Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael

This article contributes to the move beyond Western-centrism in the study of transnational practices and their justification. Taking Boltanski and Thévenot’s work on justification out of France and Europe and to Chinese practices in Africa, it develops and ‘worlds’ an ‘orders of worth’ framework that, building on and going beyond their work, uncovers an original set of repertoires of justification at work. The article develops its argument through an analysis of Chinese discourse and practices of corporate engagement with host societies in Africa. It shows that Chinese practices mobilize five orders – a ‘Market Order’, a ‘Legalist Order’, a ‘Socialist (Party Line) Order’, a ‘Confucian Order’ and a ‘Daoist Order’ – and discusses the compromises and frictions between them. Instead of emphasizing Chinese misconduct or juxtaposing a ‘Western’ with a ‘Chinese’ brand of transnational governance, we propose an orders-of-worth heuristic and a variety of practices of justification that mobilize a broader set of philosophical and practice traditions than often assumed. Importantly, we argue that such an adapted heuristic and broadened repertoire of practices are useful for capturing transnational practices of justification more fully in a pluriversal and increasingly less Western-centric world order.

Chapter 8 explores the geopolitical significance of the BRI in the case of Indonesia, Southeast Asia's largest country. It argues this region constitutes the geographical centre of today's global great-power rivalry, in which the US and China are the key players. It was in the Indonesian capital, in 2013, that China first announced its ambitions for the Maritime Silk Road. This chapter asks which economic and diplomatic activities constitute the BRI in the case of Indonesia. It then asks what impact these activities have on China and Indonesia's political relations as well as on Indonesia's position with regard to China-US tensions. The chapter particularly focuses on Indonesia's efforts to maintain strategic autonomy and on manifestations of great-power influence on the country's foreign policy-making.

The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the single most important multilateral forum when it comes to solving the global climate crisis. Whilst there has been intensive study into the outcomes, policies and institutional aspects, little attention has been paid to the group dynamics that occur during the intensive, annual two-week decision-making process. By using a group dynamic lens, field observations from COP28 were used to differentiate not only the different social settings in which negotiators come together, but also how these affect their ability to communicate effectively and to take decisions. Results show that whilst the negotiation process is highly structured and bureaucratic, key moments of COPs—in particular the informal parts—are often unfacilitated spaces, which make meaningful, relational and quality communication difficult. Alongside further recommendations for research, the paper concludes that strengthening the group dynamics competencies of negotiators, and especially chairing staff, should be paramount in the effort to increase trust and quality of communication during these large scale multilateral negotiations.

We study how individual and country-level variables interact in affecting political gender attitudes in Europe. Based on data from the 2017 Eurobarometer survey, we show that there are high levels of support for more women in politics and legal measures to achieve gender parity across the EU. In fact, more people, and women in particular, put higher trust in female compared to male political representatives than the other way round. We find that – at the individual level – gender, age and education have significant effects on political gender attitudes. Contrary to theory, however, the effect of gender is not mediated by beliefs about the proper role of women in politics and society. We also do not find support for the contextual effects of masculine culture and the religiosity of society, but we do uncover significant gaps in political gender attitudes between post-communist and other countries, especially for men. This gap is very significant in size and declines only marginally with the age of the respondent. Our study identifies men in post-communist countries as the group least likely to trust female politicians and support gender parity in politics in Europe. These attitudes are at least partly independent from stereotypes about gender roles.

The EU’s Global Gateway—launched in 2021—goes back to the Connectivity strategy launched in 2018, and addresses the challenge of a rising China, especially its bid to increase its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Global Gateway provides target states with a safer bet than the BRI and meets the infrastructure needs in the Indo-Pacific region. Based on three core principles—sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based—the EU is able to combine economic growth with strengthened liberal values, thus maintaining and improving its global economic competitiveness and strategic advantages especially in the Indo-Pacific. The regulatory aspects of the Global Gateway are also important, as these regulations, especially in the digital domain, will have democratic values integrated within them which directly challenge the digital authoritarianism of China. Whether the EU can be successful in implementing this agenda will depend on its ability to work with the United States, Japan, and like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific.