The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

Color names influence the memory of a specific hue by shifting it closer to the prototypical color associated with the name. Typically, in studies regarding color naming and memory maximally seven traditional color names are used. We tested whether the distinctiveness of the color name can modify the shift of the memorized hue by introducing unique color names for all hues presented in the experiment. Specifically, we gave unique names to boundary colors, defined, based on previous experiments, as hues that are equally likely named using two traditional names. Central colors are consistently named with one of the seven traditional color names. We observed that more distinctive names were associated with a poorer color recall performance than the traditional names. We propose it can be the result of long-term memory overload caused by having to memorize new color names. At the same time, when distinctive names were provided for boundary colors, the difference in the ability to accurately recall a hue between the boundary and central colors was smaller than when only traditional names were used. Moreover, when using only the traditional color names for boundary colors, we observed a consistent shift in the recalled hue towards the direction of the color name that accompanied it. This study should be considered a preliminary one. Follow-up experiments should be conducted to assess the exact cause of the observed differences. As the next step, we propose to test whether alternate labels to Pantone would lead to similar results.

The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is often used to probe conscious experience, but the assumptions behind the scale and its validity are rarely tested. Using a continuous colour estimation task to assess perceptual quality, we focus on how well PAS follows perceptual quality and how the presence of the estimation task affects PAS ratings. We varied the number and presentation time of stimuli in a simultaneous presentation and target position in a sequential presentation. In all experiments, PAS rating closely followed colour precision. However, it was affected by task-induced response bias, even when the possible task difficulty was judged, without performing the task itself. Still, this bias was only observed on the absolute rating level rather than the scale's ability to capture changes in perceptual quality. Reported studies shed light on factors influencing scales outside of the scale formulation and construction.

Abstract Michel (The mismeasure of consciousness: a problem of coordination for the perceptual awareness scale. Philos Sci 2019;86:1239–49) claims that the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) faces the problem of coordination (also known as validity). We argue that his claim holds only under certain theoretical assumptions which need to be made explicit as these are likely not in line with the PAS proponents’ standpoint. We also call for terminological clarity, an example being the usage of ‘levels’ of consciousness. Precise terminology combined with an explicit reference to the chosen theoretical perspective is necessary conditions for making progress in consciousness research and the development of consciousness theories.

The theoretical landscape of scientific studies of consciousness has flourished. Today, even multiple versions of the same theory are sometimes available. To advance the field, these theories should be directly compared to determine which are better at predicting and explaining empirical data. Systematic inquiries of this sort are seen in many subfields in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, e.g. in working memory. Nonetheless, when we surveyed publications on consciousness research, we found that most focused on a single theory. When 'comparisons' happened, they were often verbal and non-systematic. This fact in itself could be a contributing reason for the lack of convergence between theories in consciousness research. In this paper, we focus on how to compare theories of consciousness to ensure that the comparisons are meaningful, e.g. whether their predictions are parallel or contrasting. We evaluate how theories are typically compared in consciousness research and related subdisciplines in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and we provide an example of our approach. We then examine the different reasons why direct comparisons between theories are rarely seen. One possible explanation is the unique nature of the consciousness phenomenon. We conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness, and we set out the features that a theory of consciousness should account for.

Michel (The mismeasure of consciousness: a problem of coordination for the perceptual awareness scale. Philos Sci 2019;86:1239-49) claims that the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) faces the problem of coordination (also known as validity). We argue that his claim holds only under certain theoretical assumptions which need to be made explicit as these are likely not in line with the PAS proponents' standpoint. We also call for terminological clarity, an example being the usage of 'levels' of consciousness. Precise terminology combined with an explicit reference to the chosen theoretical perspective is necessary conditions for making progress in consciousness research and the development of consciousness theories.

When queried about events in the past, a person may face questions that concern details that have been witnessed-answerable questions-and details that have not been witnessed-unanswerable questions. With regard to answerable questions, the person's willingness to answer these questions increases as a function of not only information available about the queried detail itself, but also as a function of contextual information. The present research assesses whether the willingness to report specific-and thus incorrect-answers when facing unanswerable questions also increases with the amount of available contextual information. In 3 experiments, we show that when recognition questions for critical details one had not encoded are preceded by reinstated contexts, participants are less willing to respond "don't know" to these questions, thus making more commission errors. These results show how greater access to contextual information, commonly associated with better memory for answerable questions, can also lead to more incorrect responses in the case of unanswerable questions. This documents how conversion processes-metacognitive processes of monitoring retrieval from memory and controlling the quality of output-play an important role in shaping the accuracy of memory reports. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

People often claim seeing images completely despite performing poorly. This highlights an issue with conscious representations. We introduce an experimental manipulation aiming to disentangle two prevalent positions: Rich views posit that people virtually represent the external world with unlimited capacity; Sparse views state that representations are reconstructed from expectations and information. In two experiments using the object recognition task, we tested two probe types: Images, which should aid reconstruction more, and Words, which should aid it less. From a sparse view, one should expect that Images lead to greater accuracy and reported experience. We found no reliable differences in accuracy and reported experience across probe types; however, we observed that the object positions influenced both accuracy and reported experience, which is surprising from a Rich view as it seemingly requires assumptions of different access across the visual field. Both theoretical positions thus currently need further development to explain our results.

Understanding how people rate their confidence is critical for characterizing a wide range of perceptual, memory, motor, and cognitive processes. However, as in many other fields, progress has been slowed by the difficulty of collecting new data and the unavailability of existing data. To address this issue, we created a large database of confidence studies spanning a broad set of paradigms, participant populations, and fields of study. The data from each study are structured in a common, easy-to-use format that can be easily imported and analyzed in multiple software packages. Each dataset is further accompanied by an explanation regarding the nature of the collected data. At the time of publication, the Confidence Database (available at osf.io/s46pr) contained 145 datasets with data from over 8,700 participants and almost 4 million trials. The database will remain open for new submissions indefinitely and is expected to continue to grow. We show the usefulness of this large collection of datasets in four different analyses that provide precise estimation for several foundational confidence-related effects and lead to new findings that depend on the availability of large quantity of data. This Confidence Database will continue to enable new discoveries and can serve as a blueprint for similar databases in related fields.

What is the relation between perceptual awareness and action? In this study we tested the hypothesis that motor response influences perceptual awareness judgements. We used a perceptual discrimination task in which presentation of the stimulus was immediately followed by a cue requiring a motor response that was irrelevant to the task but could be the same, opposite, or neutral to the correct response to the stimulus. After responding to the cue, participants rated their stimulus awareness using the Perceptual Awareness Scale, and then carried out their discrimination response. Participants reported a higher level of stimulus awareness after carrying out responses that were either congruent or incongruent with the response required by the stimulus, compared to the neutral condition. The results suggest that the motor response overlapping with a potential response to the stimulus provides information about the outcome of decision process and increases the reported awareness of stimuli.

How do we assess what we remember? Previous work on metacognition suggests that confidence judgments are more accurate when given after than before a response to a perceptual task. Here we present two experiments that investigate the influence of decision and response on metacognitive accuracy in a memory task so as to establish what kind of information people use to assess their memory content. Participants were asked to remember lists of words and then to decide which of two target words had previously been presented. In both experiments, participants rated their confidence either after or before the response. However, the experiments differed in the amount of information provided for confidence rating. In Experiment 1, before confidence rating, participants were either presented with both target words and asked to decide between them, or they were only presented with a cue (first letter of the subsequent target words). In Experiment 2, participants were always presented with a target word before confidence rating. The results of both experiments showed that although task accuracy correlated with confidence ratings in both conditions, this relationship was weaker when confidence was assessed before response to a memory task. We argue that metacognitive judgments are influenced by processing information that is not available at the time of primary response. We discuss the implications for theories of confidence and metacognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

How can we assess the accuracy of our decisions? Recent theoretical and empirical work suggest that confidence in one’s decision is influenced by the characteristics of motor response in a preceding decisional task. In this paper we present experiment designed to test whether decision itself can also inform confidence and therefore increase its accuracy. We tested 143 participants who solved an anagram-solving task in one of 3 conditions: participants either rated their confidence immediately after responding to the anagram task (overt decision), rated their confidence immediately after making a decision but without overt response (covered decision), or rated their confidence before both deciding and responding. The results showed significant relationship between decision accuracy and confidence level in each condition, however this relation was stronger when confidence rating followed decision, either covert or overt. We argue that completing a decisionmaking process increases metacognitive accuracy.

How do perception and language interact to form the representations that guide our thoughts and actions over the short-term? Here, we provide a first examination of this question by investigating the role of verbal labels in a continuous visual working memory (WM) task. Across four experiments, participants retained in memory the continuous color of a set of dots which were presented sequentially (Experiments 1-3) or simultaneously (Experiment 4). At test, they reproduced the colors of all dots using a color wheel. During stimulus presentation participants were required to either label the colors (color labeling) or to repeat "bababa" aloud (articulatory suppression), hence prompting or preventing verbal labeling,, respectively. We tested four competing hypotheses of the labeling effect: (1) labeling generates a verbal representation that overshadows the visual representation; (2) labeling yields a verbal representation in addition to the visual one; (3) the labels function as a retrieval cue, adding distinctiveness to items in memory; and (4) labels activate visual categorical representations in long-term memory. Collectively, our experiments show that labeling does not overshadow the visual input; it augments it. Mixture modeling showed that labeling increased the quantity and quality of information in WM. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that labeling activates visual long-term categorical representations which help in reducing the noise in the internal representations of the visual stimuli in WM. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Recent research suggests that the content of iconic memory (IM) and fragile visual short-term memory could be associated with a similar level of conscious accessibility as working memory (WM). The results of our studies, in which we used a subjective visibility scale in a partial-report change detection paradigm, indicate that it is possible to distinguish separate stages of memory based on both discriminative accuracy and conscious accessibility. The highest scores were associated with IM and the lowest with WM, while somewhere in the middle there was fragile memory. Based on classical assumptions, WM accessibility should be greater than the other two types of memory; however, our study showed that this might not always be the case. We discuss the potential sources of this outcome, of which one may be the task construction, as we only tested items that were directly in the focus of attention.

The aim of the following study was to answer the question whether multimodal grammar learning would improve classification accuracy as compared with a unimodal learning. To test this hypothesis, an experimental procedure was constructed based on the research conducted by Conway and Christiansen [2006]. Their study regarded modality-specific Artificial Grammar Learning task (AGL). The grammatical sequence that was used in the study presented here was based on an algorithm with a finite number of results. Two additional sets of ungrammatical sequences were generated in a random manner. One of them was used in the learning phase in the control group while the second one, in the classification phase, in both, control and experimental groups. The obtained results showed that participants performed classification task above the chance level. These findings supported the hypothesis, which stated that grammar learning would occur [Conway and Christiansen 2006; Reber 1989]. We did not observe any effect regarding the hypothesized accuracy enhancement in a multimodal learning condition.