Some inequalities are the result of morally required self-sacrifice by the worse off. Versions of luck egalitarianism that count such inequalities as unfair, when combined with other unexceptional assumptions, face a circularity problem. But versions of luck egalitarianism that do not count such inequalities as unfair, and which are not otherwise implausible, face an arbitrariness problem. The problem concerning inequalities that are the result of morally required self-sacrifice thus threatens luck egalitarianism itself. To handle the problem, luck egalitarians will need to do further work in explaining their view's basis; the problem thus provides new motivation to do that work.
For harm to be permissible, it must be necessary. This principle is widely endorsed in a range of contexts. But sometimes how much harm it is necessary for an agent to inflict is the result of the conduct or dispositions of others. Let's call these third parties "necessity-makers." This article explores the moral implications of necessity-making, arguing that necessity-makers can be liable to harm and that this has important ramifications for deterrent punishment in particular. I also argue that aggressors are sometimes only partially liable to the harm made necessary, requiring us to rethink the relationship between necessity and liability.
Kingma and Woollard argue that many forms of harmful prenatal conduct are better understood as allowing rather than doing harm and that treating them as doing harm creates a justificatory bypass around pregnant people's autonomy. I take up their invitation to examine special obligations directly. I argue that pregnancy is a structured dependency relationship marked by total dependence, vulnerability, and causal responsibility. Together, these features generate significant though bounded duties of care. The account avoids fetal personhood claims and coercive maximalism while explaining why omission-based prenatal harms can carry normative significance beyond the doing/allowing classification.
The balancing view of ought holds that what we ought to do is a function of the balance of our reasons. Thomas Schmidt has developed this view and supplemented it with two transmission principles. In this article, I argue that his model has troubling implications and propose an alternative combination of balancing and transmission principles that is more theoretically attractive. I further argue that the model developed here is preferable to another model, presented by Alexander Arridge, that dispenses with these transmission principles. Hence, I show that the view I defend is the most plausible of the three balance models.
