This article examines the fluid boundaries between piracy, privateering, and naval warfare in Southwestern Atlantic Europe during the late Middle Ages. Far from being clearly defined, these practices were shaped by shifting political and economic interests, creating a legal ambiguity that persisted until the rise of monarchical control and maritime jurisdictions. Focusing on Cantabrian and Breton seaports, the study highlights how urban actors developed enduring diplomatic mechanisms—such as arbitration tribunals and cooperative institutions like the Brotherhood of the House of Trade —to regulate letters of marque and mitigate conflict. These arrangements reveal a preference for negotiation over confrontation, contrasting with the aggressive strategies of major maritime kingdoms. By situating privateering as both an economic opportunity and a strategic risk, the article underscores its role in the formation of Atlantic networks and the pursuit of maritime supremacy, offering new insights into the interplay of law, diplomacy, and commerce at the close of the Middle Ages.
The history of the bankruptcy of the Cassa di Sconto e di Risparmio (CSR) in Egypt following the outbreak of the 1907 financial crisis has remained largely unexplored to date. The CSR was an Italian-Levantine banking institution rooted in the multicultural business world typical of North African societies during the Belle Époque. During the cotton and farmland economic boom, the CSR was a universal banking institution that developed to capitalize on the unprecedented business opportunities offered by the market, especially from the end of the Long Depression in the nineteenth century onwards. As there is no archive of this institution, its history, business, and bankruptcy are reconstructed by consulting official pamphlets, local and international newspapers, and various archives of Italian banks that had been linked to the Cassa, such as the Banco di Napoli, the Banco di Roma, and the Banca d’Italia.
