The Royal Danish Defence College (Danish: Forsvarsakademiet; FAK) is an independent authority in the Armed Forces under the Armed Forces Commander's Defense Command, which provides training, research, advice and consultancy services in core military areas. The activities of the Defense Academy primarily target the staff of the Armed Forces, but much of the research is done in collaboration with other research institutions. The head of the Defense Academy typically has the rank of Major General or Rear Admiral.
Hybrid crisis governance – combining hierarchical control with networked collaboration – has gained increasing attention in the public policy and crisis management literatures. Yet, the concept of hybridity remains crude and underdefined, limiting its analytical utility. To address this gap, we conducted a systematic review of how hybrid governance was applied during the COVID‐19 pandemic in Europe. Following the PRISMA 2020 guidelines, we screened 337 records and selected 20 studies for thematic synthesis. Our analysis identifies three distinct types of hybrid crisis governance: temporal, concurrent and integrative. Temporal hybridity refers to sequential shifts between control‐based and collaborative modes over time. Concurrent hybridity captures the parallel coexistence of control and collaboration with limited integration. Integrative hybridity denotes the blending of control and collaboration into fused forms such as controlled collaboration or collaborative control. This typology advances conceptual clarity in both crisis management and public governance by offering a structured analytical vocabulary for hybrid crisis governance. Assessing the strengths and limitations of each type of hybridity, we argue that effective crisis governance depends on a context‐sensitive capacity to recalibrate governance modes in response to shifting constraints and demands.
This article examines how subnational political entities can gain and exercise power over defense and security policy. Although some scholars still claim that subnational political entities play no role in defense and security policy, several studies have argued otherwise. However, these studies have typically focused on one type of power used by subnational political entities. I argue for a broader approach to the power of subnational political entities within the defense and security policy domain. I create an analytical framework that highlights three types of power—legal claims, compellence, and normative appeals—that subnational political entities exercise within this policy domain. I demonstrate the value of this framework by showing that Greenland has used all three types of power in different settings to obtain at least three types of ends (power over defense and security policy, power over other issues, and economic benefits). I argue that this analytical framework provides a language for studying the multitude of types of power, ends, and settings at play and that it can serve as a starting point for further research about the power of subnational political entities in the defense and security policy domain.
Purpose Severe disruptions in supply chains caused by events such as pandemics, energy crises and geopolitical tensions place significant pressure on supply chains related to societal vital sectors and functions. The purpose of this paper is to enhance the understanding of the complexity of building resilience in the supply chains that support societal vital sectors and functions. Design/methodology/approach This paper presents a process model grounded in current research, incorporating insights gained through engagement with resources from the former Danish Critical Supply Agency (now Danish Resilience Agency) and representatives from various critically important societal vital sectors. Findings Based on process theory, this paper presents a four-phase process model to ensure supply chain resilience (SCRES) in societal vital sectors and functions: map the supply chains for societal vital functions under the societal vital sectors, assess the probability and consequences of incidents for societal vital functions, identify vulnerabilities for societal vital functions and conduct risk assessments and develop action plans for risk mitigation and capability building. Research limitations/implications This paper is based on societal vital sectors in Denmark, which may have a different structure and legislation compared with other countries. Practical implications This paper proposes a pragmatically structured approach to ensuring SCRES in societal vital sectors and functions, which involves significant complexity. Social implications By mapping supply chains, assessing risks and identifying vulnerabilities, the model helps societies better prepare for potential disruptions. Originality/value This paper introduces segmentation theory to segment societal vital sectors and functions to guide employees to focus their work on what is most critical. Furthermore, a supply chain perspective is applied in the analysis of societal vital sectors and functions.
