Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was a cable television provider in the United States, and for most of its history was controlled by Bob Magness and John Malone.The company was started in 1958 in Bozeman, Montana as Western Microwave, Inc. and Community Television, Inc., two firms with common ownership. The companies merged in 1968 and operations moved to Denver, taking the name Tele-Communications Inc. It was the largest cable operator in the United States at one time.After going public in 1970, the company grew rapidly, and became the top cable provider in the United States. After a failed merger attempt with Bell Atlantic in 1994, it was purchased in 1999 by AT&T, whose cable television assets were later acquired by Charter Communications and then Comcast Corporation.
Internet of things (IoT) ecosystems introduce significant cybersecurity challenges due to device heterogeneity, firmware opacity, constrained resources, distributed deployment, and the integration of devices within wider socio-technical systems where they are used. Existing approaches to address IoT cybersecurity typically address isolated aspects of this problem, such as vulnerability enumeration, anomaly detection, or risk assessment; but without integrating them across the full lifecycle of devices and systems. This paper presents an extensible architecture that unifies cybersecurity testing, runtime monitoring, contextual risk modelling, secure update mechanisms, and auditable evidence management for IoT ecosystems that aims to address these challenges. The framework supports both device under test and system under test perspectives and integrates component-level techniques (such as SBOM generation, network fuzzing, machine learning-based anomaly detection, and access control risk evaluation) with system-level, knowledge-based, risk modelling to capture threat propagation across interconnected assets. A distributed ledger-backed auditable data infrastructure ensures integrity and traceability of indicators, results, and decisions. Automated workflow orchestration enables flexible tool chaining and lifecycle-aware execution aligned with established security development lifecycles. The approach is validated through three industrial use cases in aviation cargo monitoring, smart manufacturing, and telecommunication residential gateways. Results demonstrate the feasibility of combining static analysis, runtime indicators, and dynamic risk assessment to prioritise vulnerabilities contextually, detect anomalous behaviour, and support secure patch deployment in resource-constrained environments. The work advances lifecycle-integrated, system-aware cybersecurity assurance for IoT ecosystems and highlights the need for contextualised, interoperable tooling to address systemic vulnerability and risk propagation in complex systems where IoT, ICT and people interact.
We introduce Qiana, a logic framework for reasoning on formulas that are true only in specific contexts. In Qiana, it is possible to quantify over both formulas and contexts to express, e.g., that “everyone knows everything Alice says”. Qiana also permits paraconsistent logics within contexts, so that contexts can contain contradictions. Furthermore, Qiana is based on first-order logic, and is finitely axiomatizable, so that Qiana theories are compatible with pre-existing first-order logic theorem provers. We show how Qiana can be used to represent temporality, event calculus, and modal logic. We also discuss different design alternatives of Qiana.
Go's adoption in critical infrastructure intensifies the need for systematic vulnerability detection, yet existing symbolic execution tools struggle with Go binaries due to runtime complexity and scalability challenges. In this work, we build upon Zorya, a concolic execution framework that translates Go binaries to Ghidra's P-Code intermediate representation to address these challenges. We added the detection of bugs in concretely not taken paths and a multi-layer filtering mechanism to concentrate symbolic reasoning on panic-relevant paths. Evaluation on five Go vulnerabilities demonstrates that panic-reachability gating achieves 1.8-3.9x speedups when filtering 33-70
eBPF safely extends OS kernels in domains such as networking, observability, and security. The safety comes from an in-kernel compilation pipeline where a verifier checks every program, and a kernel just-in-time compiler (JIT) translates the verified bytecode to native code. The kernel keeps the JIT simple to stay trustworthy, translating one bytecode instruction at a time in a single pass. This single-pass design misses optimization opportunities, so eBPF runs up to twice as slow as natively compiled code in our characterization. Adding optimizations to the kernel JIT directly requires upstream acceptance and a long release cycle, enlarges the trusted computing base (TCB), and grows the per-architecture kernel code. To address this, we present Kops, an extension interface that lets userspace compilers and kernel modules introduce new operations without modifying the kernel core, while keeping a minimal trusted computing base (TCB). Each operation has two forms, a proof sequence of vanilla eBPF instructions that the existing verifier checks and a native emit of machine instructions that the JIT compiles. Because the verifier checks the proof sequence, the native emit is the only per-operation addition to the TCB. Hardware idioms are the lowest-hanging fruit for this interface. With Kops, we build EInsn, seven operations such as rotate and conditional select that CPUs execute as single instructions. Lean 4 proofs show that each native emit computes the same result as its proof sequence. On x86-64 and ARM64, EInsn speeds up eBPF microbenchmarks by up to 24
In recent years, AI agents have evolved into capable assistants that carry out multi-step tasks in digital environments. The network systems community is beginning to explore these capabilities in operational and experimental settings. However, an agent operating in network systems should not be judged solely by whether it completes the immediate task. The experiment record it modifies must also remain trustworthy. We call this property artifact integrity: the record's claims must remain supported by the available evidence, confined to the scope established by that evidence, and traceable through the artifacts that encode their support. To make this property measurable, we introduce NetArtifactBench, which tests whether AI agents can repair inconsistent records derived from public network-system artifacts while preserving claims that remain supported. The benchmark contains 52 instances with injected inconsistencies ranging from direct contradictions to unstated relations spread across several artifacts. We evaluate 23 agent configurations across three general-purpose AI agent runtimes using deterministic scoring. The average contract pass rate is 65.3
