ABSTRACT Graphical summary of the study context, mixed-methods evaluation, four RBC performance dimensions, and key finding that D3 scored highest and D4 lowest. Often, river basin committees are established to coordinate water governance across administrative, sectoral, and stakeholder boundaries. However, their legal creation does not necessarily ensure effective implementation. This study evaluated the performance of Thailand's 22 River Basin Committees (RBCs) under the Water Resources Act B.E. 2561 (2018), focusing on their operation during the 2022–2024 implementation period. A mixed-methods institutional evaluation was conducted in 2025, combining documentary analysis, meeting observation, semi-structured interviews, and questionnaire surveys. Thirteen statutory-duty indicators, reviewed through expert consultation, were grouped into four dimensions: planning alignment, basin management, legal and regulatory execution, and innovation, public awareness, and support for Water User Organizations (WUOs). Based on the results, there was moderate overall performance, with a mean score of 3.29 out of 5.00. Legal and regulatory execution recorded the highest score (4.33), while innovation, public awareness, and WUO support recorded the lowest score (2.05). The findings showed that Thailand's RBCs have established an important procedural foundation for basin-level water governance. The next stage of development is to strengthen operational support for outreach, innovation, local institutional support, and follow-through mechanisms. The study's contributions include distinguishing legal institutionalization, procedural functioning perception-based satisfaction, and operational capacity in basin governance.
ABSTRACT Groundwater infrastructure is the principal source of domestic water supply for rural households in Uganda. However, frequent infrastructure failures continue to undermine reliable water service delivery, with important implications for household welfare and the sustainability of groundwater systems. Despite considerable investments in rural water infrastructure, limited empirical evidence exists on the interrelationships between groundwater infrastructure failure, household welfare and sustainable groundwater management. Using cross-sectional data from 410 households in Luweero and Bukomansimbi districts, this study applied generalized structural equation modelling (GSEM) to examine these relationships. The results showed that although the prevalence of groundwater infrastructure failure was comparable between the two districts, Bukomansimbi experienced significantly longer infrastructure downtime, longer repair periods and a higher proportion of abandoned groundwater facilities. Preventive maintenance, higher observed water flow and access to qualified technicians were significantly associated with lower groundwater infrastructure failure. The findings demonstrate that groundwater infrastructure failure is not merely a technical challenge but a socioeconomic and institutional constraint associated with lower household welfare and weaker sustainable groundwater management. The study therefore recommends a shift in rural water policy from an infrastructure expansion approach towards service-oriented groundwater management that prioritizes preventive maintenance, timely technical support, sustainable financing and strengthened community institutions.
Hydropower is central to renewable-energy transitions and to the Water–Energy Nexus (WEN), but its resilience is increasingly shaped by hydrological variability, competing water demands, aging infrastructure, and changing governance conditions. This study develops an evidence-weighted framework that integrates SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) with PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal) analysis. Twenty-two publicly available institutional reports were examined through 33 structured questions, producing 726 source-question evaluations. Documentary evidence was synthesized into retained SWOT factors and weighted according to source coverage, evidence density, geographic breadth, and recency before being mapped to PESTEL dimensions. Intersectoral water-use conflict and competition, climate change and extreme weather, renewable-energy integration, and adaptive reservoir management emerged as the most strongly supported strategic factors. Technological conditions most strongly reinforced the strengths of hydropower, whereas social, environmental, political, and economic pressures dominated weaknesses and threats. Alternative weighting scenarios produced highly stable rankings (Spearman's rho = 0.976–0.995). The framework provides a transparent and transferable basis for identifying strategic priorities, while its numerical outputs should be recalibrated with basin-specific hydrological, institutional, and stakeholder data.
ABSTRACT A two-layer game model optimizes water rights trading in the Yellow River Basin. Minimizing sewage parameters (h, I) boosts efficiency and equity. Price, driven by terminal value (k) and discount rate (r), peaks stability at a saddle point. Excessively long trading cycles cause price decay and imbalance. Rapid industrialization and urbanization are sharply increasing water demand, so efficient management, equitable allocation, and sustainable use are imperative. Amid intensifying basin-scale supply–demand imbalances, water-rights trading is a key instrument for reallocation. Guided by game theory, we construct a two-tier dynamic differential-game model of water rights allocation and pricing, validate its robustness through dynamic simulation, and apply it empirically to the Yellow River Basin. Results show that: (1) Regional optimal allocation is governed by sewage discharge proportion and unit sewage output value proportion. When both shares approach their minima, basin-wide supply efficiency peaks, the regional Gini coefficient declines, and equity improves. (2) The equilibrium trading price is positively correlated with the water's terminal value and negatively correlated with the discount rate; their interaction yields an asymmetric response surface whose saddle point maximizes price stability. (3) Trading-cycle length is positively correlated with traded volume, yet excessively long cycles trigger price decay and spatial divergence: deficits accelerate in ecologically fragile areas while surplus regions enjoy rising rents, aggravating basin-wide imbalance. The findings provide dynamic decision support for basin water rights trading and promote balanced progress between ecological conservation and high-quality economic growth.
ABSTRACT Seven radar charts, one per country, showing mean scores on a 0 to 3 scale across six governance dimensions: Institutional Structure and Leadership, Water Allocation and Reallocation, Collectivity and Participation, Planning, Economic and Financial Instruments, and Innovation and Sustainability. Australia scores 2.4, 2.8, 2.3, 2.8, 2.2 and 2.8, forming a broad hexagon with its lowest point in economic instruments. Brazil scores 2.2, 2.2, 2.2, 2.3, 1.7 and 2.0, a moderate and fairly even shape, also lowest in economic instruments. Chile scores 2.0, 2.2, 2.5, 1.5, 1.5 and 1.5, with a peak in collectivity and participation and low scores in planning, economic instruments and innovation. Mexico scores 2.6, 2.2, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0 and 2.0, with its highest point in institutional structure and an otherwise even profile. Peru scores 2.2, 1.8, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0 and 2.0, a nearly even hexagon with a slight dip in water allocation and reallocation. Portugal scores 2.0, 2.4, 2.0, 2.7, 2.3 and 3.0, with its highest point in innovation and sustainability. Spain scores 2.4, 2.4, 2.7, 2.8, 2.2 and 2.8, a broad hexagon similar to Australia’s, with its lowest point in economic instruments. Water governance structures at the national level influence collective action, shaping the distribution of power and decision-making processes. This study examines how different governance typologies, government-led, market-oriented, and collective governance, influence coordination between national authorities and local actors. Using a theory-based evaluation framework, the analysis focuses on seven national-level case studies, identifying mechanisms that enable or constrain collective participation and adaptive management. The results show that no single governance model performs uniformly across dimensions. Instead, outcomes depend on the alignment of leadership, basin-level authority, participation mechanisms, and water allocation and reallocation systems. The findings reveal how hybrid arrangements, where central oversight is coupled with delegated basin institutions, strengthen coherence and adaptive capacity, while fragmented or under-resourced systems struggle to sustain innovation and long-term planning. The findings contribute to ongoing debates on polycentric governance by highlighting the importance of institutional bridges that link national policy frameworks with basin and local implementation.
