whole system. 3) In model MMR, scenario MMR-R outperforms MMR-M for the retailer and the whole system, while for the manufacturer, it depends on parameters such as channel substitutability and extended warranty sensitivity.