The object of this commentary is to consider the above case with regard to the concepts of defamation, reputation and the reasonable person criterion. It will also briefly consider the award of costs. The commentary is divided into three sections. The first will outline the background out of which Mr Burke’s defamation action arose. The second will detail the arguments of the parties, the judgment and the award of costs. Finally, a case commentary will consider the concepts of defamation, reputation, the reasonable person, non-violent civil disobedience and the rule of law. It will also suggest that the impugned article was defamatory and that the plaintiff had a reputation to defend.
One of the most significant developments in relation to domestic abuse has been the emergence of the ‘coercive control’ framework and the enactment of a specific criminal offence thereof at section 76 Serious Crime Act 2015. The recent Jackson case was the first opportunity to see whether and how this framework, and the enactment of section 76, would inform the operation of the partial ‘loss of control’ defence as set out in section 54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This defence was, itself, introduced in response to the enduring criticisms directed at the previous ‘provocation’ defence when relied on in cases where abused women had killed abusers. In this article, I argue that, in its ruling in Jackson, the Court of Appeal has failed to take the opportunity to draw on this increasingly mainstreamed framing of domestic abuse as climatic, processual and continuing and to promote this framing when women kill abusers but rather has colluded in a narrative that prioritises domestic abuse as repeated incidents. In upholding this narrow approach to harm, the ruling underlines the continuing difficulties faced by abused women in relying on the loss of control defence but also puts the section 54 framework at odds with that at section 76.
This paper was given at the 2025 Annual Colloquium of the Franco-British Lawyers Society on 19 September 2025 in a session on ‘Miscarriages of Justice: The Court and Review Commission Perspective’.
The case of JR87 concerned the provision of religious education within Northern Ireland’s school system and, in particular, whether both the substance of that provision under the Religious Education and Collective Worship syllabus and the manner in which it was implemented were compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The rights relied upon in the challenge were the right to education under Article 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR, read together with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Article 9 ECHR. At first instance, the Northern Ireland High Court granted a declaration that the relevant arrangements were in breach of the ECHR. Thereafter the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal overturned that decision and declared that there had been no breach. The United Kingdom Supreme Court, however, allowed the appeal against this decision and restored the High Court’s declaration. This case note outlines the principal elements of the Supreme Court’s reasoning and considers their implications not only in the instant case, but also more broadly, extending beyond the specific context of education in Northern Ireland.
The care owed by the carrier of a passenger ship to a passenger is a complex and unique duty. The duty is characterised by the differences between the carrier and passengers (for example, power, control, and knowledge) and the specific context of shipping and its law. This analysis explores the early judicial desire to recognise an ethic of care in maritime law in considering the positions of the parties. An ethic of care contributes to protecting the various vulnerabilities of passengers, even as shipping continues to technically develop. This article argues, utilising the Titanic ticket cases, that the lens of an ethic of care as an underlying principle, supported by feminist and relational contract theories, advances a greater understanding of the relationship between carrier and passenger. It starts the conversation as to feminist and relational insights into the carriage of passengers by sea.
This is the text of a public lecture delivered in the Queen's University Belfast in 1998.
Although there is no global consensus on surrogacy, the Verona Principles provide all states involved in surrogacy with a framework to inform development of comprehensive safeguards and protections for children born via surrogacy. Principle 10 concerns legal parentage and parental responsibility in surrogacy arrangements and suggests two approaches to determining this upon the birth of the child. This article will explore whether domestic laws pertaining to surrogacy arrangements in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland comply with the first approach to legal parentage suggested by principle 10, and recommend viable reform of those laws that would better align them with the principle. Subsequently, the article will determine whether the UK and Ireland could move to embrace the second approach to legal parentage suggested by principle 10 in their respective laws, and do so in a manner that balances the rights of all parties to a surrogacy arrangement. In an era where surrogacy arrangements are increasingly under scrutiny, the Verona Principles represent a set of considered, albeit non-binding, international best practice guidelines for surrogacy, and as such they should be closely adhered to when surrogacy law reform efforts are undertaken in the UK and Ireland.
Despite an expanding body of legislation aimed at prevention and punishment, violence against women (VAW) remains pervasive and deep-rooted in Nigeria. This article critically examines VAW from a structural rather than individual perspective, arguing that, while the existing frameworks are seemingly progressive, they fall short of adequate measures for practical enforcement and victim protection. In this article, some key statutes such as the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015 and relevant case law have been used to highlight structural gaps, anomalies in judicial interpretations, and sociocultural underpinnings that hinder access to justice. By analysing the law’s text, this article demonstrates that VAW is inter alia perpetuated by structures that uphold patriarchal norms, leading to unequal power relations between women and men. It is recommended that laws be enacted to reflect the realities of the day such as addressing psychological and systemic forms of VAW. This article is intended to contribute to the growing body of knowledge on the interplay between VAW, patriarchy, cultural influences, legislative actions, and judicial decisions.
High-profile criminal cases increasingly depend on complex scientific and medical evidence, yet the legal framework governing its admissibility in England and Wales remains strikingly underdeveloped. This article examines that tension through the case of Lucy Letby, a neonatal nurse convicted of the murder of seven infants and the attempted murder of seven others at the Countess of Chester Hospital between 2015 and 2016, where the prosecution case relied heavily on expert interpretation of clinical events. It argues that the current admissibility regime, rooted in common law principles and supplemented by procedural rules, remains permissive and lacks sufficiently robust mechanisms to rigorously evaluate the reliability of expert testimony. Situating these concerns within the Law Commission’s 2011 proposals and comparative experience under the United States Daubert standard, the article contends that neither procedural reform nor formal gatekeeping tests have resolved the underlying epistemic tensions between law and science. The problem is structural: the criminal process lacks the epistemic infrastructure necessary to evaluate contested scientific evidence in a principled and consistent manner. In response, the article advances a set of integrated reforms, including more structured judicial reasoning, a proportionate pre-trial reliability review mechanism, clearer expectations around accreditation and continuing expertise and enhanced judicial engagement with scientific reasoning. Ultimately, it argues for a shift towards “epistemic literacy” as the foundation for a more transparent and defensible approach to expert evidence.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s decision in Marcia Ayers-Caesar v The Judicial and Legal Service Commission (2025) is, on the one hand, an important reiteration of the importance of judicial independence (a key requirement of the rule of law) through the security of tenure enjoyed by judges under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago and, on the other, a relatively straightforward matter of constitutional statutory interpretation. It will be argued that this characterisation is deceptive given the differing interpretations as to the ambit of section 137 of the Constitution reached by the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago and the Privy Council. The case concerned an appeal by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission against the decision of the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. The Court of Appeal had held that Marcia Ayers-Caesar (the respondent) had been unlawfully pressured to resign as a judge through the threat of a disciplinary enquiry in the event that she had not tendered her resignation. The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago and the Privy Council in their decisions were clear that section 137 of the Constitution was the only method available to remove a judge and that the Judicial and Legal Service Commission had sidestepped this important constitutional provision. This article considers the provisions of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago that permit the removal of a judge; the broader context of judicial independence; and analyses the decision of the Privy Council.
The extended joint criminal enterprise principle, also known as parasitic accessorial liability, had been widely recognised as an independent basis for attributing criminal liability in both England and Wales and Hong Kong. The paths of the two jurisdictions diverged in 2016 with the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) decision in Jogee and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA) decision in Chan Kam Shing. In Jogee, the UKSC abolished the application of the extended joint enterprise principle and restated an intention-based account of accessorial liability. In contrast, in Chan Kam Shing, the HKCFA refused to follow Jogee’s approach and retained the extended joint enterprise principle. This article examines why the HKCFA refused to follow Jogee and whether it was correct to do so. It is argued that the UKSC’s approach should be preferred and that the extended joint enterprise principle should be abolished.
AbstractThe Irish Government’s approach to the regulation of limited partnerships (LPs) has for many years prioritised the narrow economic interests of the powerful financial services sector over businesses more generally and the broader public interest. This has created two significant problems. First, non-financial services LPs have missed out on important reforms. Second, LPs have been left open to abuse by wrongdoers, facilitating financial and other criminal offences. Both problems need to be solved if the Government is to fulfil the aims of Project Ireland 2040 to support enterprise generally, create regional growth, and reduce inequality. This article explains how this can be done, taking account of the current law, the draft Registration of Limited Partnerships and Business Names Bill 2024, the extensive vulnerabilities of the LP vehicle to abuse, and the reforms necessary to improve partnership law for legitimate businesses beyond the financial services sector.
This is the text of a public lecture delivered in the Queen's University Belfast on 4 March 1965. This version was first published in NILQ (1965) 16(3): 371–386. We are republishing it as a companion text to our Reflections on Writing series.
This article was first published in NILQ 22.1 (spring 1971). It is republished here with the kind permission of the author.
Case commentary on DPP v Quirke [2023] IESC 5, [2023] 1 ILRM 225
