The article examines the key features of Türkiye’s foreign policy strategy in the context of global geopolitical transformations. As a model for its relations with major powers, the authors propose the concept of two-level balancing – a policy of manoeuvring between states with opposing interests (the first level) and of engaging with them through a combination of cooperation and confrontation (the second level). This approach proved effective under conditions of bipolarity and remains relevant in the context of an emerging international order. It plays a central role in Türkiye–US and Türkiye–Russia relations, particularly during periods of heightened tensions among great powers. While this approach expands opportunities for advancing national interests, it simultaneously generates new challenges for Türkiye as well as for both the United States and Russia. To identify the distinctive features of this model, the authors analyse key factors shaping great power relations, including intensifying competition over the formation of a new world order, countering the terrorist organizations, the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, and Russia’s presence in the region. The authors conclude that two-level balancing is not employed by Türkiye merely on an ad hoc basis, but rather constitutes a deliberate response to geopolitical challenges. Its implementation relies on both political and military instruments, which is made possible by the complexity of the international environment and the slow and uncoordinated response of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Why are electoral reforms implemented or why are electoral systems used in parliamentary elections changed? The author argues that most previous studies have focused on cases of changes in the electoral system in consolidated democracies. The object of this study is electoral reform in Kyrgyzstan, which was implemented in 2021. The theoretical basis for explaining institutional changes is grounded in sociological institutionalism in general and the congruence model of legitimacy in particular. Applying process-tracing as a case study method, the author seeks to answer the following research question: why did the parties represented in the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan (known as the Jogorku Kengesh) support the bill that provided for the introduction of a mixed electoral system in parliamentary elections instead of proportional representation? The results obtained challenge the dominant approach in the academic literature (rational institutionalism), and confirm the central role of electoral legitimacy in stimulating electoral reform in the Central Asian republic. The main conclusion of the author is that the institutional changes were caused by the delegitimization of the results of the 2020 parliamentary elections in the eyes of some participants in the electoral process. The article emphasizes that electoral reform is a response to the decline or loss of legitimacy of the political institution in general and the electoral system in particular. The results allow us to rethink the causes and consequences of electoral reforms not only in Kyrgyzstan, but also in other countries with similar political contexts, and also stimulate further research on the role of legitimacy in institutional change and democratic transition.
This work aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of national conservatism as an intellectual and political movement that emerged in opposition to liberalism and now plays a significant role in the transformation of the American political landscape. Drawing methodologically on the general theory of scientific and intellectual movements (developing Thomas Kuhn’s approach) and on the concept of intellectual genealogy (in the form of Michel Foucault’s discursive organization of practice), the study traces the development of national conservatism through an analysis of the discourse produced by its representatives. National conservatism has consolidated a broad network of intellectuals of various persuasions—nationalists, post-liberals, federal reformers, and constitutionalists. This coalition, possessing a significant institutional infrastructure, has achieved considerable success, influencing not only public debate but also concrete political processes. The right-wing revolution of national conservatives has several key aspects. First, it is a struggle against the hegemony of liberal globalism, associated with a unipolar world order known as Fukuyama’s end of history. Second, it is a break with the fusionist status quo and outdated forms of conservatism, which is referred to as “defusionism.” Third, national conservatives are initiating a fundamental reform of political and bureaucratic institutions, including the abolition of elements of the “deep state,” considered dead and counterproductive. National conservatives’ primary interest is focused on regime change—a process they have already largely succeeded in initiating by shaking the existing status quo. The electoral success of national conservatives poses new challenges for the conservative revolution. Beyond preserving the existing coalition, a key focus remains ensuring the victory of candidates like J.D. Vance and Marco Rubio in the 2028 U.S. presidential election. Alongside maintaining political power, there is a need to move from abstract ideological discussions to concrete actions aimed at supporting the family and promoting the national good, as interpreted by the Natcons and based on the principle of prudence. Thus, national conservatism not only opposes the predominant form of liberalism but also actively promotes systemic reforms and a rethinking of the institutional structures (foundations) of the modern state.
This work reconceptualises the relationship between the political and the technical in the age of artificial intelligence. The authors reject the dichotomy that presupposes their ontological independence and propose a framework of mutual constitution: the political and the technical are two modalities of a single process of human representation and self-organisation. The investigation traces the transformation of regimes of representation from ancient Greek τέχνη – the creative supplementation of nature through knowledge and craft – to the rupture in the modern epoch, when technique was reduced to instrumental rationality and politics claimed to preserve meaning. The digital age transcends this division: mathematics and algorithms form a universal metalanguage, unifying political narratives and cultural codes into a single system of representation. Concrete examples – AI regulation in the EU, platform recommendation systems, social credit schemes – demonstrate that political decisions require technical architecture, whilst technical management bears a political character, determining the boundaries of inclusion and defining the enemy. The central analysis concerns the transformation of sovereignty. The sovereign decision (in Schmitt’s understanding) splits into three levels: developer sovereignty (data and objective function selection), algorithmic sovereignty (real-time decisions), and state sovereignty (control over systems). The enemy is redefined as an outcome of statistical computation, a mathematical category. At the level of subjectivity, AI technologies function as anthropotechnics – practices of human self-formation. From self–knowledge through language models to collective mobilisation via recommendation systems and state governance through algorithms, AI permeates all levels. These processes are ambivalent: technologies serve both subjection and resistance. The authors identify three cardinal problems: the democratisation of metalanguages, the revision of fundamental political philosophy categories, and narrowing the gap between technical velocity and ethical reflection. The work reconceptualises the foundations of political knowledge, proposing that technical governance be understood as inseparably linked to politics. The political does not disappear; it reformats itself, acquiring new modes of articulation through algorithms. The investigation opens a horizon for reconsidering the boundaries and possibilities of political action under conditions of distributed sovereignty and algorithmic power.
The article develops the concept of national interests as the main guideline for Russia’s foreign policy. With reference to the classics of political realism, H. Morgenthau, E. Carr, R. Aaron, it is stated that national interests arise not from abstractions, but from the specific position of the country in the system of international relations, its geography, history, institutions and value-normative guidelines, representing nothing more than long-term vital expressions of the community of the nation in the conditions of an anarchic international system. Further, the modern American experience in determining national interests is examined, including reference to the US National Security Strategy of December 2025. Russian approaches are analyzed through historical dynamics: from the change of ideological foundations to modern strategic planning documents – the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2021) and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2022). The author his own systematic classification of Russia’s fundamental national interests in the form of a stable hierarchical structure, on the basis of which it is possible to deploy a system of essential, auxiliary and peripheral interests and which, thus, can serve as the basis for strategic goal-setting in the field of foreign policy and national security.
The article addresses the relationship between politics and fan culture. It examines, in particular: (1) how fan communities that have emerged around objects of popular culture can become politicized, acquiring features of political movements; and (2) how fandomization of politics and the transfer of fan practices into the sphere of political communication occur. In the former case, media fandoms appear as an object of study for political science, while in the latter case, they appear as a theoretical lens for analyzing the processes of fandomization of politics. Studies of political manifestations of fan culture focus on the phenomenon of fan citizenship and activism, the relationship between fan and political preferences, the hierarchy of power and the so-called “morality police” within fan communities themselves, as well as the influence of the political regimes on fan activity. Contrary to the rather widespread notion of the apolitical nature of fan culture, this sphere offers numerous avenues for political research. In turn, the concepts of fandom (and anti-fandom) allow for a deeper understanding of the processes of transforming politicians, parties, and politics itself into fan objects, as well as of the accompanying affective practices characteristic of modern political discussions and movements. Although the figure of the fan remains problematic for politics as a sphere of rational communication, the processes of celebrityization and fandomization of the political are becoming increasingly visible and intense. The author also notes a certain politicization of fan studies themselves and the prospects of turning to fandom to expand both the subject field and methodology of political science.
During the period 2022–2024, relations between Russia and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have significantly deteriorated due to Moscow’s launch of a special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine and Seoul’s participation in sanctions against Russia. In this regard, the questions of whether the perception of Russia in the ROK has changed since the start of the SMO and how sustainable the changes in South Korean public opinion towards Russia have become relevant. The article aims to trace the dynamics of the perception of Russia and attitudes towards it in the ROK through the prism of public opinion polls as well as to assess how public opinion towards Russia has changed and whether changes in public opinion in the ROK can influence Russia-South Korean relations. Since the early 2010s, there has been a negative trend in the perception of Russia in the ROK. It can be stated that there is pessimism regarding cooperation with Russia, increased wariness towards it, as well as the spread of the image of Russia’s hostility. After the events of February 2022, the attitude of South Koreans towards Russia has worsened, and the hostile perception of Russia was fueled by reports of military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK. The population of the ROK reacted sensitively to changes in Russian-South Korean relations, and polls reflected their deterioration. At the same time, public opinion is unlikely to become an obstacle to the restoration of relations between the two countries, since it was caused not so much by deep historical grievances, but rather correlates with the international situation and the state of relations between Russia and the ROK.
The article is devoted to the analysis of the genealogy of the modern nation and its constitution as a subject of political reality. First, based on the analysis of the discourse on the nation, three main traditions of understanding the nation are distinguished therein: substantialist, desubstantialist and deontological. Further, to determine the scientific validity and heuristic value of these approaches, the article examines the etymology and semantics of such concepts as “ethnos”, “nation” and “people”. As a result of the analysis, the historical variability of the meanings of these terms and the uniqueness of the modern combination of the field of meanings of the concepts “nation” and “people” are stated, which makes it possible to assert the connection of the modern understanding of the “nation” with the formation of a new cultural paradigm – modernity. Based on the conclusion reached and in order to trace the phenomenology of the nation’s formation as a subject of political reality, an analysis of landmark documents of the era is carried out: peace treaties, declarations and decrees. The conducted research allowed us to state that the nation became the subject of the political process at the turn of the XVIII-XIX centuries. In this regard, it is argued that the birth of a modern nation is the result of a systemic cultural transformation associated primarily with a rethinking of the nature of the individual and the essence of the social process. Philosophical explications play an important role in such transformations: in the philosophy of the Enlightenment it was proved that a person is an autonomous, free, equal subject, and the voluntary unity of many such individuals – the people/nation acts as a new form of political legitimacy. At the same time, it is shown that the idea of an autonomous self–sufficient personality is not an innovation of Enlightenment thinkers, but a secularized form of Christian anthropology. As a summary, it is stated that the nation, like modernity itself, appears as a result of the detranscendatalization of the Christian cultural paradigm and is a post-Christian phenomenon, genetically dependent on it.
This review examines the monograph by Ekaterina Egorova-Gantman and Elizaveta Egorova, titled “Modus operandi of politicians: the history of psychological sketch, portrait, and profile” (Moscow: Niccolò M Agency for Strategic Communications; Griffon Publishing House, 2025). The book discusses the author’s interpretation of the history of personality modeling of political leaders, encompassing three categories: a psychological sketch of a politician’s personality, crafted by an individual acquainted with the politician but lacking formal psychological training; a professional psychological portrait of a politician’s personality; and a professional psychological profile of a foreign leader, commissioned by government agencies. This book also provides a detailed analysis of the methodologies employed by notable psychologists and psychiatrists in psychological portraiture and profiling, research techniques, and the personality theories that inform personality modeling. The article discusses the evolution of psychological modeling of politicians’ personalities, the typology of models, and the challenges facing contemporary political psychologists—academic scientists and practitioners who create portraits and profiles of leaders.
This article examines the evolution of the Federal Republic of Germany’s policy toward Syrian refugees in the early 2020s. The impetus for the analysis was the recent political changes in Syria, in particular, the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from power on December 8, 2024, which caused a strong public response among the Syrian diaspora outside Europe. The main objective of the study is to explain the transformation of Berlin’s position toward Syrian refugees through the lens of international relations theory. The paper traces the key stages of Germany’s migration policy from 2015 to the present, identifies the major factors influencing changes in its approach to Syrian migrants, and explores the impact of these dynamics on Germany’s domestic and foreign policy. The theoretical and methodological framework of the study is based on the concepts of neoliberalism, neorealism, and constructivism.
The article offers an assessment of the political significance of the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technological Progress (CPSTP) – one of the most ambitious projects of late Soviet economic policy. The CPSTP is viewed not only as a scientifically grounded program and a reflection of the specific worldview of representatives of Soviet mathematical economics, but also as an element of political competition in which economists were active participants. The authors show that work on the program became a field of competition between two groupings within the Soviet elite. The first one was focused on the interests of ‘group A’ industries – ‘production of means of production,’ primarily machine building, which was closely linked to the military-industrial complex. Its interests were best served by maintaining and even expanding the centralized distribution of resources. The second one was associated with ‘group B’ industries – the ‘production of consumer goods’ – whose leaders were interested in expanding the autonomy of enterprises and developing the consumer sector. One manifestation of this tension was the competition between academic institutions and entities subordinate to the State Planning Committee for the opportunity to participate in the scientific justification of planning. A key moment in the history of this program – the transfer of a group of economic forecasting specialists, led by A.I. Anchishkin, from the Gosplan’s Economic Research Institute (NIEI) to the Central Economic Mathematics Institute (CEMI) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences – is interpreted as an episode of this competition. In addition, the article reconstructs the methodological foundations of the program, explaining how its developers sought to introduce technological progress into economic descriptions. The authors demonstrate that the actual role of the program was dual. On the one hand, the state apparatus created a unique forecasting system, involving thousands of specialists, huge amounts of data, and many academic and research institutes. On the other hand, the actual influence of the program on economic planning was systematically hampered, since its implementation threatened to redistribute powers and disrupt the established system of economic interests.
In recent years, the Asia-Pacific region has become an arena of increasingly intense great power confrontation, where the interests of several key global political players, including the US and China, intersect and compete. For decades, US policy in the region focused on maintaining its leadership through the creation of military alliances and ensuring security, promoting economic growth, and strengthening relations with regional countries. However, with China’s rise, the successful modernization of its army, and Beijing’s increasing influence in the region, this strategy was revised and formalized into a comprehensive vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region.” This strategic shift marked an ideological reconceptualization of the region, with the Indo-Pacific becoming a priority of American diplomacy, the instrument of which is currently the consolidation of collective efforts of regional allies to deter China. In the “Strategic Minilateralism and the Regional Security Architecture of the Indo-Pacific: The Quad, AUKUS, and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” by T.S. Wilkins, a security expert in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions and an Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, an answer is provided to the question of how Washington’s approach to forming military partnerships in the region has changed in recent years, what are the strengths and weaknesses of existing alliances, and why the term “Asia-Pacific region” has disappeared from all conceptual documents of the US and its allies and been replaced by the phrase “Indo-Pacific region.” The analysis focuses on the phenomenon of revitalized “strategic minilateralism” as a key instrument of US policy to unite allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific for countering China’s growing influence. Three cases are examined – QUAD, AUKUS, and the US, Australia, and Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, with an emphasis on their underlying concepts, functions (“hard” and “soft” balancing), as well as factors of their stability/fragility and scenarios for future development.
The article examines the digital political communication of a new generation of right-wing populist leaders in the European Union. The aim of the study is to identify the mechanisms through which systematic digital communication transforms into a stable digital reputation and becomes a significant resource for political mobilisation. The working hypothesis suggests that regular and personalised communication by right-wing populist leaders on digital platforms contributes to strengthening their public image, shaping a resilient digital reputation, and increasing their appeal among younger audiences. The study draws on contemporary approaches to populism as a style of political mobilisation, as well as on concepts of digital political communication, political personalisation, and the mediatisation of the public sphere. Digital reputation is conceptualised as the outcome of discursive, visual, and communicative practices formed in the online environment under the influence of the algorithmic logic of platforms. The methodological framework is based on a qualitative approach, including case studies, comparative analysis, and elements of digital discourse analysis. The empirical basis consists of three cases of young right-wing populist leaders: Jordan Bardella (France), Tom Van Grieken (Belgium), and Rita Matias (Portugal). The analysis focuses on the choice of digital platforms, communication styles and formats, dominant narratives, modes of leader representation, and mobilisation effects. The findings demonstrate that social media function as the central channel of political communication for right-wing populists, enabling a high degree of personalisation, emotionalisation, and direct interaction with audiences. Despite differences in national contexts, digital strategies exhibit similar discursive elements, most notably the reproduction of the populist dichotomy between “the people” and “the elite”. The identified differences point to the variability of models of digital reputation formation, ranging from personalised leadership to symbolic reputational positioning. The article concludes that digital reputation constitutes an important factor in political mobilisation and in the transformation of party leadership under conditions of digitalisation.
Drawing on Xenophon's Cyropaedia and wider corpus, this article argues that fear is a calibrated political instrument rather than the impulsive hallmark of tyranny. For Xenophon, fear can secure order when joined to law and consent; it is not fear that differentiates kingship from tyranny - lawlessness and ruling the unwilling do. While Cyrus deploys fear prudently to elicit willingness, Xenophon also exposes its liabilities: when unbalanced or left un-institutionalized, fear breeds resentment, dependence on a leader's charisma, and the ultimate fragility of political order. In this sense, coercive fear yields only temporary compliance, whereas `respectful fear' embedded in norms can stabilize rule. The essay situates fear as a political tool but emphasizes its negative externalities: misused fear corrodes loyalty, inflames insecurity, and can become destructive. Xenophon thus treats fear as an ethically ambivalent technique whose careful calibration marks good rule.
Aristotle describes the activity of political rule using two different frameworks. In the first politics is an art, an application of reason to achieve the happiness of the community. In the second political activity is praxis, excellent activity choiceworthy as an end in itself. The first, followed exclusively, implies that the wisest individual should rule, while giving him little reason to wish to. The second, followed exclusively, points again towards monarchy but in an opposite way, spurring those most serious about virtue to desire sole rule for themselves. This article explores the tension between the two frameworks and their possible reconciliation, arguing that viewing politics solely as art fails to do justice to our political nature, while viewing it solely as praxis leaves political virtue without content. Reconciling them is essential for grasping Aristotle's deepest arguments for republican self-government, while shedding new light on his preference for the theoretical life.
The Greek novelists Xenophon of Ephesus, Heliodorus, and Achilles Tatius have been understudied by political theorists and scholars of ancient outlawry. I argue that these authors offer distinctive, valuable theories of the polis and the outlaw. For the novelists, the defining feature of a polis is no legal or institutional feature, but the affective bonds that tie its members to their homeland and each other. Xenophon suggests that outlaw communities lack such bonds. Heliodorus argues the opposite, to the effect that outlaw communities can be considered poleis. Consequently, where Xenophon holds that poleis must exterminate outlaw communities as incompatible with a polis states-system, Heliodorus finds possibilities for integration. Achilles complicates the picture by suggesting, through his characters' conflicting perspectives, that poleis employ the label `outlaw' to justify the extermination of communities that encroach upon the poleis' own prerogatives. His critique foreshadows and enriches modern criticism of the discourse of terrorism.
This article examines the issue of the ethical foundations of rhetoric in Cicero. Rather than focusing on the moral integrity of the orator, whose moral goodness cannot be guaranteed in Cicero's view, I investigate whether there are morally good reasons why rhetoric itself is worth pursuing despite its potential misuse. My claim is that these can be found in Cicero's view that reason and speech are essential traits of human nature, and that the interaction of these two natural faculties plays a key role in the foundation and preservation of human civilization. Accordingly, I show that Cicero held this view consistently throughout his life in both his rhetorical and philosophical works. Therefore, rhetoric is worth pursuing because it contributes to the improvement of speech, a natural faculty that, together with reason, makes us truly human, allowing us to live peacefully with other members of our species.
This article examines how Thucydides' History and Aeschylus' Eumenides dramatize the interplay of force ((3ia) and persuasion (mOc) in sustaining political authority. Focusing on Brasidas' negotiations at Acanthus (Thuc. 4.85-87) and Athena's reconciliation with the Furies (Eum. 778-918), it argues that both scenes reveal power politics as a performative blend of coercion and symbolic appeal. Drawing on realist and post-realist theories of compulsory power, the study shows that authority is stabilized not by force alone but by making coercion appear rightful and persuasive. Brasidas cloaks threat in the language of liberation, securing compliance but leaving a fragile legacy dependent on his personal performance. Athena, by contrast, institutionalizes coercion by transforming the Furies into civic guardians, embedding power in enduring ritual order. By comparing history and tragedy, this article highlights how ancient texts anticipate realist concerns while illuminating the performative and symbolic dimensions of sustainable authority.
This article critically analyzes the concept of synousia, an under-theorized term in late Plato's political thought. Through a textual analysis of the Minos and the Laws, it proposes a twofold institutional understanding of the term, redescribing synousia as denoting either a `festive gathering' or an `epistemic colloquium'. It argues that, while the former is designed to screen civic competence for soon-to-be officeholders and to contribute to social integration, the latter concerns only the knowledge habituation of exceptional constitutional founders and `lawgivers' (vo & micro;oOTat) such as Minos or members of the Nocturnal Council. These findings suggest that even within the seemingly equal circle of politically active citizens, Plato's city-building project yields hierarchical results: while elite lawgivers are provided with quality access to philosophical knowledge of the law, average officeholders are not. This variegated access to these political spaces reveal a Plato who is at once deeply inegalitarian and deeply institutionally engaged.
The article examines manifestations of civic engagement among Russian youth in the online environment. To address the research objective - identifying the prevalence of different types of digital citizenship among young people in Russia and their relationship to subjective assessments and objective characteristics - the study draws on the approaches of S. Hoffmann, G. Almond, and S. Verba, which broaden the understanding of citizenship and its links to state traditions. Citizenship is conceptualized not only as "political publicity" (following J. Habermas), but also as a combination of civic duties, a sense of belonging, goal orientation, and actual participation in social transformation. Based on the conceptual framework developed by G. Almond and S. Verba, the author proposes a typology of digital citizenship. Institutional and subject forms are interpreted as political, while slacktivist and parochial forms are treated as non-political. It is emphasized that participation in addressing non-political yet socially significant issues also expresses the agency of civic action. The proposed model is empirically verified using data from a sociological survey of youth across eight federal districts of Russia. The results of the statistical analysis demonstrate the presence of diverse forms of digital citizenship among Russian youth, as well as a higher level of interest in the political online sphere compared to national average indicators. Particular attention is drawn to the significance of parochial digital citizenship for the development of civil society, as youth involvement in solving local problems contributes to the formation of political orientations and civic competence. Key factors shaping digital citizenship include education level, material well-being, and settlement characteristics, with the federal district of residence playing a particularly notable role.
