The article presents the results of a comparative analysis of the political discourse of European and Russian right-wing forces on social media. It shows that, despite the high level of mutual alienation between modern Russian and European societies, there are signs of ideological similarity in the discourse of some right-wing groups. However, there are also significant differences between the groups, reflecting the fundamental characteristics of the political systems and political cultures of Russia and the EU countries. European and Russian right-wing conservatives advocate the restoration of the traditional "happy past," but their images of the past differ. For Russian right-wing conservatives, this is the model of the Romanov Empire or the Stalin-Brezhnev USSR, while for European nationalists, it is the model of sovereign nations before the formation of the EU, and any form of a multinational state is unacceptable to them. The article provides examples of the erosion of the similarities between European and Russian right-wing conservatives when European nationalists are included in coalition governments in EU countries. The article summarizes the research published in the author's three previous articles in 2025-2026 and relies on discourse analysis combined with social media content analysis.
The article conceptualizes the methodological potential of hyperlink network analysis as a tool of empirical reconstruction of social interaction through digital traces. Using the partnership network of Russia's artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystem as a case, the paper presents an original analytical framework for translating technical hyperlink data into sociological categories. The study describes a full data processing cycle, including a contextualization stage through manual verification of hyperlink content. A combination of network analysis techniques (density, centrality, clustering) enables a "dual optics" approach to measuring partnerships: through institutional prestige (in-degree) and network activity (out-degree) of actors. The identified structure of 18 clusters demonstrates a distributed model of the AI ecosystem, where low network density is counterbalanced by the specialization of autonomous niches. Particular emphasis is placed on interpreting micro-clusters as "weak signals" of new market trends. The proposed instrumentation ensures the replicability of the analysis for various types of institutionalized digital communications.
The purpose of the article is to present the case of the institutionalization of marketplaces as empirical evidence of lobbying practices for promoting corporate and private interests within the "corridors of power" of Russian society. The authors identify the main groups of interests involved in informal communications, represented in legislative and executive authorities, and the main channels for promoting departmental and corporate positions ultimately enshrined as a result of public discussions in the Law on Marketplaces (Federal Law No. 289 of July 31, 2025). As shown, informal lobbying communications not only complement the institutional environment of lawmaking, but, in some cases, have a direct impact on the adopted Law, linking it to specific interests and life situations. The article is based on preliminary documents of public organizations prepared for parliamentary readings in the State Duma and personal observations of the authors.
The article is based the results of a measurement of AI literacy among the adult population of Russia. The study addresses the lack of empirical data on the actual level of proficiency in artificial intelligence among citizens. The methodology is based on self-assessment of proficiency in five types of AI tools on a 5-point scale and subsequent indexing. Data were collected using a telephone survey (CATI) based on a nationwide sample of the WCIOM-Sputnik project (N = 1,600). The annual reach of Russian users of AI technologies is determined. Hypotheses regarding the active penetration of AI "from below" and the uneven distribution of AI competencies across various socio-demographic groups are confirmed. The results of population segmentation based on AI literacy level are presented.
The article presents empirical results of a study of social risks, which was conducted offline and online using two different methods. The relevance of social risks in the offline space was measured using the traditional survey method for sociology in three regions of Western Siberia-Kemerovo, Novosibirsk and Tomsk regions. It is shown that the most pressing problems in the representation of residents of these regions are economic (inflation and sharp price increases, poverty) and environmental problems. To measure the relevance of social risks in the online space, a source of information such as search query statistics in the Yandex search engine was used. For this purpose, 79 thematic markers (search queries) were selected, which reflect various types of social risks. Using a tool such as the index of interest, which is available in the Yandex service, Wordstat identified the most pressing risks for each of the regions: for the Kemerovo region-unemployment and environmental problems, for the Novosibirsk region-social inequality, for the Tomsk region-environmental problems and inflation and a sharp rise in prices. At the final stage, a comparative analysis of the rating of social problems obtained using two different tools was carried out, which showed significant similarity of actual social risks for residents of the three regions.
This article presents a test of an explanatory methodology combining causal logic and approaches from historical and comparative, civilization-oriented sociology. It also incorporates ideas regarding the types and dynamics of social orders and the concept of the co-evolution of concerns and structures. This methodology is based on macro-processes in China and Europe during the 16th)-19th centuries. After providing an overview of the key concepts of the 'Great Divergence', the article explains why economic and technological development was equal between medieval China and Europe, and why both civilizations subsequently experienced deep crises and diverged: Europe underwent accelerated capitalist industrialization, while China entered the 'century of humiliation'. While costs and tensions accumulated in both civilizations, China lacked the necessary factors to respond to the external and internal challenges and threats of the 19th century. In contrast, 16th-19th-century Europe was able to overcome a deep crisis thanks to the flexible complexity of concerns, institutions, and practices of competition, enrichment, and the defense of interests and rights, alongside the crisis-inducing megatrend known as the 'Well'. A megatrend known as the "Lift" emerged in the Netherlands and England and subsequently in the leading societies of Western Europe. This trend was characterized by positive feedback loops between growth trends and led to a period of global civilizational dominance. The conclusion discusses using the identified concepts of the two megatrends and the two types of social orders to interpret Russia's sociopolitical history and current global macro-processes.
Conventional explanations of resentment rely on appeals to subjective factors-morality, values, emotions and moods. However, it appears that resentment has, above all, compelling ontological foundations, and its genesis and specificity can be described in terms of concrete historical group "views revealing resentment" (L. Fishman). This allows us to identify the objective political-economic foundations of resentful sentiments, linked to the dynamics of social structure and the foundations of social stratification. The situation of Modernity, with its universal public sphere, radicalizes resentment, transforming it into a universal mechanism for correcting social norms and regulating social group relations, constantly demanding the correction of inequality and injustice. At the same time, in the context of late or singular Modernity, a paradox is increasingly observed, whereby the indignation of citizens and social groups develops according to a scenario of implosion as internal self-poisoning and deviations, instead of active social resistance to the source of injustice. Passive resentment (hate on social media, complaints to authorities, COVID dissidence, etc.) is increasingly displacing open class struggle, resistance practices, and protests. It is de facto becoming the legitimizing foundation for a general conflict between frustrated social groups demanding compensation and appealing to their current and past sociocultural traumas and disabilities, suffering, and humiliation. Resentment-based social regulation manifests itself in post-truth technologies, double standards, cancel culture, positive discrimination against minorities, compensation for victims, and so on.
The article examines the phenomenon of digitalization of family memory of the Great Patriotic War as part of a broader process of mediatization of collective memory in a digital society. The theoretical basis of the research is based on the concepts of communicative and cultural memory by Jan Assman, the theory of weak and strong connections by M. Granovetter, as well as the ideas of & Acy;. Hoskins about digital memory and media archive. The authors assume that the transition from oral forms of experience transmission to digital platforms has led to a radical change in the mechanisms of production and legitimization of memory, from horizontal communicative transmission to institutionally and technologically mediated models. Family memory is losing its former oral form, integrating into digital ecosystems, online archives, online communities and educational initiatives, where the school acts as the main mediator and censor of memorial discourse. The empirical part of the study is based on the material of the "Living History" project and demonstrates how the digital environment transforms individual narratives into elements of a public historical archive. The gender specificity of the corpus of texts (the predominance of female authorship of the narrative of the Great Patriotic War) is interpreted as a manifestation of the humanistic and empathic type of collective memory, as opposed to the heroic-state type. The article shows that digital family memory is a hybrid of personal, collective and institutional experience, forming new forms of historical reflection and civic identity.
This study examines the preservation of the demographic potential of Russian regions through the lens of reproductive plan implementation during the period 2015-2022. The methodology employs a comparative analysis of fertility dynamics across two contrast groups of regions: those with sustained positive natural growth and those transitioning to depopulation. The primary analytical indicator is the Average Number of Birth Orders per woman (ANBP), complemented by an original Discrepancy Index (D) to quantify the gap between subjective intentions and actual childbearing behavior. Results demonstrate a fundamental transition toward a "demographic polarization" model. While the absolute number of births in Russia declined by 33% by 2022, the qualitative intensity of childbearing increased within specific groups, with national ANBP rising from 1.83 to 2.06 by 2021. Significant discrepancies between intended and actual children are observed across all territories, including the North Caucasus, indicating universal barriers to plan fulfillment. The research identifies a "critical window" for plan implementation (1-2 years), after which temporal erosion occurs under external pressures. The discrepancy index reached its historical peak in 2022 due to the cumulative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical instability. These shocks, alongside 'delayed parenthood' and changing gender roles, further complicate parental scenarios. Structural analysis identifies a "demographic reserve" - approximately 15% of women (Group B) with unrealized needs for multi-child families-who serve as the primary target for effective, addressable demographic policies. The findings provide actionable evidence-based recommendations for optimizing regional strategies to stabilize the demographic situation and effectively enhance sustainable reproduction in a modern Russia.
The current twenties of the 21st century have become a turning point for Russian cinema: increased attention to national cultural policy and restrictions on the distribution of foreign films are reorienting Russia's film industry. There is a noted increase in the number of films released, expanding geography of all-Russian film festivals, and a strengthening of regional cinema's positions. In these conditions, young audiences, whose preferences are dynamic, accumulate cinematic experience and form attitudes within a changed socio-cultural environment. The authors of the article explore how today's students perceive Russian cinema. Based on data from focus groups conducted at universities in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Tyumen, and Ufa, a dualism in attitudes and film choices is stated. On the one hand, foreign cinema products remain popular among young people. On the other hand, Russian films, owing their active promotion in distribution and on streaming platforms, are increasingly capturing the youth audience. Within the broader stream of Russian films, a distinct category stands out-films produced by regional studios. The authors investigated what makes regional cinema that often includes ethnic themes, appealing to young viewers. Regional films feature nontrivial plots and characters connected to folklore traditions. As it turns out, students' viewing of regional, including ethnic, films alters their perception of Russia's cinema, which ceases to be the sole cinematic discourse possible for a multi-ethnic country.
By analyzing the population census data, the author found that family demographic policy contributed to a same increase in the average number of children among married mothers in Russia. However, this positive effect was offset by the postponement of starting a family and having children, an increase in the proportion of single and unmarried people, frequent divorces and an increase in the proportion of childless among both all and married women. The current family demographic policy improves the conditions for the birth of children in families that already exist, but not for the creation and preservation of families. The State should not only help families who already have at least one child, but also promote the creation and preservation of families, i.e. conclusion of marriages and increasing of their stability. It is especially important to help families purchase their own housing, because of the lack of which many couples postpone marriage for a long time. It is also necessary to amend the Family Code in order to create a more responsible attitude towards the conclusion and dissolution of marriages in society, especially among young people.
This study systematically examines the cognitive characteristics of Chinese online public opinion through an analysis of content related to Russia's wartime economy on Bilibili and Kwai platforms from 2022 to 2025. The research finds that Chinese public discourse has formed a narrative framework centered on "economic resilience," emphasizing Russia's anti-fragility achieved through energy and food self-sufficiency, sanctions-stimulated domestic production, and capital repatriation. The perception demonstrates significant historical depth and strategic relevance, revisiting the impact of Soviet industrial legacy on the current economic structure while highlighting the inevitability of Sino-Russian strategic complementarity and the "pivot to the East." Platform characteristics shape differentiated expressions: Bilibili users tend towards structural analysis reflecting critical thinking, while Kwai content evokes resonance through emotional narratives. The study reveals that discussions about Russia's economic resilience often transform into reflections on China's own development model and resilience, making the Russian case an important reference for validating non-Western development paths. This cognitive model reflects not only a rational assessment of geo-economic realities but also a profound self-identity and strategic awareness.
The activities of informal markets remain a focus of attention for government agencies and the academic community. Despite their significant contribution to the economy and numerous positive functions, informal markets are often perceived negatively, as they pose risks to their participants and society at large. This article aims to present a comprehensive description of the Novokuznetsk flea market as a form of informal market, using it as an example. Based on 66 observations over three years and a survey of 139 sellers and 308 buyers (2019, 2022, and 2025), we developed market types based on their emphasis on satisfying economic, social, and other needs. We also characterized the market space and sales processes, and identified key sources of risk. The main conclusion is that the flea market is an ecosystem oriented, on the one hand, towards supporting the livelihoods of the poor, on the other, towards meeting the social and cultural needs of the population, and on the third, it is positioned as a place of leisure with a low level of danger.
This article continues the research on the ideological diversity "multi-coloured" nature of modern Russian conservatism based on discourse analysis and content analysis of Telegram channels. This issue addresses the connection between political processes in Russia and the changes in the world following Donald Trump's return to the presidency of the United States. Trump's image serves as an analytical tool-a "symbolic knot" that reveals the ideological similarities and differences among the representatives of the three segments of the Russian conservative field, which are referred to as "white," "red," and "green." The theoretical basis of the study is a combination of Lacroix-Mouffe's discursive theory and the alternative concept of "contextual realism." The author argues against the poststructuralist exaggeration of the role of discourse and its autonomy in the socio-political sphere. Empirical examples demonstrate the limitations of the arbitrary influence of discourse on political behavior. These limitations related, on the one hand, to the stable ideological frames of the three currents of Russian conservatism, and, on the other hand, to the dynamics of the geopolitical context associated with changes in Donald Trump's policies.
The article examines the relationship between family socio-economic status and the content of work performed by university graduates in Russia at the beginning of their professional careers. While most studies of educational inequality focus on income or employment outcomes, this study shifts attention to the characteristics of the work performed as an indicator of job quality. The key analytical variable is the level of task routineness, which reflects the degree to which job tasks are standardized and formalized. The empirical basis of the study is the longitudinal survey Trajectories in Education and Profession. The results show that graduates from families without higher education are significantly more likely to be employed in positions dominated by routine tasks, whereas graduates from more educated families are more often concentrated in non-routine jobs involving more complex cognitive and analytical activities. These findings suggest that social origin continues to structure the quality of graduates' early labour-market positions even when they possess formally similar educational credentials.
The review considers D.G. Podvoisky's new book as an intellectual event that prompts a renewed engagement with the fundamental questions of social theory in order to rethink the nature of social constructions. The analysis is structured around the central theoretical intuition of the study, according to which, in creating social reality, the human being becomes both its product and its captive. The possibilities of applying a constructivist methodology to the study of modernity, norms, institutions, and the academic sphere are assessed. The internal tensions and lacunae of the study are identified: an emphasis on solidity at the expense of the fragility of social forms, a predominant focus on the prohibitive (rather than enabling) function of social structures, as well as unresolved contradictions between constructivism and realism, and between sociological and philosophical conceptualizations of freedom.
This article attempts to understand the social structure of society in the digital space. Drawing on concepts by P. Bourdieu, M. Castells, M. Granovetter, and others, the features, characteristics, and elements of the social topology of virtual reality are explored. The most influential group in this world-the digital upper class, consisting of the netocracy ("digital barons," platform owners, IT giants, etc.) and digital avatars of the state-is examined. The conflict between the hierarchical logic of the traditional state and the network principles of the netocracy is explained, which can give rise to new threats: cyberwarfare, loss of control over infrastructure, and the capitalization of social influence formed on the basis of popularity. The concept of "network people" is introduced as a set of actors with a transforming identity. An attempt is made to compare the phenomenon of "network people" with traditional civil society. Two large groups are identified, which owe their emergence to the global network and are united by similar professional tasks: the delivery class and the PR class. Attention is paid to the hybridity characteristic of virtual actors.
The author analyzes the system of secondary vocational education organizations in Moscow, consisting of federal, city and private colleges. The function of vocational training is performed by all types of colleges, and social functions, including guaranteed secondary education, employment, and training for the city, are performed only by colleges in Moscow. The quantitative growth of secondary vocational education institutions students in Moscow is analyzed as the result of a trend in Russia and also as a result of the regional policy of the city authorities trying to reduce the workers shortage. The consequences of the students flow redistribution from schools to colleges are in the focus of attention. The empirical basis consists of statistical data and the results of sociological survey done in 2025. The main problem of vocational training is a significant increase in the share of students without interest to pursue profession skills offered by the college. The lack of students` motivation to get the profession reduces efficiency of vocational training as it is assessed by college graduates employment in the profession.
Sociological research has long treated age as a control variable rather than an independent axis of inequality. This article advances a conceptualization of age as an autonomous stratification principle, comparable to gender and class, that structures access to resources, shapes hierarchies of recognition, and establishes regimes of inclusion and exclusion. The theoretical framework integrates three complementary approaches: Anne Barrett's tripartite model distinguishing age as institution, performance, and identity; de S & atilde;o Jos & eacute; and Timonen's multi-level conception addressing macro-, meso-, and micro-levels alongside age dispositions as internalized schemes linking structures to practices; and the "doing age" perspective developed by Cheryl Laz and Clary Krekula, which foregrounds the performative and embodied dimensions of age construction. Middle-aged women serve as a critical case for analysis, representing a point where cumulative life course effects reach maximum density while normative expectations remain ambivalent and contested. An intersectional analysis reveals how the "triple standard" of aging-operating at the intersection of age, gender, and class-combines with spatial differentiation of normative regimes to produce unequal access to resources for managing age and visibility. The article introduces into Russian sociological discourse a conceptual apparatus for analyzing age as a system of inequality, offering analytical tools applicable to both theoretical elaboration and empirical investigation.
The authors summarize changing work of professional musicians in the classical and popular music genres, employing the qualitative sociological approach methodology. Fundamental differences are identified in how professional connections are formed among musicians in these two fields: for some, traditional face-to-face interaction of the "word-of-mouth recommendation" type is necessary, while for others, the accumulation of professional contacts in the online space coupled with an element of chance prevails. In the field of classical music, the educational track has remained unchanged, while in popular music, the scope of informal (spontaneous, self-directed acquisition of knowledge and skills) and non-formal education (systematic training conducted outside traditional system) is expanding. The identified transformations in professional practices are mediated by a number of essential characteristics in musical creativity itself (duality of "author-interpreter," interrelation of the physical, technical, and creative elements in the musician's work, collective and synchronous nature of music, and dominance of quantitative measures of success). Through the narratives of the informants, an understanding of the contradictions inherent in contemporary music as a cultural industry is achieved.
