Whether or not the OSHA recordable injury was used is often a measure of safety success — but should it be?
In recent years, Russia and Turkey have been among non-Western powers that have been more assertive in their foreign policies in the Western Balkans. Naturally, this creates the need to identify the key similarities and differences between these two geopolitical players. By using the case of Serbia, the pivotal country of the Western Balkans and a country whose foreign policy was largely influenced by the idea of hedging and engaging non-Western players, one can determine key similarities and differences between these two powers. This paper states two major similarities between these two powers and one major difference. The first similarity is that both Russia and Turkey are acting based on the same permissive environment of a regional power vacuum, the environment in which the EU’s leverage has decreased and in which countries like Serbia feel emboldened to hedge their bets and diversify partnerships. The second similarity is that although the popular explanation is to stress to powers’ ethnic and religious ties with the Balkans, Slavic and Orthodox ties in case of Russia and Islam in case of Turkey, or even as the continuation of old imperial traditions, the two countries are guided by strategic pragmatism. The difference between the two powers is that Russia can be defined as a status quo power as it aims to act as a spoiler perpetuating the current state of political dysfunctions; Turkey is not a status quo player as it does not oppose the region’s membership in Western institutions as long as its interests are respected.
In this introduction into the special issue on state capture and security sector governance, we argue that state capture is a relevant concept that helps us understand the current autocratisation and the rise of hybrid regimes. We argue that the extraction of public resources via party patronage, privatization of public administration, judiciary, security institutions, and media are vital for influencing political competition. In the second part of the article, we argue that the concept of state capture brings added value to the understanding of security governance and transformations. We show why the parts or whole of security and justice institutions are the inevitable targets of state capture and what it means to understand the success of security sector reform (SSR). Finally, we examine a range of possible positions of the security sector within the captors and what it means for both the literature on state capture and civil-military relations.
Security intelligence agencies play a central role in state capture. Due to the very nature of how they are organised and operate, security intelligence agencies first become targets of these processes, before becoming their principal agents. Indeed, political elites and security intelligence agencies become natural partners in this endeavour, with the very process of state capture coming to resemble a complex intelligence operation. Even though the experiences of many countries bear this out, attempts to research the role of security intelligence agencies in a systematic and theoretically grounded manner remain rare. By using recent theoretical approaches defining state capture as a deliberate political undertaking, the main goal of which is the acquisition of unrestricted state power that in turn enables the unhindered and unsanctioned pursuit of the narrow interests of political elites to the detriment of the public good, this study aims to determine the factors, conditions and mechanisms that facilitate the rapid capture of security services and their further use in capturing the state. This will be explored through the example of Serbia - a country that, two decades on from the start of its democratic transformation, is now a captured state sliding towards autocracy.
Background The colorectal cancer screening programme (BCSP) obtains excellent participation rate, reflected in early detection and treatment of pre & malignant lesions, objectifying a downward trend in incidence & mortality rates Objectives To compare invitation coverage and impact on participation with faecal immunochemical test (FIT) pre&post pandemic. To compare the participation rate in Primary Care Units (UAP) in which the invitation and FIT pickup was interrupted with those that were not, in order to design prioritization strategies in the face of another lockdown Methods Retrospective cohort study of invitations from 2018-2020. Indicators of coverage and participation rate to COVID 19, during the interruption due to lockdown, and subsequent invitations sent out without interruption afterwards. Data analysis R version 4.0.1 stats and MKinfer Results 40% of the planned invitations were taken up (81,097/200,000) showing a decrease in participation rate (71.9/68.8%) P ≤ 0.05 95% CI(2.79-3.52), with significant differences in all groups by age and sex. In the comparative analysis between UAPs that interrupted test collection in March resumed in June or when the invitation was made without interruption (September to December), higher participation rates were observed in the group that did not interrupt the screening (68.1/69.8%) P ≤ 0.05 95%CI (1.18-2.23), with differences in all groups of age and sex. In order to reorganize the activity, agreements were made:1)prioritization of screening colonoscopies, 2)reduce the burden of follow-up colonoscopies based on the evidence. Advanced lesions, has passed from 1 to 3ys, and only the resection in piecemeal ≥20mm sessile is done in under 1y Conclusions The Covid-19 pandemic has affected the BCSP with a decrease in scheduled invitations, but only a slight decrease in the participation rate. The impact is lower if the collection of FIT samples is not interrupted. If a new lockdown is needed, we will not stop the collection of FITs Key messages The Covid-19 pandemic has affected the BCSP adn will impact in incidence and mortality of CRC. The impact is lower if the collection of FIT samples is not interrupted.
