This article uses Social Network Analysis to explain the relationships between middle power MIKTA states and International Organizations. It investigates how social network dynamics shape these countries’ patterns of interaction with seven IOs and questions how they may utilize their networked connections to generate influence within global governance. To do so, the study maps the positional configurations of MIKTA members across organizational networks via a four-criteria framework: institutional and legal depth; political-diplomatic intensity; bureaucratic and operational integration; and project and funding depth. The findings demonstrate that member states are situated in differentiated positions within the multilayered networks of IOs, converging within institutions located at the core of the global system while developing more selective and diversified engagement strategies across regional and alternative platforms.
Argentina's rejection of BRICS + under Javier Milei represents an important case for understanding the opportunities and limits of middle power foreign policy in a fragmented international order. This article argues that the decision reflected both the structural constraints stemming from Argentina's financial dependence on Western institutions and the pro-Western ideological preferences of the libertarian administration. Drawing on the literature on middle powers, foreign policy analysis, and presidential leadership, the article examines the evolution of Argentina's relationship with the BRICS across successive governments, from the Kirchner and Alberto Fernandez administrations’ pursuit of membership, through Macri's pragmatic engagement, to Milei's outright rejection of accession. It argues that the decision formed part of a broader strategy of alignment with the United States and Israel, support for Western security priorities, and the pursuit of OECD membership.
Mexico is often considered a middle power based on its size, location, membership and activity in international organizations, but different governments have been more or less willing to embrace this status. Despite their idealistic critiques of the existing world order, the left-populist Morena governments of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024) and Claudia Sheinbaum (2024-) have distanced themselves from the middle power category. This article draws on theories of middlepowerism from Eduard Jordaan and Robert W. Cox to explain this reluctance. I argue that Mexico's foreign policy positioning is best understood as the outcome of changes in the external environment, particularly its relationship with the United States, and changes in domestic policies and political economic choices under a government that aspires to break with its neoliberal past. The Trump administration's hostile and belligerent economic and security postures have increasingly constrained Mexico's capacity and willingness to adopt a middle power role.
The rapid spread of deepfakes—AI-enabled synthetic content—is altering the information environment in which contemporary conflicts unfold. This policy brief examines the increasing use of deepfakes, focusing on the May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict. It argues that deepfakes mark an important development in information warfare, broadening the range and complexity of information operations and raising the potential for influence, manipulation, and coercion. In this case, both states distributed a variety of deepfakes to support strategic narratives, undermine adversarial morale while boosting their own, and target both domestic and international audiences. The brief concludes with implications for Canada, highlighting the importance of improved detection capabilities, coordinated institutional responses, and ongoing efforts to strengthen societal resilience to deepfake-enabled information operations.
Facing complex new threats, Canada has expressed interest in developing a whole-of-society approach to both national defence and disasters, similar to models implemented in Nordic states. But how could Canada adapt these Nordic models to work within its very different geographic, political, and demographic conditions? Our analysis develops a three-pillar framework for a Canadian adaptation: industrial integration, strengthened provincial and territorial emergency management systems, and enhanced community-level resilience. It evaluates the current strength of each pillar while identifying unique opportunities to build capacity. Building on insights from Sweden and Finland, the paper demonstrates that a made-in-Canada whole-of-society model is both feasible and necessary for long-term national resilience.
The Stanfield Conversations is an annual public dialogue at Dalhousie University that brings together prominent scholars, public intellectuals, and policy leaders to critically examine the state of democracy in our times. Moderated by CBC Ideas producer Mary Lynk, the 2025 event featured the reflections of Asha Rangappa, Senior Lecturer at Yale's Jackson School of Global Affairs and former FBI Special Agent, and Wayne MacKay, Professor Emeritus of Law, Schulich School of Law, who discussed the value of the rule of law in democracy.
In May 2025, the Canadian Security Amid Global Change symposium convened leading women security experts for two panels focused on economic security and environmental security. Across the discussions, clear synergies emerged, highlighting how economic stability and environmental resilience operate as interdependent pillars of Canada's long-term security. This conversation piece synthesizes the key insights shared by the panelists and underscores the value of interdisciplinary dialogue in rethinking Canada's evolving security landscape.
This conversation piece examines how Canada navigates the challenges of national and human security. Drawing on insights from experts in defence studies, foreign policy, international law, and human rights, it explores the financial and institutional costs of sovereignty, the fragility of multilateral alliances, and the prospect of American ambivalence or aggression. Shifts toward ad hoc coalitions, total defence models, and domestic resilience are highlighted, while showing how border regimes, securitization practices, and selective legal enforcement reproduce racialized violence and erode humanitarian norms. The article argues that Canada's security cannot be outsourced or pursued solely through military preparedness; it must be grounded in justice, equity, and the primacy of human rights. Protecting the state, it contends, is meaningless if people within its borders are not safe and free, and security policy must therefore integrate national defence with robust commitments to human security.
Canada faces an unprecedented convergence of threats from Russia, China, and the US, including coercive annexation attempts, Arctic competition, and the aggressive pursuit of critical natural resources. The Canadian Armed Forces is incapable of independently defending its territory against this confluence of threats. This article evaluates three plausible deterrence pathways available to Ottawa: reconfigured alliances, Total Defence, and nuclear weapons acquisition. This article contends that there is only one option that is both feasible and effective: a citizen-centred whole-of-society model that leverages Canada's geography and societal resilience to impose prohibitive costs on any prospective aggressor. A Total Defence strategy is the most realistic pathway to safeguard Canadian sovereignty in an era of renewed great power conquest.
This article asks how middle powers adjust their defence strategies in the face of new and worsening threats, especially as their traditional alliances become less reliable. It conducts a systematic comparative analysis of middle power balancing strategies across three key regional subsystems—the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Europe—to explain variation in defence responses. Building on neorealist and balance-of-power debates, the article puts forward a new framework for understanding when internal versus external balancing logics will predominate. It posits that middle powers directly facing threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity will prioritize internal balancing over reliance on external alliances, whereas states not yet targeted may pursue bandwagoning, hedging, or appeasement. While alliances have not been abandoned, the comparative analysis shows a structural shift toward self-help, signalling an emerging era in which middle powers prioritize domestic defence capabilities over alliance commitments.
