
Why is there such widespread disagreement among philosophers and scientists concerning the nature of consciousness? In this study, we evaluate a novel hypothesis for the persistence of this disagreement: differences in phenomenological experience. We posit that differences in subjective experience predict metaphysical beliefs about consciousness, in particular physicalism and dualism (i.e. whether the mind is entirely physical or mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of things). Two groups of participants (academic researchers and non-academics) will complete a three-part questionnaire. Part I measures metaphysical intuitions about consciousness, specifically physicalism versus dualism. Part II measures judgments in thought experiments (cloning and teleportation). Part III measures psychological traits related to subjective experience, i.e. what it is like to be conscious. From these data, we infer a set of latent dimensions to (1) model participants' metaphysical intuitions about consciousness, and (2) construct a multidimensional profile of subjective experience as the central explanatory construct. The design enables us to go beyond simple predictor–outcome associations by using a more theoretically constrained two-level latent-variable strategy to test our motivated hypotheses, and then test how our results in consciousness researchers generalise predictively to a non-academic sample. This novel study will illuminate whether and which aspects of one's inner life systematically predict physicalist or dualist leanings, offering new insight into the experiential foundations of the longstanding disagreement regarding consciousness.
Because dream experiences are largely accessible only through retrospective reports after awakening, estimates of dream affect may depend on who evaluates the report. We compared dreamers’ self-ratings with ratings made by independent external judges to examine how rating method influences estimates of the presence, valence, and intensity of dream affect. The dataset comprised 1,946 home dream reports from 106 adults; models that included age used data from 104 participants. Dreams were judged as significantly more affective and emotionally intense when self-rated than when evaluated by external judges. External judges classified fewer dreams as containing affect and fewer dreams as positively valenced than did self-ratings. A three-way interaction among rating method, valence, and participants’ biological sex indicated that biological sex influenced self-ratings but not external ones: women reported more intense negative dreams than men, whereas men rated their negative dreams as less intense than their own positive dreams; these differences disappeared when external ratings were used. While word count positively predicted affective occurrence and intensity, it did not account for valence. Self- and external ratings showed a significant positive association, although agreement at the level of individual dream reports was modest. Agreement was higher for negative than positive classifications. These results indicate that rating methods shape empirical portraits of dream affect and that self- and external ratings capture overlapping but noninterchangeable aspects of remembered dream experience.
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of being an agent who initiates actions and brings about their consequences. Prior work suggests that positive outcomes may produce a stronger sense of agency than negative outcomes and that predictability of outcome valence may modulate these differences. One approach used to investigate SoA is temporal binding. However, the measure can comprise two components, action binding and outcome binding, which appear to be dissociable and may depend on partly different cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we examined whether positive outcomes strengthen binding relative to neutral outcomes and whether predictability affects the two components differently. Participants completed a Libet clock task in which a voluntary keypress caused the humanoid robot iCub to produce either a positive emotional vocalization or an acoustically similar neutral tone. iCub's facial expression indicated whether the valence of the upcoming sound was predictable or unpredictable. Positive vocalizations produced stronger outcome binding than neutral tones, whereas predictability did not reliably influence outcome binding or alter the effect of valence. Action binding was not significantly modulated by either valence or predictability. The two components were also not associated when measured across participants. These findings suggest that positive outcome valence can strengthen outcome binding relative to a neutral consequence, without a reliable change in action binding, and further support treating the two components of temporal binding separately.
The present paper presents evidence against the notion that true contingency learning effects are only possible when participants are consciously aware of the pairings, as has been argued in a series of recent papers. We present a novel variant of the colour-word contingency learning paradigm designed to eliminate (or minimize) the influence of stimulus-response binding confounds. Within each of three sets of words, each word was presented most often in one colour. Participants cycled through the three sets of words in such a way that words never repeated within close proximity (between 6 and 10 intervening items). In a series of mixed models controlling for immediate colour repetitions, long-distance word-response repetitions, and item-level objective awareness, contingency learning effects were consistently observed. Most importantly, a robust contingency learning effect was not only observed for “aware items”, but also for “unaware items” after controlling for the above-mentioned repetition effects. This represents clear evidence for implicit learning. That is, even when participants do not try to learn and do not develop conscious awareness of the pairings, a robust contingency learning effect is still observed.
Normally individuals give a fairly accurate subjective estimate of short seconds-to-minutes time interval durations. However, in some circumstances such as a high fever, sudden fear, and old age, temporal distortions can occur so that a conscious individual experiences the passage of subjective time that differs substantially from the actual measured time. Behaviors associated with these temporal distortions and with time perception in general are consistent with the existence of a neural clock circuit in the brain for estimating the passage of short time intervals, but experimental studies to date have generally been limited in demonstrating such a neural circuit. Here we propose that, unexpectedly, actions of the well-known sleep-wake neural circuit are ultimately responsible for many of these known temporal distortions given two basic hypotheses about the underlying electromagnetic nature of the brain. We review this concept, including the theoretical existence of an imaginary-valued pacemaker signal that moves through time along with the brain. We describe the details of this sleep-wake circuit hypothesis, the two main existing theoretical ideas that underlie it, its consistency with currently proposed specific mechanisms of temporal distortions, and how the sleep-wake circuit can serve as a final common route for these specific mechanisms. Importantly, we also show that the sleep-wake circuit hypothesis is readily testable – that it can be falsified using existing experimental methods.