The digital age has produced extensive datasets documenting communication by political actors, the media, and civil society, indicating a shift in political discourse toward digital platforms. Election manifestos, for example, are now primarily distributed online through campaign websites. The accessibility of such data has increased due to advances in algorithm-based methods for collecting, storing, and analysing large volumes of digital empirical data. However, greater data volume brings increased complexity. These trends introduce methodological challenges in collection, pre-processing, and analysis. To address these problems, our paper proposes a human-in-the-loop blended reading workflow combining BERTopic with a large language model (LLM), demonstrated through a case study of German and Austrian national parliamentary election campaigns between 2002 and 2025. During this period, elections took place against the backdrop of multiple crises that threatened the European Union's internal security and democratic foundations. Scholars frequently employ the term permacrisis to characterise this persistent state of crisis and its associated challenges. With our explorative approach, we trace which issues are addressed by the Austrian and German parties in their communication through national election manifestos. This shall further allow us to detect policy fields and to analyse if EU permacrisis events are displayed.
This study explores political parallelism within the digital sphere by analyzing news-sharing behavior of political party actors on Twitter in Austria. Employing the concept of political parallelism, I investigate whether these alignments persist in the context of social network sites. Using Twitter data collected during the 2019 European Parliament and Austrian national election campaigns, alongside survey data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), the study assesses which media outlets are referred to by political actors and how ideological proximity influences these referrals. The findings indicate that political actors are more likely to amplify news from outlets whose readership aligns ideologically with their party, confirming the extension of traditional political parallelism into digital media environments. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the results show that right-wing, nationalist parties do not necessarily use media referrals more selectively than mainstream parties. Finally, the findings suggest that political party actors use media referrals as opportune witnesses, to selectively amplify information that aligns with the party's political stance. These insights underscore the impact of political parallelism on political information environments and have implications for audience engagement in the digital sphere.
Austria's federal bureaucracy has long been characterized by a high degree of politicization. One largely overlooked aspect of this politicization is the appointment of (former) ministerial cabinet members to the influential position of department head (Sektionsleitung) within federal ministries. Using original data on all such appointments between 1970 and 2023 (N=547), this study shows that the share of department heads with cabinet experience has increased significantly-from roughly 10% in the 1970s to around 40% in recent years. Theoretically, three potential drivers of this trend are proposed: political expertise, party affiliation, and personal loyalty. Empirically, the findings point clearly toward a partisan logic. While a few department heads with cabinet experience are appointed by ministers from outside their own party, the vast majority are nominated by ministers from the same party. Only a minority are reappointed by the very ministers they once served. Thus, the politicization of department heads through cabinet recruitment primarily reflects partisan considerations, rather than personal ties or functional demands for political expertise.
Political science has long suffered from the limited ability to conduct experiments and observations in a controlled environment due to its subject matter-groups of people and societies. In this article, the authors explore the potential of survival games as a research tool and setting in political science, weighing their advantages and disadvantages. In the following parts of the article, they conduct an observation of violent and non-violent behaviour of players in the game Rust. This was done to not only prove the utility of games as research medium, but also to obtain new data and insight into the state of nature, a fundamental question of political science posed by Hobbes and Locke. The results show that in a totally anarchic environment of the game, which in certain aspects encourages violence by lowering the stakes, players nonetheless favour non-violent behaviour and defensive violence, rather than offensive violence.
Parliaments are arenas of political dispute, but at the same time they require a generally accepted basic consensus and its concrete implementation in organisational issues such as the design of the parliamentary agenda and the handling of procedural conflicts. To resolve such conflicts, many parliaments use coordination committees, consisting of members of the presidium and representatives of the parliamentary groups. The article at hand analyses the Presiding Conference (PK) in the Austrian National Council as such a coordination committee on the basis of detailed interviews with its members. What role does the PK play in setting the agenda in the National Council andwhat mechanisms does it use to establish and reproduce a basic procedural consensus? The analysis shows that the PK and the preparatory informal round of club directors primarily determine the National Council's timetable agenda and serve as a coordinating body for a wide range of procedural and organisational issues. The highly consensual interaction in the PK can be explained by six institutional mechanisms - personality-oriented or interaction-based - including the strict separation of procedural and political decisions, the orientation towards precedents, the anticipation of obstruction possibilities, a consensus-oriented understanding of members' roles and the repeated interaction in a small, confidential and highly professionalised group. These theoretical mechanisms can be generalised beyond the National Council and show how parliamentary organisation can promote stable and fair parliamentarism even under conditions of political polarisation.
The literature on public childcare provision focuses mainly on countries as unit of analysis and investigates public expenditures or enrolment rates. We contribute to existing studies by analysing the availability and flexibility of childcare provision at the subnational level. Although Austrian municipalities experienced childcare expansion, there are remarkable differences in availability and flexibility among them. We test four explanations for this variation: party ideology of local councils, party ideology of mayors, women's representation in local councils, and gender of mayors. Ordinal and logistic mixed-effects models covering 429 municipalities in Upper Austria between 2011 and 2018 reveal that the cabinet share of the Social Democratic party (SP & Ouml;) and women in local councils show a robust association with higher quality of institutional childcare provision, while the Christian Democratic party (& Ouml;VP) is negatively associated. In contrast, mayors play no role.
& bdquo;Neutrality" is a basic concept of political and social language and probably finds its most prominent application in the field of international law and international relations. Both European international law scholarship and state practice slowly developed a more positive attitude during the early modern period, which expanded in the course of the 19th century to become recognized as an institute of positive international law. Neutrality was defined in terms of international law, remained controversial in many details of international law policy and yet was unanimously seen as a & bdquo;basic principle" of international relations. This shift in perception processed historical experiences of conflict of state practice and lead to a codific tion of international law in the course of the 19th century. Nevertheless, there remained a tension between legal positions and the actual power imbalance in international relations, which made the status of neutral states appear precarious. The question of legally permissible neutrality under international law was also contrasted with a political perspective, according to which non-neutrality sometimes appears more desirable. The relationship between neutrality and impartiality was also assessed inconsistently. With the outlawing of war after the First World War and the ban on the use of force under the UN Charter, the perception and assessment of neutrality changed once again. It came under greater pressure to justify itself in the face of demands for solidarity among states against violators of peace who were to be sanctioned.
This article discusses Austrian neutrality from the perspective of Catholic peace ethics. In a first step, Austria's independence in 1955, a peace-oriented understanding of neutrality and a certain opportunistic tendency are named as three reasons for the Austrian population's strong support for neutrality, which are then critically discussed in a second step from the perspective of peace ethics. This is done above all by contrasting the approaches of Carl Schmitt, who wants to preserve neutrality as an instrument of containment in a world of war, and Hans Kelsen, who wants to secure peace through law and can therefore no longer give neutrality a place in an order of collective security. The Catholic peace ethics is closer to Kelsen than to Schmitt. Neutrality is neither good in itself nor fundamentally pacifist. However, it can contribute to peace under certain circumstances. In a final section, two proposals for a new understanding of Austrian neutrality within Europe are considered, with Austria's support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and a possible increased focus on methods of social defense.
After the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Austrian federal government was increasingly confronted with accusations from the political camp, but also from the public and parts of civil society, that Austria was no longer fulfilling its traditional role as a neutral, peace-building actor. In this context, general reference is regularly made to Austria's supposed successes in this regard during the Cold War. This article examines the question of what role neutral Austria played historically during the Cold War. It traces in stages how Austria increasingly developed into an "honest broker" between East and West with an "active neutrality policy". On the other hand, it also shows the limits that severely restricted Austria's room for manoeuvre in foreign policy during the Cold War.
Perpetual neutrality not only has a passive-abstaining from interference in inter-state warfare-, but also an active dimension: the duty to maintain the capacity to defend oneself independently. Yet, Austria is neither sufficiently willing-according to polls-nor able to do so. Rather, it has effectively outsourced its security. As a post-heroic society, Austria engages in cherry-picking to enjoy the benefits of neutrality while ignoring the corresponding obligations.
The establishment of international organizations in Austria is a central element of the Second Republic's foreign policy. While Austrian politicians present the policy to host headquarters of international organizations as central for the small and neutral state, the Austrian public widely regards this policy as a result of Austria's neutrality. The article looks at argumentative connections between Austrian neutrality and the establishment of international organizations in two widespread political narratives. We focus, firstly, on the narrative that neutrality was and is a decisive pull factor for international organizations to move to Vienna, and secondly, that the presence of international organizations represents an important security factor for Austria. The historical perspective, however, shows that neutrality was only one of several factors that attracted international organizations to Austria. The security narrative about international organizations was mostly framed to sell this policy to domestic audiences.
This article argues that due to the current global political situation, for the first time in the Second Republic, Austria has to seriously deal with the military aspect of its security policy. Despite lip service to neutrality based on public opinion, it is de facto moving towards a Common European Security and Defense Policy. Neutrality is also valued in Austria because it is-in an exaggerated way-considered to have a peace-making and conflict-reducing role. It therefore makes sense to clarify that Austria can fulfill this function better within the framework of a common European approach.
Austria is still a long way from a debate about the state and future of its neutrality. This article addresses the questions of why such a debate is urgently needed and how it should be conducted to enable informed decisions on the future of Austria's neutrality. It argues that the need for the debate arises from the fact that the external conditions of Austria's foreign and security policy as well as the legal framework of its neutrality have fundamentally changed, while the political debate about the nature and value of neutrality has subsided. With regard to the nature of a vitalized debate, the article argues that it should be informed more extensively by evidence from science and practice, distinguish more clearly between different approaches to this topic (neutrality as an instrument, principle, point of reference and point of conflict) and be expanded beyond circles of experts and practitioners into society. As a point of departure for the special issue on the topic "The State and Future of Austrian Neutrality", the article also provides an overview of the subsequent articles in this special issue.
If Austria wants to be perceived as a serious partner and co-owner of the European integration project, it must actively contribute to European security. Security policy is the responsibility to protect population, territory and institutions in the light of respective conditions and challenges. In view of the Russian war of aggression, Austria should urgently take a closer look at its current and strategic security policy options. Without blindfolds, within the framework of neutrality, but also beyond it. Neutrality is a false protective shield. Wishful thinking cannot provide protection. Neutrality does not help against violent aggressors who respect neutrality just as little as they respect international law, basic political rules and the fundamental prohibition of violence. Even an active neutrality policy or military neutrality is not a mandate for petrifaction but rather requires ongoing adaptation to the respective security policy circumstances and challenges. In democracies, sustainable security policy requires public awareness and debate. Establishing acomprehensive overview, soberly weigh up advantages and disadvantages, recognize the outdated and leave it behind-this is the essence of the self-determined citizen, and this is what freedom thrives on. In the long run, you only have what you are willing to defend.
In hitherto almost 70 years of its existence, the interpretation of Austria's neutrality has been subject to constant change. Starting with current surveys, this article examines the roots of Austrian neutrality and key phases of its interpretation in the international context of East-West relations. The role of the Soviet Union as an incubator of the Austrian declaration of neutrality and a shaping factor for its interpretation receives particular attention. In addition to internal Austrian tendencies that go back to the end of the Habsburg Monarchy and found new support as a result of the East-West occupation of Austria after 1945, the Soviet demand for a declaration of neutrality as the price for agreeing with the withdrawal from Austria in 1955 was the most important root for this. Initially conceived as a pure rejection of alliance membership and military bases, the interpretation of neutrality was subject to a continuous expansion of the duties and tasks of permanently neutral states in peacetime during the decades of the Cold War under the impression of continuous Soviet communication and Austrian efforts to legitimize its policies. The end of the Cold War initiated a movement into the opposite direction. Today, the assessment of neutrality is divided between experts, who view neutrality as an outdated obstacle to security, and the public majority, who views this status as worth protecting. That neutrality continues to exist can therefore be explained by its overwhelming popularity among the population and support from groups on both sides of the political spectrum.
This article examines the various instruments of direct democracy available when it comes to deciding on maintenance or abolition of Austrian neutrality. According to the prevailing opinion in constitutional law, neutrality is not a so-called basic principle of the Federal Constitution, the abolition of which would require a referendum. Nevertheless, there are other options to involve the people in a decision on the future of neutrality. The question is also examined to what extent neutrality is not already undermined by Austria's participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, which can be based at least in part on the approval of the federal people for EU accession. Finally, the paper discusses how a possible accession to NATO should be judged in terms of constitutional law and what rights of participation the people would have in the process.
A society's willingness to fight (W2F) is influenced by a bundle of variables. In addition to socio-demographic and socio-economic factors, it is above all the political orientation of people, their experiences in the armed forces, and the salience of security policy issues that influence their willingness to fight. Recently, however, the post-modern and post-heroic character of societies has also been identified as a cause for a declining W2F. Based on a survey of more than 3,000 Austrians on foreign and security policy issues (conducted by members of the & bdquo;Austrian Foreign Policy Panel Project-AFP3"), this article argues that the reason for Austria's low willingness to fight, across all societal groups, is first and foremost the absence of a political debate on foreign and security policy. Such a debate is hindered primarily by the belief in neutrality as an anchor of identity and as an alleged shelter from wars.
In response to the "turning point" of the Russian attack on Ukraine, Austria needs an intensified foreign and security policy discourse. Since neutrality is not put into questions by any political party, it will probably constitute the security policy and constitutional framework for action for the foreseeable future. In addition to the necessary strengthening of the capacities of the Federal Army, Austria should also place a significantly increased focus on the numerous non-military security policy issues that severely affect the human security of the European neighborhood and thus also the security of Europe and in which neutrality does not have any restrictive effect. This should manifest itself through a higher level of aspiration and more resources. The traditional focus of Austrian foreign and security policy on strengthening international law, multilateralism and international organizations offers a broad field of activity for non-military security challenges. Over the last three decades, Austria has played a central role in international discussions and negotiation processes on landmines, cluster munitions, nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of international humanitarian law. This commitment to progress in disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation is an expression of an interest-driven security policy and an important aspect of an active and committed neutrality policy. Austria's proactive positioning in this area offers an example of how this can be successfully and visibly implemented within the constitutional framework of neutrality.
This paper explores explanations for the continued insistence on Austria's neutrality in the face of a changing international environment. It argues that tensions between a specific Austrian role conception in international politics and the challenges of a changing international environment became particularly visible in the context of Austria's application process for membership in the EC/EU. During this period, two broad narrative frames developed which continue to be present until today: on the one side, the minimization of the legal and political impact of neutrality, and on the other side the insistence on neutrality as a core principle of Austria's grand strategy, albeit without concepts for an innovative neutrality policy. The article also suggests research approaches that may be amenable to stimulating qualitative public debate about neutrality.
This article raises the question of the credibility of Austrian neutrality and how it is perceived within and beyond Austria's borders. Although the policy of neutrality is an internal Austrian matter, neutrality determines the status of the Second Republic under international law and applies to interstate relations. As a result, what foreign countries perceive of neutrality is also important for Austria's international position and strategy. Since the declaration of Austria's perpetual neutrality on 26 October 1955, there have been several interpretations of Austrian neutrality and its role in security policy, which is why this article takes a diachronic approach. First, it focuses on the discussions surrounding the declaration of neutrality and the fear shared by many states that a neutral Austria could become Europe's Trojan horse. Austria's "active neutrality policy" is then discussed: Despite diplomatic successes, whichwere due to a large extent to Bruno Kreisky, there were persistent doubts about Austria's ability to effectively defend its neutrality and territory. In a third part, the role of neutrality in security and defence policy since the 1990s and the accusation that Austria is a security policy free rider within the European Union are examined.
