This article explains how the cyber domain today largely replicates the patterns of devolution and fragmentation observed in the electromagnetic spectrum (EM) and aviation domains more than a century ago. Both remained fragmented under duress of heightened Great Power rivalries and tensions coinciding with World War I and World War II. Relevant history demonstrates that once fragmented under Great Power duress, global domains with obvious incentives for pursuing mutual gains remain fragmented—often until after a severe clash of Great Power militaries. The ongoing cyber domain fragmentation under the pressure of increasing Great Power stress is destined to persist and will render moot legal and diplomatic efforts to constrain risky strategic cyber competition between them. Successful American strategic competition in cyberspace below the threshold of armed conflict requires all national instruments of cyber power—including military ones—be utilized in persistent and assertive strategic cyber-campaigning against Russian and Chinese cyber campaigns that aim for strategically significant erosion of western relative power and cohesion.
In an era defined by intense competition with China and Russia, Washington faces a crucial challenge: how to reconcile its ideological commitments with the pragmatic needs of global geopolitics. This article argues for forming pragmatic coalitions that include illiberal regimes, noting that key geopolitical partners in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East are often less than ideal from a liberal democratic perspective. However, deterring revisionist challenges will remain an utmost priority for the United States, and achieving it would likely require diplomatic flexibility.
For the last thirty years, US grand strategy has been predicated on an expansive definition of US interests and optimistic assessments of US capabilities. In the changed global conditions of the 2020s, a fresh look at American global engagement needs to determine where, when, and under what conditions the United States ought to intervene. Thinking in terms of a national security “butterfly effect” and balancing that risk assessment against the realities of the “Lippmann Gap” (where strategic aspirations cannot exceed actual capabilities) produces a series of grand strategic options for policymakers.
This article reviews prominent definitions of global competency, explores the available (though limited) current evidence for its potential benefits, and offers recommendations for framing an understanding of the salience of global affairs education within theories of national security and related practice. The article identifies three potential pathways through which global competency benefits security. First, global competency—especially through phased primary, secondary and tertiary educational models—may contribute to a stronger and more competitive workforce in direct and indirect ways, in turn enhancing a country’s innovative capacities and economic and military power and resilience to shocks. Second, global competency can serve as a form of public diplomacy, in turn supporting a country’s soft power and global influence. Third, global competency can strengthen domestic institutions, combatting dis/misinformation about global issues and reducing vulnerability to malign actors who aim to leverage inaccurate and fear-based messages about the world to influence and destabilize foreign electorates.
Great powers conduct defense and security cooperation to achieve national interests, usually with an expectation to garner influence with partners. Sometimes the result is contrary to a great power’s intent. Essential factors that contribute to defense and security cooperation effectiveness include: communication, commitment, interests, and coordinated plans. The US approach to security cooperation is grounded in noble intent, but in some cases falls short when compared to its competitors. Russia and China are more transactional in their approaches and have achieved marginal success in their own ways. This article examines great power defense and security cooperation with partners in Africa to assess relative advantages and disadvantages.
At present, much of what passes for our national security debate focuses on re-litigating the past or on day-to-day crisis and escalation management. At the same time, little thought in the public square is being devoted to fostering a strategy to navigate the storms brewing over the horizon. America urgently needs a serious debate on the nation’s grand strategy for this new era of state-on-state conflict, one that eschews the heretofore dominant normative language about “defending the rules-based international order,” and instead speaks to the enduring verities of hard power.
In this security environment, focused, pragmatic national security policy is as important as ever in US history. Clearly articulated priorities among national security interests, and achievable objectives to protect them, are the compelling security imperatives to focus both government and defense industrial base effort. The unsettling reality is the National Security Council (NSC), and the associated security policy-making system, routinely fails at this critically important mission.
The strategic imperative for a resolution of the Russia-Ukraine War requires that we combine the military and diplomatic instruments of power to accomplish first a cease fire and then a lasting peace. This article traces the development of peace negotiations prior to the outbreak of the war and offers possible lessons that could inform policymakers today. The main argument is that negotiations prior to the invasion were primarily at a standstill because of the way in which the parties interpreted the conflict and how each saw possible ways of conflict resolution.
Despite the growing salience of the Pakistan-China and US-Indian alliances, Pakistan-US relations continue to be a valuable enhancement both to stability and to Washington’s influence in South Asia. The United States contributes to Pakistan’s national security, just as Pakistan reciprocates in those areas where the U.S.-Indian relationship has its limitations. Pakistan also helps play a stabilizing effect on the US-China rivalry, despite Islamabad’s close association with Beijing.
Every four years often signals change in American politics whether the incumbent president is re-elected or there is partisan turnover in the White House. While individuals change and pursue their campaign promises with their own style and appointees, there is much continuity across administrations. Longstanding security commitments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East with bipartisan agreement on national interests, the sclerotic structure of the Executive Branch, plus congressional, judicial, and international limits imposed on the presidency prevent wholesale change in American foreign policy. Simply, one cannot understand international politics without understanding intranational politics.
The rapid pace of novel technological change, referred to as “emerging technologies,” is challenging our ability to devise policy and governance apace. This is particularly true in the life sciences and biotechnology, where the current tools used for promoting biosecurity via policy and governance are becoming outdated.
While rising geopolitical competition poses significant political challenges for future arms control negotiations, it also complicates national arms control verification by making on-site inspections unlikely. One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence. American policymakers should consider how they might combine on-site inspections and counting rules in future arms control agreements. By allowing each party to choose its verification modality, future arms control agreements could cater to different security preferences while also preserving areas of American military advantage.
Contrary to the prevailing view, messianic thinking has not driven Russian expansionism. Russian rulers have rather been guided by realpolitik in a search for security through the creation of strategic depth. When messianic thinking has infected Russian conduct abroad it generally has led to humiliating setbacks. In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has abandoned realpolitik for messianic thinking. Such thinking lay behind his decision to invade Ukraine. It informs his escalating conflict with the West. And it will likely produce no better results for Russia than messianic thinking has in the past. This article is a slightly edited excerpt from the author’s new book, Getting Russia Right.
This essay addresses the imperative need for a comprehensive American, if not Western strategy to support Ukraine. This strategy must include not only the current tranche of weapons but also consistent and regular supply to achieve victory, i.e., restoration of the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine. Equally important is the necessity for Washington and its allies to collaborate on the long-term preservation and sustainment of conventional deterrence in Europe at the Russo-NATO border. In addition, the Administration must make the case for Ukraine to the public.
The United States’ deterrence strategy against the Islamic Republic of Iran has not yielded desired outcomes to meet mission objectives. Iranian-backed groups have taken advantage of the Israel-Hamas war and Washington’s preoccupation with both the Russia-Ukraine war and China. Iraqi groups and Yemen’s Houthis have rebranded and adapted to the new operational environmental that has unfolded in the region, due largely to the war in Israel. Policymakers should consider a strategy that goes beyond deterrence that includes partnerships, greater interagency coordination, and imposing costs with offensive measures.
As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaches its 75th- year anniversary, it is important to reflect on the past, examine the present, and to imagine the future of the alliance. NATO has had periodic self-reflections in the past, including the influential 1967 Harmel Report. Importantly, the report laid out the rationale for a dual-track NATO policy that would retain a strong deterrence posture while moving toward a détente with the Soviet Union and later toward cooperation with Russia. While Russia’s war against Ukraine rages, it is impossible to return to a more cooperative relationship with Russia. Yet, NATO’s history demonstrates that conflict with Russia is not inevitable. In any case, only a strong NATO can prevent that conflict and provide stability to the transatlantic region.
