Abstract In this review essay, I argue that Hershovitz’s “Moral Practice Picture” of law is attractive in providing an elegant explanation of the central aspects of our legal practices that seem to pose problems for other theories of law and in making law out to be a sensible and desirable institution. The theory also has significant limitations, however, failing to account for critical ways in which we understand and experience the law and to explain the distinctiveness of law and legal reasoning. The essay illuminates the explanatory power and limitations of Hershovitz’s theory through a discussion of stare decisis.
Abstract This paper argues for three points. First ( very briefly): Kant’s criteria of perfect/imperfect duty should not be conflated with other perfect/imperfect distinctions. Second (less briefly): when you reflect on the duties you, as a human being, are under, you find reason to accept Kant’s distinction; it tracks important considerations. Third (and not at all briefly): the common objection to Kant’s distinction in modern philosophy—that it misclassifies some duties of aid—fails. I argue for this last point on two lines. I show that familiar arguments for reclassification face serious difficulties. I then attempt to undermine the assumption that “directed” duties are all, or almost all, of what matters.
