Abstract The non-intervention policy adopted by European Powers during the Spanish Civil War is often relegated as a matter of realpolitik in which international law, if relevant at all, was only disregarded. This article posits that the non-intervention agreement ( NIA ) and its institutionalisation were an attempt to redefine the relationship between international law and civil war. However, the so-called non-intervention system and its underlying discourse of localisation , developed in the context of the Spanish civil war, were as much a legal innovation as they were a reactionary project subordinated to the interests and will of the powerful states. Through an ostensibly neutral international legal language which put the insurgents and the established government on the same a-legal footing in order to ‘localise’ the Spanish civil war, the discourse of localisation eventually failed in providing European powers a legal and technical escape out of the politics on the interwar period. Far from illustrating any inherent deficiency of the work of legal creativity in the context of collective security mechanisms, the exploration of the NIA rather points towards the banal and continuous problem of the monopolisation by a few states of the ability and authority to imagine and implement legal innovation.
Abstract This article critically examines the early development of space law during the formative 1950s and 1960s, revealing how legal, diplomatic, and political forces converged to shape both the international governance of outer space and the emergence of the United States as the dominant space power. Moving beyond conventional narratives that celebrate space law as a triumph of multilateral cooperation, the article argues that early space law functioned as a strategic ‘world-making’ tool that constructed myths, narratives, and imaginaries that framed outer space not merely as a new physical domain but as a geopolitical canvas embodying Cold War power dynamics. Central to this process was the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ( COPUOS ), alongside key US lawyer-diplomats, who crafted legal principles that advanced American diplomatic and strategic interests while shaping global perceptions of space as the final frontier. By analysing archival records, diplomatic exchanges, and legal texts, the article reveals how competing worldviews and interests influenced early space law’s content and institutional design. It highlights the interplay between bilateral negotiations among superpowers and multilateral deliberations, exposing how unresolved legal questions were strategically postponed or reframed to maintain US influence. Ultimately, the article contends that space law’s origins were neither neutral nor inevitable but were actively produced by powerful actors weaving ideological projects into the fabric of international law. This legacy continues to inform contemporary debates on space governance, underscoring the enduring significance of early Cold War legal and political imaginaries.
This article describes the genesis of Article 2 of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. This convention, which came into force 100 years ago on 14 August 1925, not only subjects this Arctic Archipelago to the sovereignty of Norway, but also contains an agreement on nature conservation that, for the first time, is truly international, multilateral and global in protecting nature for its own sake. This article examines this special aspect of the history of international law using contemporary literature and archival sources. Particular attention is paid to previous initiatives by experts from various disciplines and national origins to protect Arctic nature. The project can be seen as a milestone in international nature conservation law, which was originally driven by efforts in Germany and Sweden in particular and was then enforced by Norway and the United States after the First World War. It is also regarded as paradigmatic for the formation of new international regimes, a feature that came to typify modern international law in its capacity to regulate specific interests and challenges.
Raphael Fulgosius (1367–1427) in his comment on Dig. 1.1.5 appears to advance a revolutionary notion: In certain cases, the outcome of a war is itself a just verdict. In prior work, the emphasis rests almost entirely on his argument about the impossibility of judging the different sides’ claims to justice in a formal bellum . In fact, Fulgosius developed two frameworks: One of dissensiones , to be applied to conflicts within Christendom, where there would always be a common superior at least de iure, and another for conflicts between Christian and non-Christian gentes (or perhaps entirely between non-Christians), to which papal jurisdiction does not extend, with the acquisition of territory and captives being ratified by the legal effects of bellum as an institution of the ius gentium . This interpretation also holds up for reexamination the writings of jurists who relied on Fulgosius.
The non-intervention policy adopted by European Powers during the Spanish Civil War is often relegated as a matter of realpolitik in which international law, if relevant at all, was only disregarded. This article posits that the non-intervention agreement (NIA) and its institutionalisation were an attempt to redefine the relationship between international law and civil war. However, the so-called non-intervention system and its underlying discourse of localisation, developed in the context of the Spanish civil war, were as much a legal innovation as they were a reactionary project subordinated to the interests and will of the powerful states. Through an ostensibly neutral international legal language which put the insurgents and the established government on the same a-legal footing in order to `localise' the Spanish civil war, the discourse of localisation eventually failed in providing European powers a legal and technical escape out of the politics on the interwar period. Far from illustrating any inherent deficiency of the work of legal creativity in the context of collective security mechanisms, the exploration of the NIA rather points towards the banal and continuous problem of the monopolisation by a few states of the ability and authority to imagine and implement legal innovation.
This article critically examines the early development of space law during the formative 1950s and 1960s, revealing how legal, diplomatic, and political forces converged to shape both the international governance of outer space and the emergence of the United States as the dominant space power. Moving beyond conventional narratives that celebrate space law as a triumph of multilateral cooperation, the article argues that early space law functioned as a strategic `world-making' tool that constructed myths, narratives, and imaginaries that framed outer space not merely as a new physical domain but as a geopolitical canvas embodying Cold War power dynamics. Central to this process was the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (coPuoS), alongside key US lawyer-diplomats, who crafted legal principles that advanced American diplomatic and strategic interests while shaping global perceptions of space as the final frontier. By analysing archival records, diplomatic exchanges, and legal texts, the article reveals how competing worldviews and interests influenced early space law's content and institutional design. It highlights the interplay between bilateral negotiations among superpowers and multilateral deliberations, exposing how unresolved legal questions were strategically postponed or reframed to maintain US influence. Ultimately, the article contends that space law's origins were neither neutral nor inevitable but were actively produced by powerful actors weaving ideological projects into the fabric of international law. This legacy continues to inform contemporary debates on space governance, underscoring the enduring significance of early Cold War legal and political imaginaries.
In his De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari libri tres , the Dutch-Spanish jurist Balthazar de Ayala (1548–1584) took it upon himself to develop a just war theory carefully tailored to the exigent circumstances of the Dutch Revolt. Given how the conflict was undoubtedly fueled by fervent disagreements on matters of faith, it is remarkable how Ayala’s dissertation seems to have provided the blueprint of a practicable just war doctrine unshackled from its moral tethers. Rather than solely focusing on what was just, Ayala instructed Farnese on the finer points of what rendered a war legal, simultaneously trying to keep the restoration of the one true faith clearly in view. Through a careful analysis of his source material, this article will attempt to demonstrate that – despite the obfuscation caused by his Augustinian frame of reference – Ayala’s treatise contains an innovate attempt at secularisation of just war theory.
This article aims to analyze the practice of early modern law of nations – rather than its well-known doctrinal debate – in the Spanish empire. To do so, I focus on Hispano-Mapuche parliaments held in the south of colonial Chile during 1605, in which certain native customs, such as Mapuche polygamy, were temporarily recognized after concluding a series of peace agreements. Thus, this article claims that Hispano-Mapuche peace depended on validating some indigenous legal customs, which opposed even the ius commune foundation of the Castilian law. As the main analysis factors, I consider the need for a new basis of legitimacy to establish interethnic relationships and the weakness of the Spanish imperial expansion during the 17th century.
From East Timor to Palestine, political erasures flowing from the legal concepts of self-determination and permanent (state) sovereignty over natural resources remain enduring sites of struggle. This article traces how international law produced such an erasure in Kashmir through a pre-history of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. David Lilienthal, famous as the architect of the Tennessee Valley Authority, argued that harnessing the Indus waters for India and Pakistan’s postcolonial development required setting aside Kashmiri demands for self-determination. International law had to transform the waters into common property owned by India and Pakistan and protect their economic value from popular politics. Adjudication of the water dispute was dismissed because a public legal argumentative battle would inflame controversy. Instead, disputes needed to be solved by international law. This pre-history of the Treaty cuts against celebratory narratives of the water-sharing arrangement by showing what lies beneath the surface of a seemingly successful treaty regime.
Extraterritoriality in China has traditionally been viewed through the lens of the unequal treaties, often symbolizing China’s subjugation to foreign powers. This article repositions the narrative by highlighting the Qing government’s active adaptation of modern international law and its implementation of extraterritoriality to protect its nationals abroad. By the late 19th century, the Qing began to reimagine its imperial domain not only within the emerging paradigm of territorial sovereignty but also through an extraterritorial extension of its authority abroad, leveraging evolving concepts of nationality and jurisdiction over its diaspora abroad. This article highlights how Qing intellectuals and political leaders appropriated Western legal norms to safeguard Chinese nationals abroad, culminating in the promulgation of the Nationality Law of 1909. By examining the evolution of extraterritoriality and the Qing government’s efforts to protect its diaspora, this study situates these practices within the broader frameworks of international law, highlighting the limitations and paradoxes of sovereignty.
The article uncovers a significant historical connection between Raphael Lemkin, known for his work on genocide, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1947. Archival discoveries reveal Lemkin’s involvement in discussions on defining the legal concept of aggressive war, aiming to influence the proceedings of the Tokyo Tribunal. A transcript of a US War Department conference shows how Lemkin’s legal philosophy, balancing natural law and practical pragmatism, guided his views on aggression. His preference for a common law approach to formulating legal norms also became evident. Linking the 1947 conference report to an earlier publication by Lemkin sheds light on his role in imagining a practicable legal concept of aggression during the pre- and post-World War II era. This historical connection and a survey of the epistemic communities around Lemkin foster a deeper understanding of his multifaceted contributions to international law and the prevention of mass atrocities.
Alberico Gentili wrote addenda and corrigenda to his De iure belli libri tres (ed. pr. 1598), which were not included in the later, posthumous, editions of that work. The additions the author directed to be inserted after his exhortation `Remain silent, theologians, on an issue which is not your responsibility' (Book 1, Ch. 12) suggest that he intended to emphasise the illegitimacy of wars on religious grounds, especially in international relations with the Ottomans, who in any event provided sufficient other grounds for waging war against them. Gentili's remark did not preclude the use of theological literature in jurisprudence, although he considered that jurists had a specific competence for scholarship on the governance of human relations.
