Le colonialisme a profondément façonné tant la protection de la jeunesse que la justice juvénile au Canada, deux régimes qui opéraient historiquement au sein des mêmes institutions cherchant à réhabiliter des jeunes dont les familles étaient perçues comme incapables d’éduquer leurs enfants. Les familles et enfants dits « modèles » étaient définis en opposition aux familles et enfants autochtones, vus comme ayant besoin d’être civilisés et assimilés dans la majorité non autochtone. Aujourd’hui, la Loi concernant les enfants, les jeunes et les familles des Premières Nations, des Inuits et des Métis (2019) affirme la compétence des peuples autochtones en matière de services à l’enfance et aux familles. Vu cette reconnaissance, nous avançons qu’il est souhaitable d’amorcer une prise en charge en matière de justice pénale adolescente par les communautés autochtones. Quatre composantes analytiques portent cet argument. Premièrement, il existe des chevauchements importants entre le droit de la protection de la jeunesse et le droit de la justice pénale adolescente, et ce, tant en droit canadien que dans diverses traditions autochtones. Deuxièmement, la prise en charge de la protection de la jeunesse par les communautés autochtones est déjà bien amorcée, notamment depuis l’entrée en vigueur de la loi fédérale de 2019. Troisièmement, le droit canadien en matière de justice pénale adolescente est guidé par des normes qui s’apparentent à celles caractérisant les traditions juridiques autochtones, notamment la réhabilitation, la réparation des torts causés et l’implication de la communauté dans la prise de décision. Finalement, le phénomène hautement répandu des jeunes faisant l’objet d’un double mandat en protection de la jeunesse et en justice pénale adolescente suggère que leur réalité est intimement liée.
This paper examines the contemporary relevance of pre-1970 Supreme Court of Canada decisions through quantitative citation analysis, responding to Chief Justice Wagner’s 2024 assertion that these historical decisions are of minimal legal interest. The study analyses three datasets: citations in Supreme Court decisions (1985–2024), appeal factums (2009–2024), and decisions from all Canadian courts and tribunals on CanLII. The evidence contradicts the chief justice’s assertions. Pre-1970 cases appear in over half of Supreme Court decisions and one-quarter of factums filed between 2015–2024. This engagement spans 2,100 unique pre-1970 decisions. Qualitative analysis reveals that lawyers and judges invoke these precedents primarily as binding legal authority (77.6%) rather than historical background. Contrary to claims that older precedents are irrelevant in commercial matters, this area demonstrates the highest rate of pre-1970 citations. Surprisingly, French-language factums cite untranslated pre-1970 decisions more frequently than English ones, and Chief Justice Wagner himself ranks among justices most likely to cite pre-1970 cases. The paper concludes that pre-1970 decisions continue to meaningfully influence Canadian jurisprudence, particularly in certain legal domains, suggesting that official translations would serve a valuable purpose.
Many new arrivals to Canada are victims of international crimes perpetrated by states and their agents. This article considers the reception of international law in Canada to determine whether a civil right of action exists for two crimes: crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. It also proposes recommendations that would help remove barriers for civil redress and pave the way for victims to receive reparation orders in Canadian courts for their harm. This article is a novel addition to the subject of civil remedies in Canada for breaches of international law. While much has been written on the jurisdiction of Canadian courts to prosecute crimes at international law, the scholarship on civil remedies for such crimes is scant and outdated. This article fills this gap and proposes changes to the law in order to bring Canada more closely in line with its reputation for defending human rights on the world stage.
Family courts are struggling to resolve parenting disputes over children’s treatment. These cases ask judges to decide such sensitive matters as whether a young person will be vaccinated against their wishes, granted access to gender-affirming healthcare, or forced into therapy. Parenting disputes over children’s treatment implicate two distinct and potentially conflicting areas of law: family law and health law. Because family law and health law employ different legal standards and espouse different legal principles, the outcome in these cases may depend on which legal framework is applied. This article makes two contributions. First, it surveys recent family court decisions and suggests that courts are resolving parenting disputes over children’s treatment in one of three ways: (1) applying health law rather than family law; (2) drawing on health law principles in applying family law; and, most commonly, (3) applying family law rather than health law. Second, I look to larger debates around children’s welfare versus autonomy to make a case for how the apparent tension between family law and health law in these cases may be reconciled.
This essay—originally delivered to the Canadian Association for the Prevention of Discrimination and Harassment in Higher Education—reflects on the ambivalent relationship between equity, diversity, and inclusion, and employment equity, canvassing both the existing literature on effectiveness and the normative imperative of achieving substantive equality. It also critically considers the vision embodied in one recent sector-specific initiative, the Scarborough Charter on Anti-Black Racism and Black Inclusion in Canadian Higher Education. It asks what frameworks enable us to prioritize the work of transforming relationships in higher education in Canada, and beyond.
In R. v. B. (K.G.) (KGB), the Supreme Court identified the procedural criteria necessary to ensure sufficient reliability of certain types of witnesses’ police statements, such that they can be introduced for the truth of their contents. The criteria include that the statement be videotaped, taken under oath, and that the witness be cautioned regarding the severe penal sanctions they could face if they lie. The type of witnesses contemplated are accomplices, coaccused, or others whose character makes them presumptively untrustworthy, and whose statement may become necessary because of the likelihood that they will recant at trial. The Court did not intend for KGB to be used generally, and the police do not typically impose this protocol on people who report crimes. Indeed, there are two types of witnesses subjected to KGB when they give statements to the police: those the Court intended (criminally implicated, coaccused or presumptively untrustworthy witnesses) and women who allege sexual or gender-based violence. A close examination of case law, the rules of evidence, and Crown prosecution standards reveal that imposing this protocol on women who allege sexual and other gender-based violence is, in the vast majority of cases, pointless, rooted in discriminatory assumptions about women and rape, and likely to impose unnecessary harms on those who turn to the criminal justice system to respond to experiences of sexualized violence.
This article conceptualizes academic freedom as a form of social contract, grounded in what is termed the republic of dissent. This concept rests on two pillars: a republican tradition of resisting the accumulation and centralization of power, and a classical liberal emphasis on protecting the ability to think and dissent freely. The republic of dissent model helps clarify the relationship between freedom of expression and academic freedom, which are often conflated as a matter of constitutional usage. While universities contain free speech zones, this article argues that the university, as an institution, is more accurately understood as a decentralized system designed to allow academic competition while preserving dissent. From this perspective, not all versions of freedom of expression will necessarily be compatible with academic freedom. Classical liberal versions—which treat expression as a paramount community value and require institutional content-neutrality—are consistent with the republic of dissent. In contrast, balancing models that give equal weight to competing values and rely on officials to conduct content-based scrutiny to prevent social harm are likely incompatible with academic freedom.
While the interpretation of Canadian constitutional laws has long been carried by a teleological wave, a textualist backlash has emerged in recent years. This article questions this trend and argues that the teleological method remains the most appropriate for constitutional interpretation. To support this argument, the article first draws a parallel between Canadian constitutional laws and civil codes, primarily the Civil Code of Québec (the “Code”). These instruments share certain fundamental characteristics—namely, their constitutive role, their aspiration for unity and durability, as well as their often general and abstract drafting style. It is well established that these characteristics require civilian interpreters to adopt a flexible and evolving method that emphasizes the purposes and spirit of the Code beyond its text. The presence of these same characteristics in Canadian constitutional laws justifies the application of the same interpretative method, which reinforces the teleological approach and thereby rules out any textualist inclination. The article then responds to some objections—namely, the idea that the entrenchment of constitutional laws justifies the use of a more textual method of interpretation. It further suggests that this particularity, far from hindering the application of the civilian method, provides an additional argument in its favour. Finally, it argues that the pan-Canadian reach of our constitution requires that the approaches developed in Quebec be taken into serious consideration.
This article analyzes when expression is discriminatory and when discriminatory expression should be legally prohibited. It reaches theoretical conclusions about these matters by examining the recent Ward v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada. In Ward, the Court determined that a comedian’s jokes that ridiculed the appearance of a disabled boy did not constitute discriminatory expression because of disability. In any event, there was no reason to prohibit them under Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms that could outweigh the countervailing reason to protect the comedian’s freedom of expression. We argue that there are two weaknesses in the Court’s opinion. First, the Court adopted a conception of how to define expression as discriminatory expression that is inconsistent with standard approaches to this issue in law and the philosophical literature on the ethics of antidiscrimination. Second, while the Court held that only the imperative to prevent harm gives a reason to prohibit discriminatory expression, as opposed to preventing offence, it relied on an impoverished conception of harm that was restricted to the societal harm of hate speech. There are reasons to prohibit discriminatory expression to prevent other types of harms.
Recently, there has been a push for courts to review rules made by the executive for substantive reasonableness. While reasonableness review may foster better-informed regulation, it also risks giving vested interests disproportionate influence over rulemaking. By flooding rulemakers with analyses emphasizing regulation’s costs and uncertainties about its benefits, to which rulemakers must then respond so as to survive reasonableness review, these interests can slow down and frustrate regulation designed to benefit the public. Courts could mitigate this risk, however, by applying reasonableness review in a way that recognizes the uncertainty that attends the rulemaking process—including the limits it imposes on rulemakers’ ability to refute alternative analyses of new rules’ likely costs and benefits. This does not mean acquiescing in arbitrary decision-making. To the extent rules’ effects are uncertain at adoption, courts can encourage rulemakers to revisit these rules post-implementation. Properly designed, reasonableness review can foster informed regulation that responds to new evidence and is less easily diverted from public-oriented objectives.
Traditional “formalities” in the law of wills—including formal requirements for revocation by destruction—contemplate paper documents, wet signatures, and testators and witnesses in the physical presence of one another. Unless these traditional requirements have been modified by legislation, wills made using one or more electronic formalities will not meet the formal requirements for a valid will. Traditional wills formalities have become something of an outlier as the use of electronic text, records, signatures, and witnessing has become routine in many spheres, including for the creation and storage of valid legal agreements. The special nature of wills, and their consequent vulnerability to fraud and reliance on documentary evidence of intent, has been cited as a justification for retaining traditional formalities. This article examines the risks, benefits, and opportunities associated with electronic formalities, as well as their implications for wills storage, the assessment of testamentary capacity, and related issues. It also evaluates the adequacy of dispensing provisions as an alternative to electronic formalities. The article includes contributions by coauthors in four common law jurisdictions—England and Wales, British Columbia, Queensland, and New York—with a discussion of how the risks, benefits, and opportunities presented by electronic formalities and wills have been perceived and balanced within each of these jurisdictions. Les « formalités » traditionnelles du droit des testaments — y compris les exigences formelles liées à la révocation du testament par destruction — impliquent des documents papier, des signatures manuscrites, et des testateurs et témoins physiquement présents les uns avec les autres. À moins que ces exigences traditionnelles n’aient été modifiées par la législation, les testaments rédigés à l’aide d’une ou plusieurs formalités électroniques ne rempliront pas les conditions formelles requises pour un testament valide. Les formalités traditionnelles des testaments font désormais figure d’exception considérant l’utilisation de textes, d’enregistrements, de signatures et de témoins électroniques qui est devenue courante dans de nombreux domaines, y compris pour la création et le stockage d’accords juridiques valides. Or, la nature particulière des testaments, et leur vulnérabilité conséquente à la fraude, ainsi que leur dépendance aux preuves écrites de l’intention du testateur ont été invoquées pour justifier le maintien des formalités traditionnelles. Cet article examine les risques, les avantages et les opportunités liés aux formalités électroniques, ainsi que les répercussions de leur utilisation sur la conservation des testaments, l’évaluation de la capacité testamentaire et d’autres questions connexes. Il évalue également la pertinence des dispensing provisions comme alternative aux formalités électroniques. L’article comprend des contributions de co-auteurs issus de quatre juridictions de common law — l’Angleterre et le Pays de Galles, la Colombie-Britannique, le Queensland et New York — ainsi qu’une discussion sur la façon dont les risques, les avantages et les opportunités présentés par les formalités électroniques et les testaments ont été perçus et équilibrés au sein de chacune de ces juridictions.
Une grande partie du Canada a été colonisée par la France bien avant l’arrivée des Britanniques au milieu du XVIIIe siècle. Cet article aborde le problème de l’impact de l’affirmation de souveraineté française sur le régime du titre ancestral autochtone reconnu par le droit canadien d’origine britannique. Dans la première partie, l’auteur fait d’abord ressortir une tendance jurisprudentielle consistant à considérer la situation territoriale autochtone qui existait au moment de l’affirmation de souveraineté britannique, plutôt qu’au moment de la prise de possession française, aux fins de l’application du critère du contrôle exclusif sur lequel repose la reconnaissance d’un titre ancestral. Il montre ensuite que cette approche risque de faire échouer les revendications de titre ancestral émanant de peuples dont les ancêtres ont perdu le contrôle exclusif de leur territoire pendant le régime colonial français. Dans la seconde partie, l’auteur s’attache à démontrer que le droit canadien d’origine britannique n’exige pas la preuve d’un contrôle exclusif du territoire par les Autochtones après l’affirmation de souveraineté française. Il avance que la jurisprudence actuelle repose sur une méconnaissance de l’articulation juridique des titres coloniaux successifs de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne au Canada. En effet, le titre affirmé par la Couronne française constitue le fondement juridique de celui que la Grande-Bretagne a acquis par succession d’État à la faveur des traités franco-britanniques de 1713 et de 1763. Or, exiger la preuve du contrôle exclusif autochtone malgré l’affirmation de souveraineté française est incompatible avec la reconnaissance du titre affirmé par Versailles. Ainsi, en plus de priver de droits territoriaux des peuples autochtones dont le sort aura voulu qu’ils soient d’abord colonisés par la France, cette impasse sur la souveraineté française va à l’encontre des postulats du droit colonial britannique qui consacre le caractère dérivé de la souveraineté de la Couronne sur les territoires canadiens originairement revendiqués par la France. L’auteur conclut que, lorsqu’elle aura à trancher la question, la Cour suprême du Canada devrait par conséquent décider que, dans ce qui fut la Nouvelle-France, c’est le contrôle territorial autochtone antérieur à l’affirmation de souveraineté française qui fondera le titre ancestral.
Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) can be used to ensure that legislation operates notwithstanding sections 2 or 7 to 15 of the Charter, but can it be used to ensure that administrative decisions made under legislation survive notwithstanding those provisions, and if so, how? This administrative law—as opposed to purely constitutional law—question has become a live one, given increasing use of section 33 and the evolving framework for assessing whether administrative decisions comply with the Charter. Yet this question is underexplored. In this article, I suggest that section 33 can, in principle, be used to ensure that administrative decisions survive notwithstanding the relevant provisions. I then examine whether section 33 can, in fact, be used in this way—and if so, how. Given the evolving framework for assessing whether administrative decisions comply with the Charter, I distinguish between two general approaches to the framework—one based on Charter rights and the other based on Charter values—and explain the effect of using section 33 in the context of administrative decisions on each approach. On the Charter rights approach, using section 33 has effects that are analogous to the effects of using section 33 in the context of legislation; at the least, it prevents a court from quashing the decision. On the Charter values approach, however, using section 33 has no effect, since using section 33 has no effect on Charter values or their enforcement.
Gig work is not new, but the introduction of digital platforms to broker its delivery vastly expands its domain. Workers can experience vulnerability in their relationships with these platforms, especially when power imbalances are acute. Collective bargaining is one way platform workers might protect themselves. However, due to their uncertain status as “employees,” platform workers are likely excluded from some, if not most, statutory collective bargaining regimes in Canada. A section 2(d) Charter right to bargain collectively could protect them from such exclusion. While early section 2(d) decisions rejected a Charter right to bargain collectively, more recent ones affirm that section 2(d) protects that right, especially for workers who experience workplace vulnerability. Many platform workers fall within that category and should therefore be entitled to Charter protection. A Charter right to bargain collectively would compel governments to act, and not act, in ways favourable to protecting those workers’ collective voice and interests.
