South Texas College of Law Houston (STCL or South Texas) is a private law school in Houston, Texas. Founded in 1923, it is accredited by the American Bar Association. South Texas College of Law Houston is the oldest law school in the city of Houston. In 1923, the YMCA made the decision to establish a law school with a focus on offering night classes for working professionals.In 1998, the College was admitted as a member school into the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) by a unanimous vote of the AALS House of Representatives; the AALS is considered the learned society for legal education. The College also joined with four other independent law schools – California Western School of Law, New England School of Law, Stetson University College of Law, and William Mitchell College of Law – to create a unique academic partnership, the Consortium for Innovative Legal Education. The consortium represents a cooperative effort designed to enhance and strengthen the educational mission of each school separately and all of them collectively, providing expanded opportunities for educational programs on a national and international basis.
The COVID-19 virus shattered everyday life as we once knew it. The legal profession and our court systems were likewise radically impacted. While most courts had never held any proceedings online before the pandemic, almost overnight they were forced to close their doors and hold hearings remotely. Because this shift happened so rapidly, states and the federal government were forced to adopt rules that permitted these virtual appearances without the luxury of time for careful consideration or legislative process. Now, more than five years removed from the COVID-19 crisis, most jurisdictions are still using these hastily made rules. The time has long since come to evaluate the workability of these guidelines, and particularly their impact on access to justice. Whether a hearing is held remotely or in person can have outcome-changing consequences, especially for vulnerable groups who face countless barriers to attending court, such as survivors of abuse, members of the disability community, and impoverished individuals. Most jurisdictions’ rules currently base hearing format on unfettered judicial discretion or on the consent of both parties. Accordingly, for individuals unable to travel to the courthouse, their opportunities to be heard depend on the whims of individual judges or mercy from opposing parties. Therefore, this article advocates for the states and our federal government to adopt uniform standards that set certain hearing types presumptively remote or in person. Furthermore, factor tests for making exceptions to these standards would assist judges in addressing access barriers such as difficulties in traveling to court or, conversely, a lack of technology needed for virtual attendance. Finally, to further support accessibility, jurisdictions should consider initiatives such as comprehensively educating judges on technology and accessibility barriers, creating user-friendly online court platforms, and providing litigants with safe public spaces to access legal information or pro bono services.
A teenager grieving his parents' death gets drunk and goes on a vandalism spree. His probation officer suggests that instead of going to jail, the teen and his accomplice could meet their victims and face the impact of their actions. The teens do so; they then pay restitution to help repair the harm. Born out of the restorative justice movement, this type of restitution-marked by careful tailoring-reduces recidivism and rehabilitates young offenders. The juvenile thus moves away from the criminal justice system while victims receive their rightful compensation. This was restitution's early promise.(1) But another strand ofjuvenile restitution, rooted in the tough-on-crime policies of the 1980s, grew up alongside the restorative justice movement. This strand tends to have the opposite effect. State juvenile restitution laws vary widely, but many impose juvenile restitution that is broad, mandatory, and permanent. The resulting levels of debt can be unrealistically high, following young offenders into adulthood and leaving the victim uncompensated. This kind of untailored restitution pulls juveniles deeper into the system, as it can prompt probation revocation, continued court supervision, reduced educational and employment opportunities, and hopeless debt. This harsh genre of restitution debuted in expansive federal restitution statutes in the 1980s and then moved into state victims' rights statutes. Juvenile law soon followed. Juvenile criminal justice has moved in recent decades toward a rehabilitative model, due in part to new information. The young mind, research has shown, is different from that of adults-more impulsive, struggling to foresee the consequences of certain actions. Less blameworthy. Accordingly, the Supreme Court eliminated the death penalty for crimes committed by minors and limited juvenile life without parole. Arrest and incarceration rates for juveniles have been halved since the 1980s. Yet restitution laws, for the most part, have barely changed since their tough-on-crime inception; juveniles therefore remain subject to lasting involvement in the criminal justice system a burden that amounts to a financial death penalty. This article explains why juvenile restitution should now change too. The time has come for restitution that achieves its rehabilitative goals for juveniles while also compensating victims.
In its recent decision of Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court invalidated the collective effort of the President and Congress to limit the ability of "enemy combatants" held by the United States to challenge the legality of their detention in Article III courts. While the majority opinion focused primarily on the scope of the constitutional habeas guarantee, it is impossible to ignore the reality that the issue that lay just below the surface was the legitimacy of subjecting individuals to "generational" detention based on an expansively applied definition of the term "enemy combatant." Although the Court had four years earlier held that preventive detention based on such a designation was conceptually justified as a "fundamental and accepted incident of war," it had also suggested that should the scope of that definition become disconnected from the customary concept of an enemy battlefield belligerent, this justification might erode. By providing Guantanamo detainees with the long-demanded opportunity to obtain judicial review of the legality of their detention, the Court has set in motion a process that will almost inevitably force the government to defend the scope of the "enemy combatant" definition it has relied on to justify the preventive detention of individuals who do not fall into the traditional realm of a battlefield belligerent. In so doing, the Court has set in motion a process that will finally bring to a head the legitimacy of applying detention authority derived from the long-established customary law of armed conflict in a context characterized by the hyperbolic designation of a "Global War." Because the government will almost certainly now be forced to demonstrate how the scope of the "enemy combatant" definition relied on by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals in Guantanamo remains consistent with the law of armed conflict itself, the Boumediene opinion is not a catastrophic blow to the government's authority to detain terrorists who participate in hostilities against the United States. Instead, it has provided the opportunity and impetus for the government to finally reconcile its assertion of detention authority with the law upon which it purports to apply the law of armed conflict.
Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (SFFA) will be studied by law students for generations, in much the same way that Bakke and Grutter were studied before. But there is much more to SFFA than the final decisions about Harvard University and the University of North Carolina will reveal. This Article, published for a symposium by the SMU Law Review, focuses on three stages of the litigation: the petitions, the oral arguments, and the decision. Part I recounts the complex procedural history, which began in federal courts in Massachusetts and North Carolina. The Harvard case reached the Supreme Court first, while the UNC case lingered in district court. The Supreme Court called for the views of the Solicitor General. By doing so, the Court could punt the case to the following term, which allowed the UNC case to catch up, and Justice Breyer’s replacement to be confirmed. Both cases would be argued on October 31, 2022. Part II parses the questions asked by all nine Justices during oral argument. Chief Justice Roberts signaled up front that he would rule against the universities. Justice Thomas repeated his charge that arguments in favor of racial preferences mirror the arguments made by segregationists. Justice Alito worried about discrimination against Asian-American applicants. Justice Sotomayor focused on the detailed findings of the trial courts. Justice Kagan questioned whether SFFA would favor universities with few or no racial minorities on campus. Justice Gorsuch looked to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Kavanaugh suggested preferences could be reserved for the descendants of slaves. Justice Barrett inquired about the expiration date of Grutter. And Justice Jackson recounted how the Reconstruction Congress used racial preferences for the freedmen. Finally, Part III breaks down four aspects of the Court’s decision. SFFA eliminated the “educational benefits” rationale for affirmative action. Chief Justice Roberts continues to take inconsistent positions in similar cases during the same term. Justice Kavanaugh continues to follow the lead of Chief Justice Roberts in leading cases, including SFFA. And I defend Justice Jackson’s likely involvement in the Harvard case, notwithstanding her recusal.