The article analyses Turkey's policy towards Greece after the formation of the Blue Homeland doctrine. It reflects the historical problems that hinder the development of Greek-Turkish relations. A fundamentally important issue underlying the doctrine is the unresolved problem of delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The doctrine initially assumed the use of aggressive methods of exerting pressure on Greece through a demonstration of force and attempts to achieve recognition of the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone without taking into account the interests of Greece. The implementation of the doctrine from a position of force did not lead to a solution to the problems. The main results of aggressive actions were the growth of regional tensions and the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations. Realising the lack of positive results, Ankara has revised its foreign policy towards Greece in recent years. At the same time, maintaining its own vision of the exclusive economic zone in the coastal seas. Positive trends in Greek-Turkish relations are highlighted, high-level meetings are held to find areas of cooperation between the states. The growth of economic cooperation between Ankara and Athens leads to the formation of a basis for deepening bilateral cooperation. In the economic sphere, long-term plans are being created between Turkey and Greece to form a stable growth in foreign trade volumes. The new stage in the development of Greek-Turkish relations means a revision of the methods for implementing the Blue Homeland doctrine, which implies a rejection of aggression in favor of dialogue and cooperation. At the same time, the unresolved issue of the exclusive economic zone will continue to be a subject for Greek-Turkish negotiations.
This article examines the modern Old Believers – a religious community that declares a consistent and unwavering commitment to the Old Orthodox tradition in its doctrine and socio-cultural practices. This study of traditionalism as a socio-political position is relevant. It opposes the contemporary challenges of globalization and offers its own historically proven glocalist alternative. In many ways, this uncompromising approach meets the spiritual needs of our contemporaries, who are searching for a self-definition of Russia's civilizational identity. It should be emphasized that Old Believers are not only a Russian phenomenon. As a result of persecution and waves of migration, they have formed the largest and historically oldest Russian religious diaspora. Old Believer communities are present in almost all post-Soviet countries and many countries further afield, preserving their language, culture, and ties to their fellow believers and their historical homeland. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the potential of modern Old Believers in promoting traditional values and their importance for preserving the civilizational integrity of our country and the unity of its peoples. The research methodology is based on a consistent historical and sociological analysis of phenomena and processes in the life of Old Believer communities, as well as a content analysis of documents, media, and author interviews. A review of historiography demonstrates the formulation of an original patriotic historiosophic tradition by modern Old Believer authors. State policy towards the Old Believers is analyzed, demonstrating the shift toward their support during the commemorative events marking the 400th anniversary of Archpriest Avvakum, as well as a set of state measures to support Old Believer returnees and create conditions for their adaptation in their destinations. A conclusion is drawn regarding the value of Old Believer preservation of traditions for state ideology in the Russian Federation.
The crisis of the global economic world order, along with the exhaustion of the explanatory and practical potential of neoliberal doctrines of economic regulation, has generated a demand for new concepts of economic policy. The US, as the leader of the Western world, has already proposed such innovations as the “new supply-side economy”, the “new Washington consensus”, and productivism. In 2023 the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer of Great Britain from the Labor Party R. Reeves developed the concept of securonomics as a new path of economic policy based on the revival of state activism, taking into account the principles of economic security and social justice. Securonomics inherits the earlier concept of “everyday economics” by R. Reeves, which implied a radical rejection of the generally accepted foundations of neoliberalism. In theoretical terms, the original version of securonomics is close to the paradigm of “productivism” of D. Roderick, and in socio-political terms it reproduces the economic policy of J. Biden. However, as it moved to power and after winning the 2024 elections, securonomics underwent significant adjustments. The idea of economic growth and export-oriented (“border”) industries as the basis of real economic policy was returned to the doctrine. Nevertheless, the Laborites’ programmatic economic policy, both in the fiscal sphere and in the long-term Sectoral Development Strategy adopted in June 2025, reproduces the basic ideas of securonomics in matters of supply chain security, expanding access to cheap “green” electricity, the important role of basic (non-traded) industries, including the development of critical minerals. Thus, securonomics retains its significance as a new conceptual course of economic policy in a period of global uncertainty and turbulence, but at the same time, since it widely presents political science emphases, one can conclude that its purpose is to be a conceptual shell that gives the appearance of novelty and meaningfulness to the political economic doctrine of the renewed Laborites.
The article examines the main stages of the development of the highly developed Swedish military-industrial complex and the specifics of its functioning in the context of Sweden's traditional policy of neutrality, which was based on a strong and independent defense, and the limited demand for weapons by the national armed forces. During the Cold War, Sweden's foreign policy doctrine significantly hindered military-technological cooperation and arms trade between neutral Sweden and the superpowers and their allies. These circumstances prompted the country's foreign policy leadership to focus on creating opportunities for exporting Swedish weapons to neutral and non-aligned countries in the Third World that were fighting, including through armed means, for their national liberation. This provided opportunities for exclusively private companies involved in the production of Swedish weapons not only to compensate for their expenses in order to secure suppliers to the national armed forces and the armies of their North European neighbors, but also to generate profits. To successfully achieve these goals, the country's extensive foreign policy efforts were crucial in creating and maintaining Sweden's image as a sincere friend and selfless partner for the nations fighting for their liberation. After the Third World countries gained their national political independence, their market for Swedish arms exports began to shrink, and aid for their development gradually shifted from the battlefield to the offices of international banks and other institutions. The Swedish military-industrial complex and the country's political leadership faced the challenge of reducing Swedish exports and finding new markets for them. The end of the Cold War between East and West opened up opportunities for Swedish arms manufacturers to develop military-technical cooperation and trade in weapons with the vast market of NATO member countries. However, maintaining a traditional policy of neutrality posed obstacles to the practical implementation of these new opportunities, promoting the Swedish foreign policy leadership to reevaluate the country's foreign policy priorities, culminating in Sweden's accession to NATO.
The global economy has being experiencing a period of tectonic structural shifts in the third decade of the 21st century and, as a result, a “cooling” of economic growth. These processes accelerate geoeconomic fragmentation which exacerbates, among other things, global challenges to sustainable development. At the same time the global concept of sustainable development is being fragmented into regional formats that meet the interests of the world's largest economies. So far this results in stagnation in achieving the sustainable development goals set by the UN in 2015. The research subject covers the specifics of the sustainable development concepts of the European Union, the United States and China. The object of the study is to analyze specific practices, goals and tools for achieving sustainable development, used by countries in the new geoeconomic reality. The working hypothesis is that the fragmentation of approaches towards ensuring of the process of sustainable development negatively affects not only the achievement of global goals but also increases the vulnerability of the countries. The comparative analysis of the approaches of the EU, USA and China conducted in the work showed that the countries’ approaches regarding the implementation of the strategy of sustainable development in modern conditions are increasingly linked with various forms of protectionism (“green”, “neoprotectionism”, “innovative mercantilism”). This results in the escalation of trade wars and increasingly greater global uncertainty. The conclusion of V.I. Vernadsky, who called on humanity to “think on a planetary scale” to overcome challenges, is becoming more relevant than ever in the current conditions.
The article analyses the evolution of the foreign policy principles of Germany’s ruling party Christian Democratic Union after its transition to opposition in 2021. The loss of power prompted a conceptual rethinking of Germany's role in Europe and the world, and “Zeitenwende” marked a turning point in the transformation of the party’s foreign policy strategy, with an emphasis on securitisation. The concept of “security” has become the key element of Germany’s overall foreign policy, both geographically and functionally. The CDU's party line has evolved in response to the changing geopolitical situation globally and has prompted significant changes at the highest levels of German foreign policy following the CDU's return to power. The authors characterize Chancellor Merz's team, responsible for implementing foreign policy principles, emphasizing the duality of its aggressive rhetoric: on the one hand, containing “systemic opponents”, and on the other, finding ways to engage with them as countries on which Germany's economic and political stability largely depends. Previously, the formula was that Europe and the West were interested in a strategic relationship with Russia. Following the transformation of the foreign policy stances of Germany's ruling elites, particularly in the Christian Democratic Union, this partnership was finally curtailed. The main focus of the article lies within the program principles as the CDU's fundamental party documents for developing its foreign policy strategy.
The relevance of the study is associated with the trend of regionalization of the world, the transformation of individual regions into zones of influence for external actors, on the one hand, and into independent actors of world politics, on the other. The uniqueness of this article lies in the fact that it allows us to trace the role of diplomacy (which in its modern form originated precisely on the European continent) in the formation of regional order using the example of Europe. Thus, the main goal of the author is to show how the diplomatic instruments of interaction between European states and with the outside world have changed, as well as how these changes have influenced the European regional order and the current position of Europe in the system of international relations. The structural-systemic approach (A.D. Bogaturov, M.A. Khrustalev, V.G. Baranovsky, etc.) played a key role in preparing the work. This method allows us to identify tendencies in the development of European diplomacy within the regional subsystem. During the historical reconstruction of the process of evolution of the European regional subsystem, much attention was paid to the works of foreign authors who focused on such issues as national interest (K. Richelieu, N. Machiavelli, F. Guicciardini, G. Morgenthau) and state sovereignty (A. Wicquefort, T. Hobbes), which represent the basic characteristics of the state-centric European subsystem. The author comes to the conclusion about the transformation of Europe from the central component of the world order into one of the elements of the global system of international relations in the context of strengthening the multipolar world. In addition, it is concluded that modern methods and forms of diplomacy, in particular the tools of multilateral and network diplomacy, allow the European region to act in the international arena not only as individual states, but also as a collective player – the European Union.
The change of power in Syria in December 2024 necessitated a revision of the EU's policy towards the country and the sanctions policy as one of its key components. The EU abandoned its three “no” approach, that is normalization of relations with Damascus, participation in the county’s reconstruction and the lifting of sanctions, which had determined its Syrian policy before. By June 2025, most of the EU's restrictive measures, as well as the United States' ‒ the key subject of sanctions pressure on Syria, were lifted. Thus, the sanctions regime against Syria, one of the toughest and most comprehensive in Brussels' modern practice, was transformed. The easing and lifting of sanctions, as well as their introduction, are usually dictated by a certain political expediency from the point of view of the subjects of restrictions. An examination of the motives and logic behind the EU's efforts to lift sanctions on post-Assad Syria shows that they were intended to reset relations with the new Syrian authorities and to help stabilize the socio-economic, political and humanitarian situation in the country. In addition, these efforts were aimed at ensuring the broad interests of the EU and its member states in Syria, including in the economic, energy and security sectors. Previously, the refusal to ease sanctions was seen by the EU as a means of exerting pressure on the Assad regime, but under the new Syrian leadership it has now been replaced by the lifting of sanctions as both a means of influence and a mechanism of control. However, the effectiveness of this approach, as well as the future development of the situation in Syria, remains uncertain.
The article analyzes the position of the Benelux countries towards cultural heritage repatriation. Although the issue of repatriation of cultural heritage is not new and has been continuously raised after World War II and during decolonization, a new impetus to the process was given by the speech of French President E. Macron in Ouagadougou University (Burkina-Faso) in 2017. The authors see the policy of return as a form of “repentance” of European states. The process of returning heritage cannot be considered in isolation from the ongoing discussions about the colonial past that actively unfolded in Europe in the 2010‒2020s against the backdrop of growing protest movements and deteriorating relations between former metropolises and colonies. Three Benelux countries were chosen for comparison due to their historical similarity and closeness of cultural identities. Two of the Benelux states were colonial powers, and one did not have colonies, but nevertheless, has also been involved in the process of repatriation of cultural objects. The theoretical concept of the “politics of regret” by J. Olick is used, according to which memory plays an important role in social structures and is meant to promote social solidarity. Some symbolic acts, which in this study are represented by ceremonies of returning cultural heritage to former colonies are meant to demonstrate the willingness of the parties to discuss the tragic past and achieve reconciliation. However, it is emphasized that the process of return takes a lot of time, is accompanied by numerous bureaucratic obstacles and is carried out according to the rules of Western countries, often without taking into account the opinion of the receiving party. The process of digitalization of heritage as a special form of return and its potential for the development of bilateral relations between states are considered in the concluding part of the article.
This article aims to identify the threats posed by the malicious use of artificial intelligence (MUAI) to psychological security (PS) in Serbia, and to examine their consequences for the country’s political and social development. A wide range of primary and secondary sources was used during preparation of this research, including documents from the Serbian government related to AI industry regulation, as well as expert reports on various aspects of cybersecurity, AI risks, and MUAI. The theory of securitisation provides the framework for analysing MUAI threats. A three-level classification is employed to assess threats to PS through AI. At the first level false or distorted images of AI and its implications are spread. The second level of PS threats involves the antisocial use of AI, where psychological impact is not the direct objective, but significant psychological consequences still arise. The third level includes deliberate attacks intended to cause damage specifically in the psychological sphere. The authors conclude that at present the most relevant PS threats in Serbia stem from MUAI levels two and three. However, the country’s acute social and political tensions also create a favorable environment for level one threats. One of the most alarming trends in Serbia is the increasing use of AI in cybercrime. Equally concerning are the widespread disinformation campaigns associated with political protests. Nevertheless, Serbian society maintains a generally positive attitude toward AI, which provides strong support for the implementation of AI technologies for the public good.
After the Justice and Development Party came to power, Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans received a new impetus. The goal was to expand cooperation with different countries and thus increase Ankara's regional influence. Turkey’s position on the Kosovo conflict was shaped by a number of historical and geopolitical factors. One of the reasons for Turkey's attention to Kosovo problem is the Turkish ethnic minority that has lived there since the Ottoman times. In the Kosovo conflict, Ankara has supported Albanians Muslims, who are close to it from a confessional point of view. The Turkish authorities have been flexible in building contacts with Kosovo's Turks in a way that maintains a balance in relations with these two ethnic groups. Recognition of the region's independence the day after it was declared in 2008 contributed to increased contacts between Ankara and Pristina. Policy towards Kosovo reflects the Balkan strategy of modern Turkey, which includes direct dialogue at the highest level, economic penetration and military cooperation. The spheres of culture and education, which serve to expand Turkey's “soft power” space in the region, can be considered separate instruments of Turkish policy. In recent years, Ankara has managed to build an extensive system of bilateral ties with Pristina in all areas, which contributes to the growth of Turkish presence in the Balkans. By supporting Kosovo's aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration, Turkey can expect to strengthen ties not only with Pristina, but also with the EU and NATO.
The article is devoted to the analysis of changes in approaches in the sphere of humanitarian influence of the European Union and the United States in the post-Soviet space in the context of intensifying geopolitical rivalry with Russia after 2022. The purpose of the research is to reveal the transformations of EU and US humanitarian policy tools and content based on the material of the post-Soviet countries, as well as to conduct a comparative analysis of EU and US approaches. Statistical data, expert publications and official documents of the USA and the EU are considered. The chronological framework covers the period from 2020 to 2025 with an emphasis on events after the start of the World War II. The conducted analysis made it possible to draw a number of conclusions. With the coming to power of D. Trump, the USA went on the path of a complete revision of the existing institutions due to the liquidation of the largest operators of humanitarian influence. However, the contours of the new model are only viewed hypothetically, at the level of discussions in political and expert circles, their implementation in practice remains questionable. The European Union adopted a number of decisions on the re-profiling of institutions and changing the content of their work for a tighter connection with geopolitical priorities. The EU and the USA have maintained increased attention to Central Asia and Armenia, striving to find new approaches to strengthen their influence; continued support for the Belarusian opposition. Against the background of funding cuts, the influence of the USA in the region will decrease in the short term, the new configuration of the presence has not yet been determined. Humanitarian policy is increasingly linked to security issues, which reflects the general trend towards securitization of foreign policy approaches.
The problem of shared and dividing “European values” occupies an important place in current studies of international relations. The analysis of the evolution of the value discourse of European political institutions proposed in the article allows to trace the change in the motivation of the official narrative and answer the question of how the supranational bureaucracy, by adapting the content of the category of “common European values”, managed to achieve the observed level of initiative in the formation of collective action and identitarian mobilization. The study demonstrates that the universal nature of the "European values" listed in the founding documents of the EU was the result of the victory of the technocratic approach of EU institutions over the conservative interpretation of specific European values inherent to a number of member states. Today, framing “European values” through the prism of existential threats to the European integration project from both within and without allows European institutions to shadow the crisis of democratic legitimacy.
This article explores the specifics of Starmer’s Cabinet’s approach to China, drawing on risk theory in international relations. The author examines how the UK government assesses the threats and political and economic opportunities posed by China. In its foreign policy planning, the UK leadership is guided, on the one hand, by a combination of economic and political interests, which has led to an intensification of political dialogue with China in the Cabinets first year in office (from 2024): previously frozen formats have been restored to improve the bilateral agenda, and the foundations have been laid for advanced cooperation in clean energy, climate, and scientific and technological collaboration. On the other hand, anti-Chinese sentiment within the UK is hindering rapprochement between the two countries. Measures aimed at hardening the line on China include reducing control over critical infrastructure, pressuring Beijing to support Moscow, and ensuring national security. At the same time, improving relations is supported by the need to maintain access to technology, attract investment, and mitigate the negative impact of the US-China trade standoff. Attempts to find a balance between these two approaches formed the basis of the government’s “Audit” of China’s strategy, designed to assess its alignment with national interests. The inconsistent outcome of the “Audit” suggest that the government will continue its dual policy, driven by a pragmatic search for benefits from bilateral cooperation and a domestic demand to establish “red lines’ in UK-China rapprochement.
The article examines Norway’s humanitarian policy in Africa as an indicator of the opportunities and constraints faced by small states in the contemporary international system. The analysis covers the evolution of the Norwegian approach from early postwar initiatives and institutionalization through structures such as Norad and the Norwegian Refugee Council, to strategies for 2024–2029. Particular attention is paid to the normative framework of humanitarian activity, including the principles of international humanitarian law, as well as the interconnections between humanitarian policy and the Sustainable Development Goals, the climate agenda, and mediation practices in conflicts. Based on African case material, the article demonstrates how Norway combines value-oriented principles (solidarity, global responsibility, and the protection of human rights) with pragmatic interests related to energy, investment, and climate initiatives. A significant focus is on how humanitarian programs are integrated with long-term socio-economic development strategies, creating a basis for partnerships with regional states and reducing the risks of project fragmentation.The article identifies key challenges for the humanitarian policy of small states: limited resources, politicization of aid, competition from major donors, dependence on co-financing, and vulnerability to domestic public opinion. It is emphasized that these factors affect not only the effectiveness of individual initiatives but also the sustainability of the overall humanitarian strategy. The experience of Norway illustrates a transition from reactive and sporadic aid to a comprehensive strategy that includes long-term educational programs, refugee support, climate projects, and investments in renewable energy. The conclusion is that the humanitarian dimension constitutes an important element of the foreign policy identity of small states, enhances their international authority, and allows them to influence the global humanitarian architecture, despite objective constraints.
The article analyzes the transformation of relations between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia during the first quarter of the 21st century. Three key stages in the evolution of these relations are identified: the formulation of an approach (2000–2010), institutionalization (2011–2019), and the period of geopolitical challenges (2020–2025). The author concludes that by 2025, cooperation has reached the level of a strategic partnership, driven primarily by the EU's economic interests in diversifying sources of critical raw materials and developing alternative transport corridors bypassing Russia. It is emphasized that, despite a significant increase in trade and political dialogue, the EU's influence in the region is limited by the multi-vector foreign policy of the Central Asian states, their aspiration for greater agency, and fierce competition from Russia, China, and other actors. The EU's role as a dominant player in CA is unlikely, but it has established itself as an important partner.
The article analyzes the history of cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the EU and presents a periodization of their relations. From the early 1990s to the early 2000s, the parameters of cooperation were laid down. The second stage, from 2000 to 2010, was characterized by the intensification of dialogue and the desire of the parties for pragmatic cooperation. The third period from 2010 to the present is a period of searching for promising partnership parameters. It is concluded that a return to the idea of a common strategy for Central Asia is a promising approach. Road maps for specific joint projects (construction of enterprises, infrastructure projects, hospitals, schools, etc.) can become an effective tool. The aggravation of relations between Brussels and Moscow, the discrepancy between EU and US approaches on this issue, and difficulties in relations with China have created a problem area for the EU in the Central Asian region.
An intensive academic debate is constantly unfolding around the European Union’s sanctions policy. Although scholars have examined in considerable depth the institutional design, substance and effects of the EU’s sanctions regime, aspects related to the factors behind its dynamics and resilience have received far less attention. Against the backdrop of the rapid evolution of the EU’s sanctions policy – especially its anti-Russian programme since February 2022 – it is important to fill this gap and to systematise existing research. Particularly significant is an analysis of factors linked to the EU’s integration dynamics and to the very nature of the Union. This article conceptualises the endogenous factors that explain the resilience of the sanctions imposed, drawing on an analysis of the academic literature in the field. The authors conclude that the conceptualisation of the EU sanctions regime’s internal sources of resilience is, in one way or another, tied to the phenomenon of political leadership in its two manifestations – structural and normative/ideational. At the level of EU integration structures, resilience and the drive to maintain sanctions stem either from the consolidation of certain national preferences within the sanctions course, or from efforts by EU institutions to expand their influence within the inter-institutional balance. In the case of normative or ideational leadership, sanctions function as a signalling tool to external audiences regarding the EU’s capabilities and values, which likewise reinforces their durability. Overall, the existing body of scholarship points to the need for further conceptual development of the factors shaping the dynamics of the EU’s sanctions policy, since these factors have not yet received dedicated treatment in academic debate.
The article examines the situation, in which the United States and the European Union found themselves in the institutionalized systems of development assistance to third countries after D. Trump suspended the work of USAID (organization was closed and banned in Russia). The significance of this topic is related to the fact that the provision of aid (humanitarian and economic) to those in need abroad has long been not only a significant component of Western foreign policy (in particular, a manifestation of its “soft power”), but also one of the tools for maintaining the “global liberal order” in the world. It is indicative that with all the criticism of this instrument for 64 years in the United States itself, both Democrats and Republicans have so far considered it important to continue its work. In the European Union, this aspect of foreign policy (EuroAID) not only retains its importance today, even despite the hesitation of individual national governments, but also (after Trump's decision on USAID) receives new impulses to intensify and expand the geography of its application. In the EU, the question is increasingly being raised to what extent Europeans could “compensate” for the Americans' withdrawal from humanitarian aid in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East region adjacent to Europe, with their potential. The author considers such a prospect taking into account certain differences between the respective American and European concepts.
This article explores the position held by Northern European countries in the strategic sectors of European economy under the new emerging technological order. The hypothesis is tested that over the past ten years Scandinavian countries have been able to strengthen their positions in the segment of strategic raw materials (primarily copper and nickel) of critical production chains. The methodology is based on a quantitative assessment of inter-country trade linkages in separate stages of production chains, namely, raw materials, intermediate goods, and final products. The author proposes a method for identifying critical production chains based on a new coefficient of import dependence, which assesses the degree of a country's orientation toward importing a certain product from a certain partner country. The countries studied included Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The time period is limited to 2014–2024. The list of strategic technologies includes traction motors, wind turbines, heat pumps, and 3D-printers working on metals. The researchdemonstrates that Northern European countries are involved in five critical production chains in the raw-materials segment, three of which originate in Finland. In 2014 there were only two critical chains; in the newest 3D-printers sector they were absent. The results verify the validity of the research hypothesis, highlighting the increasingly significant positions of Scandinavian economies in strategically important sectors of the European economy. The main positions in critical production chains in the region are occupied by Western European countries, particularly Germany. A trend towards limited dependence on strategic resources and the heavier utilization of alternative composite materials among large final producers is shown. At the same time, the EU puts an emphasis on strategic projects related to raw materials in Northern Europe. A surge is anticipated in the demand for copper and nickel, two most extensively utilized metals in strategic technologies. Both of these trends lead to a conclusion that the economies under consideration will maintain their status in the raw material segment of critical production chains. However, this will not contradict the flagship state policies aimed at increasing economic complexity.
