The paper reconstructs G.E. Moore's account of common-sense moral rules in Chapter V of Principia Ethica. It argues against both a conservative reading and a liberationist one. Moore instead defends a qualified conservatism and a conditional freedom. A small set of universal rules (e.g., prohibitions on murder and protections of property) is consequentially justified as necessary for civilised society, which enables the pursuit of intrinsic goods. By contrast, non-universal rules and moral innovations have no default standing and must be evaluated case by case for their optimific tendencies. For individual action, rule-following is a reliable decision procedure when rules tend to promote utility. Direct consequentialist judgment is permitted when rules are merely contingently useful or suboptimal. Freedom to deviate is real but constrained by epistemic limits, social practices, and the duty to maximise the good. Overall, Moore's pluralist consequentialism balances rule adherence with direct evaluation.
This paper suggests a possible new path for investigating the influence of Karl Marx's Jewish background on his thought. Unlike previous research, it proposes to relate the materialist conception of history not so much to the doctrinal content of Judaism, but rather to the historical experience of the Jewish minority in mid-19th-century Germany and Europe, that is to the historical and biographical context of its genesis. More specifically, it argues that the emergence out of the bosom of bourgeois society of a new and at the same time ancestral phenomenon such as modern antisemitism should be counted among the problems that have contributed to shaping the dialectical conception of historical time that informs Marx's social criticism.
This article examines the influence of G.E. Moore on the Oxford philosophers who, from the 1950s onward, initiated the revival of virtue ethics. Although Moore is often portrayed as responsible for the sharp divide between facts and values, his work provided the conceptual background against which Anscombe, Foot, Geach, and Midgley developed a naturalistic response aimed at grounding normativity in human nature. The paper critically analyzes Philippa Foot's neo Aristotelian naturalism, highlighting its reliance on a biologically conceived "first nature" and the tensions between human function and practical reason. It then contrasts this approach with Iris Murdoch's alternative reading of Moore: non naturalist, realist, and markedly Platonic. Murdoch's defense of the indefinability of the Good and of moral attention offers a different strategy for reconnecting facts and values without reverting to biologism. The article argues that this minority position deserves renewed attention in contemporary ethical theory.
I address the metaphysical core of Moore's conception of intrinsic value: a pattern of modalities such that intrinsic value is a property, is intrinsic, but it is not an intrinsic property. Or such that intrinsic value depends necessarily only on the intrinsic nature of its bearers, but it is not an intrinsic property of its bearers. In this way, I also aim to give support to the view that Moore's later moral philosophy (from the early 1910s on) includes a metaethical theory radically different from that of Principia Ethica. Moore's difficulty with intrinsic value depends on a potential incoherence between its modal ontology and the inferential role individuation of its concept, which includes the features of non-naturalism and a constitutive connection with deontic notions like right and ought. (Both these assumptions are in radical contrast with Principia Ethica.) I suggest that the consideration of Moore's own philosophy of modality (developed in the same years as his conception of intrinsic value) may indicate how to rethink the necessity of intrinsic value, even though this would require the additional resources of a Two-Dimensional conception of modality. I also hint at how this formal apparatus can be applied to the distinctively moral-theoretical issue of the supervenience of ethical on natural properties. My conclusion is that Moore's modal conception of intrinsic value holds important lessons for today's metaethical discussion.
The reception of Plato's thoughts in Schelling's philosophy as well as the persistence of certain Platonic elements throughout Schelling's entire philosophical production are already considered commonplace. However, the scholarship seems to not fully understand the debts that Schelling has toward Plato's doctrines and their meaningful role in Schelling's strategy, highlighting, instead, the presence of Kant's work in it. My paper aims to challenge this commonplace and prove the crucial importance of Plato's Timaeus and Philebus in Schelling's early production from a peculiar and yet unexplored perspective. I will show that Schelling's notion of synthesis is built not on Kant's philosophy, but on Plato's one and represents what Schelling will refer to as Band in his late production. Thus, I will first present the philosophical issues that are found in Kant's Kritiken and represent the beginning of Schelling's reflections. Then, I will reconstruct the genealogy of Schelling's Band in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus and Philebus. Finally, I will take into account some passages in Schelling's Ideen and Weltseele where he borrows some crucial elements of Plato's thought and applies them to his analysis of nature.
Contrary to the tendency to treat Moore's ethical theory in isolation, this article draws on Some Main Problems of Philosophy to suggest that his meta-ethics and normative ethics should be considered as the result of his general philosophical methodology. Moore's shift from the consideration of the concepts to the analysis of words used in everyday life should be seen as a way of not losing sight of certain essential claims of common sense. On this basis, Moore emphasizes how ethical evaluations and choices involve a linguistic dimension that cannot be reduced to the knowledge of natural properties dealt with by the sciences. Similarly, his insistence on the recognition of & laquo;generally accepted rules & raquo; to guide normative choices derives from the fertility of this process in our common life and not, as some interpreters suggest, from a nostalgia for the certainties provided by religious morals or from a conservative turn in the latter part of his life.
This article challenges the prevailing view that Lessing's Spinozism should be understood primarily through the lens of metaphysics and the Ethics, as shaped by the Pantheism Controversy. It argues instead that the Theological-political treatise (TTP) played a central and formative role in Lessing's engagement with Spinoza. From his early reflections on the distinction between spirit and letter to the Fragmentenstreit and The education of the human race, Lessing develops a theological-political interpretation of religion that closely echoes the TTP. His Spinozism is therefore not merely metaphysical but deeply political: it grounds a historical relativization of positive religion, a critique of dogmatism, and a defense of freedom of philosophizing. Only by considering the interplay between metaphysical necessity and theological-political critique can the originality of Lessing's Spinozism be fully understood.
This article examines G.E. Moore's critique of evolutionary ethics, as set out in Principia Ethica. Moore targets H. Spencer's theory, accusing him of committing the naturalistic fallacy. After presenting an overview of Moore's account of the naturalistic fallacy, Moore's argument against Spencer is discussed in detail. Then, some clarifications about Spencer's evolutionary account underlying his ethical view are provided. Finally, two arguments are presented against Moore's claim that Spencer committed the naturalistic fallacy. The aim of this discussion is to shed light on the influence of Moore's stance on evolutionary ethics in the contemporary debate.
In Principia Ethica, Moore defends the view that intrinsic value comes almost always in organic unities, that is, in complex wholes whose value is neither identical with, nor proportional to, the sum of the values of its parts. After presenting Moore's characterization of the theory, the paper discusses three main objections that have recently been raised to Moore's analysis, namely, the & laquo;conditional & raquo; interpretation of the organic unities, the objection from evaluative inadequacy, and the holistic theory of value. It is shown that Moore's view can be defended from these objections. However, it is also argued that, contrary to Moore's view, the theory of organic unities cannot be considered the fundamental truth of moral philosophy.
This paper is dedicated to G. E. Moore's account of ethical intuition, with a specific focus on Principia Ethica. I begin by examining the connection between intuition, self-evidence, and proof, with the aim of emphasising how Moore's understanding of the self-evident depends on the unprovability of certain ethical propositions. I then show how Moore's appeal to intuition stems from his claim that the predicate & laquo;good & raquo; is indefinable and reconstruct the non-demonstrative argumentative strategies he employs when addressing questions of intrinsic value. Finally, I consider the limits Moore places on the epistemic function of intuition, while arguing that such limits do not challenge his views on the objectivity and validity of the ethical propositions grasped intuitively, and I briefly mention his later references to self-evidence in Ethics.
In recent decades, Isaac Newton's legacy has been the focus an expanding body of research. This article focuses on the reception of Newton's work in Europe by examining a volume on the subject, edited by Scott Mandelbrote and Helmut Pulte (2019). discusses the impact of & laquo;Newtonianism & raquo;, that is the spread and understanding of Newton's ideas, across 18th-century and 19th-century Europe, from the perspective of its reception in specific geographical areas.
In this article, I discuss Kant's possibility proof (i.e. Kant's pre-critical attempt to prove the existence of God), and in contrast to some interpreters who claim that Kant was unwilling or unable to dismiss the proof, I argue that Kant himself examines and demolishes it in the Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, I argue that since the possibility proof is vitiated by a quantifier-shift fallacy, Kant's rebuttal depends solely upon logical analysis.
This essay discusses some of the new translations of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, particularly the Italian translation by Pasquale Frascolla and Luigi Perissinotto and the English translation by Michael Beaney, with some reference to Damion Searls' translation. After an initial presentation of the << desiderata >> of the Italian translation, which coincide with the intentions of the English translation, we discuss different topics concerning the main ideas of Wittgenstein's work, connected with the Fregean turn about sense and reference. Besides, we present some differences in problems concerning the translation from German into English and into Italian (which in some respects is advantaged by a more literal translation).
The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted critical issues in scientific modelling, with competing models aiming to represent the disease's spread, treatment, and prospects. Epidemiological models demonstrated rapid response, commitment to public good, and global scientific collaboration. However, uncertainties in explanatory hypotheses raised questions about medical understanding and science-policy interactions. This contribution examines the role of experts and scientific expertise during crises, exploring epistemic and non-epistemic factors at play. It also draws some possible lessons from recent philosophical debates on democratic science and public trust in science for future applications.
The essay draws on J & uuml;rgen Habermas's thoughts on managing the pandemic. Habermas does not view this as a suspension of the legal order, but rather as an internal tension within the constitutional system. From this perspective, a state of emergency differs from a state of exception in that it seeks to restore normality and safeguard the normative order itself through temporary and proportionate measures. Based on this premise, the essay examines the impact of integrating scientific knowledge into decision-making in an emergency context. The analysis focuses on three aspects: incorporating scientific evidence into decision-making; the relationship between risk definition and returning to normality; and the role of temporality in delegating to technical expertise. Taking these elements into account, the essay challenges the clear-cut distinction between technical management and political governance and opens a broader reflection on the redefinition of legitimacy criteria for power in emergency situations and on the active role of science in produc ing normativity, emphasizing the need for its political accountability and shared responsibility.
Omri Boehm defends the idea of absolute << metaphysical truth >>, which is rooted on the nature of things and opposed to statements derived from human agreements and human interests. Examples of metaphysical truth are: a) the equality of all men, as set out in the American Declaration of Independence; b) the assertion in some Bible passages that God himself is bound by the truth; c) Kant's defence of the absolute dignity of human beings. This article questions the possibility of metaphysical truth, contrasting it with the notion of a plural truth-albeit not a relativistic one. Radical universalism, which resolves (and dissolves) the concept of identity by appealing to metaphysical truth, is here contrasted with cosmopolitanism, which promotes the coexistence of different identities through dialogue.
This article examines Quine's rehabilitation of ontology following Rudolf Carnap's anti-metaphysical program, achieved by reducing the concept of << reality >> to a notion of << existence >> expressed through existential quantification. The paper analyzes two main lines of criticism against Quine's approach: a << deflationist >> perspective, which contends that Quine's rehabilitated ontology remains a << pale zombie >> of traditional metaphysics and that ontological disputes are ultimately verbal, and an << inflationist >> view, which argues that Quine's flat ontology fails to address genuine metaphysical questions concerning the modes of existence. Against both alternatives, this article posits that the selection of an ontology is deeply informed by a background metaphysical conception of reality. The paper concludes that a genuine rehabilitation of ontology, while leveraging Quine's quantificational tools, should extend beyond simple existential quantification, investigating the higher-order criteria for evaluating competing metaphysical frameworks.
Over the last few years, the evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) has undergone a notable acceleration in terms of its impact on so-ciety and on the political actors called upon to regulate and predict the consequences of the diffusion of a non-unitary technology with multiple impacts on the lives of people, both considered individual-ly and in their collective dimension. This is typical of AI where the development and diffusion of new technologies, especially through the network, generate large-scale consequences that are difficult to fully predict a priori. This has led to a << permanent emergency >> sit-uation, which must be permanently addressed. This article explores the relationship between AI and emergency situations, showing how AI can both generate crises and, conversely, serve as a valu-able tool, thanks to its unique features, for addressing and resolv-ing them.
