Este artículo explora las posibilidades de futuro de Groenlandia como causa directa del interés estadounidense en la región y analiza la alteración de las dinámicas clásicas de dependencia-rivalidad entre Dinamarca y Groenlandia ante la perspectiva de una injerencia de Washington. Partiendo de los datos electorales del referéndum de autonomía de 1979 y del autogobierno conseguido en 2008, y terminando con los recientes acontecimientos ligados al segundo mandato de Donald Trump, se analizan los documentos oficiales y planes estratégicos de Dinamarca y Groenlandia y el seguimiento de las poblaciones nativas mayoritarias reflejadas en la publicación Mundo Indígena. Con ello, este texto contribuye a dar respuesta a sí es posible una independencia real de Groenlandia, si supone una oportunidad o una transición colonial-neocolonial, y qué papel jugaría, en tal caso, la administración estadounidense
The cooperation between Indonesia and China in the downstream bauxite industry reflects the dynamic interaction between national policy and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the extractive sector. This article uses the Eclectic Paradigm Model (Ownership, Location, Internalisation) to analyse cooperation and understand the motives and mechanisms behind Chinese companies' investments in Indonesia's bauxite processing industry. The research takes a qualitative, descriptive-analytical approach, applying thematic coding techniques to secondary data from policy documents, corporate reports and academic literature. The findings reveal that Chinese companies possess ownership-specific advantages, such as capital and technology. Indonesia, meanwhile, offers a strategic location with abundant bauxite reserves and downstream policy incentives and internationalisation incentives that enable cost efficiency and the protection of intangible assets. While this cooperation has accelerated Indonesia's bauxite industrialisation and increased its national economic value added, it also raises challenges related to foreign technological dominance and long-term investment dependence.
Indonesia has taken a bold step in its arms procurement strategy, particularly during the final strategic planning phase of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) programme between 2019 and 2024. During this period, it acquired the medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) HISAR-O, the anti-ship missile (AShM) Atmaca, and the long-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM) Bora, all of which are manufactured by Turkey. This marked Indonesia’s first ever purchase of Turkish-made missiles, simultaneously positioning Indonesia as the first foreign buyer of these systems outside of Turkey. This article employs the Opportunity and Willingness Framework to analyse the decision-making process, while the research methodology is based on Causal Process Tracing (CPT). The article's central argument is that Indonesia's bold decision was driven by a convergence of opportunity shaped by the international structural environment and willingness stemming from domestic factors within Indonesia.
This article uses the lens of Feminist Institutionalism to examine Indonesia’s UNSC presidency and its sponsorship of Resolution 2538 on women in peacekeeping. Addressing the paradox of a patriarchal state championing a global feminist norm, the article argues that Indonesia’s advocacy represents instrumental norm entrepreneurship, leveraging the WPS agenda for prestige rather than transformation. The analysis reveals how the resolution’s substance was diluted by geopolitical resistance and a consensus-driven 'logic of appropriateness', while domestic scrutiny shows a stark disconnect between Indonesia’s international rhetoric and the masculine hegemony embedded in its military and politics. The findings demonstrate that the institutionalisation of norms is a contested process susceptible to co-optation. For middle powers, the WPS agenda can serve as a form of soft power, yielding performative compliance that fails to disrupt patriarchal structures either abroad or at home. This case study highlights the limitations of state-led feminist foreign policy in the absence of genuine domestic reform.
El salafismo madjalí, corriente quietista articulada en torno a las enseñanzas de Rabīʿ ibn Hādī al‑Madjalī, ha adquirido en la Libia pos‑2011 una influencia desproporcionada gracias a su penetración en los aparatos de seguridad y en instituciones religiosas. A partir de literatura académica, documentación doctrinal e informes internacionales, el artículo analiza cómo redes y cuadros madjalíes han consolidado posiciones en unidades clave —en particular la Fuerza Especial de Disuasión (RADA) en Trípoli y formaciones vinculadas al Ejército Nacional Libio/Fuerzas Armadas Árabes Libias en el este— combinando acciones de coerción, control moral y adoctrinamiento religioso. Aunque a menudo se presentan como aliados útiles en la lucha antiterrorista, su expansión se asocia con prácticas de control social, represión de expresiones religiosas rivales —tanto sufíes como Hermanos Musulmanes— y denuncias de vulneraciones de derechos civiles. El estudio contribuye a explicar cómo estas dinámicas refuerzan tendencias desestabilizadoras en la Libia actual.
The article focuses on the influence of global violent extremism in Singapore, and the efforts and successes of this country in preventing and countering violent extremism. The author argues that terrorism cannot be defeated solely through military action. Instead, it is necessary to expand counterterrorism toolkits to include a variety of 'soft approaches'. In this vein, the article presents Singapore's response to violent extremism, explaining the distinct efforts displayed by the Internal Security Department, including strong border security, well-equipped law enforcement and security agencies, close monitoring of online platforms, the promotion of secularism, pluralism and non-identity politics, as well as liberal education, the promotion of greater understanding through interfaith dialogue, legislative reforms and active community engagement to help, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.
Professor Sten Rynning answers various questions posed by UNISCI regarding the crisis sparked by Donald Trump’s interest in annexing Greenland. He discusses how Greenland and Denmark have reacted, the importance of Greenland to international security, the expansion of the Danish military presence, as well as the symbolic significance of the allies’ military presence and Operation Arctic Endurance. He also considers the implications for the North Atlantic Alliance of Trump’s statements and policies implemented, as well as the actions and reactions of the US’s allies.
Este artículo expone el impacto de las acciones de influencia y desinformación rusas en los periódicos con mayor reputación en Argentina, Chile y Colombia, desde que se desató la guerra en Ucrania. A través de una revisión de literatura se caracterizó la estrategia de influencia rusa, donde la desinformación juega un importante papel, y luego se contrastó con 25.525 titulares y resúmenes noticiosos publicados desde el 2014 hasta febrero de 2026 en los periódicos La Nación, El Mercurio y El Tiempo. El contraste se realizó a través de un modelo de machine learning con redes neuronales y el rastreo de la presencia de desinformación en las noticias. Se descubre que tanto las actividades de influencia rusa tuvieron un impacto limitado en los periódicos de Argentina y Colombia, aunque el impacto fue bastante mayor en el periódico chileno que incluso se hizo eco de las campañas de desinformación.
Este artículo analiza el papel de Mauritania en el nuevo contexto geopolítico del Sahel tras la emergencia de la Alianza de Estados del Sahel (AES) y la reconfiguración de influencias internacionales. Parte de la hipótesis de que su estabilidad es contingente, dependiente del equilibrio político-militar interno, la gobernanza de fronteras y una política exterior pragmática. La metodología combina revisión bibliográfica y documental (2005–2025), análisis comparado regional y evaluación cualitativa de variables políticas, sociales y de seguridad. Los resultados muestran que la estabilidad mauritana se ve tensionada por la presión migratoria y de refugiados desde Malí, la expansión del yihadismo y la competencia geopolítica entre actores como Rusia, Estados Unidos, Francia, China y el eje Marruecos-Argelia. Se concluye que Mauritania se configura como un Estado bisagra cuya estabilidad dependerá de su capacidad para gestionar sus fronteras, mantener su autonomía estratégica y adaptarse a un entorno multipolar competitivo.
The international system is undergoing major changes driven by increasing rivalry among great powers. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Middle East signal a return to the use of force, alongside the spread of “hybrid warfare” combining conventional, cyber, informational, and irregular tactics. Technological advances (AI, drones, cyber tools) and new strategic domains like space and cyberspace are further transforming conflict. Nuclear weapons remain central to global security, but arms control agreements are eroding while major powers modernize and expand their arsenals. This weakens deterrence stability and increases the risk of escalation. Recent cases, such as Ukraine and Iran, raise doubts about nuclear guarantees and may push more states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Overall, declining cooperation, rising geopolitical tensions, and rapid technological change are creating a more complex, volatile, and uncertain global security environment, highlighting the need for renewed diplomacy, arms control, and confidence-building measures.
The Afghan Taliban and Pakistan are often touted as two sides of the same coin, given the latter’s pivotal role in supporting the movement since its emergence in 1994, and subsequently in resurrecting it as a potent insurgent force against NATO. It was believed that this would enable Pakistan to exert considerable influence on events across the Durand Line. However, developments over the last five years belie this claim. Drawing on historical and geopolitical context, this paper argues that Rawalpindi’s motives in supporting the Taliban are deeply embedded in its historical experience and vulnerabilities, as well as being influenced by the actions of other state actors in the region. Drawing on the work of K. J. Holsti, Alvin Rubenstein, and Rafael Birnbaum, the paper argues that, whilst the relationship between Rawalpindi and the Afghan Taliban displays patron–client characteristics, it is difficult to view it as a linear, reductionist relationship.
This issue of the UNISCI Journal focuses on key aspects of India's external relations that are becoming increasingly important for its global image in the twenty-first century. Some of these aspects have yet to receive the attention from scholars and policymakers that they deserve. Despite its thematic limitations, this special issue on India sheds light on critical aspects of its foreign and security policies that highlight the country's rise and its global implications.
India has only recently begun to be regarded as an EU strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region with regard to maritime security. This article examines the challenges of EU-India security interactions, referring to three interconnected dimensions that collectively explain their drivers and limitations. Strategically, India offers the EU extra-regional reach and support in managing China-related risks, as well as growing defence cooperation. However, structural constraints remain. Brussels and New Delhi have different security priorities, disagree on Russia, and lack a coherent treaty framework. Although their relationship is presented as that of "like-minded democracies", it actually serves as an instrument of mutual leverage rather than providing coordinated support for democratic values and human rights. Nevertheless, recent developments reveal more substantive outcomes in terms of maritime cooperation and security dialogue.
As India positions itself as a rising regional decolonial power by promoting its socio-cultural norms and carving out a new place for itself in the changing landscape of global politics, its internal landscape and security policy continue to exhibit processes and practices that hark back to colonial times. This article highlights these internal contradictions by examining India’s approach to addressing armed violence in the context of the Maoist conflict, as well as the racialising logic applied to its Adivasi population. It also links this approach to the homogenising and Hindu civilisation approach that has gained primacy in India’s foreign policy since the BJP came into power fifteen years ago. It concludes with the suggestion that, if India is to establish itself as a leading voice in the shift towards decoloniality in international politics, it must address its internal contradictions in matters of internal security. The securitisation of these issues has severely undermined the political agency of India’s marginalised population, thus undermining India’s claim to decoloniality.
Narendra Modi reoriented the foreign policy of India by foregrounding cultural diplomacy, civilisational heritage, and diaspora outreach as some of the major strategic tools for global influence. Advocating upon Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, this article will try to examine how elements like yoga, vaccine diplomacy, and cultural symbolism have magnified the global visibility of our country, India. The cultivation of soft power in Indian foreign policy, as adopted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, also reflects a significant shift in strategic autonomy and multilateral participation. The article concludes that, to understand India's rise in present-day international relations, we must recognise the significant focus on Modi's sustained emphasis on soft power as a foundational pillar of Indian foreign diplomacy.
This article describes the transition from India’s idealist foreign policy under Nehru (the Nehruvian era) to its present-day pragmatism. We contend that this shift stems from India’s global leadership claim, caught between lofty normative goals and material constraints. India’s foreign policy reflects an interplay between global systemic pressures and domestic preferences, shaped by postcolonial anxieties and a distinct civilizational identity. New Delhi’s diplomacy has moved from moral non-alignment to post–Cold War strategic multi-alignment, economic liberalization, and nuclear assertion. The article examines India’s participation in multilateral forums of global governance (UN, WTO, BRICS, G20), where it promotes a fair and egalitarian global order through developmental diplomacy. It also highlights the distinctiveness of the Modi government’s strategy, which deploys civilizational soft power and symbolism to integrate cultural heritage with strategic considerations. Several Structural constraints continue to limit India’s influence. India’s rise reflects a complex interaction of power, principles, history, and modernity.
This article traces how India’s soft power has been analysed over the years since its conceptualisation in the 1990s. It argues that most of the focus has been on its potential non-military elements of soft power thereby perpetuating illusion about India’s soft power rather than its real power or influence. It further agues on the basis of a case study that the higher level of hard power results in higher level of soft power. Rather than emulating the US or China in promoting cultural and public diplomacy that give soft power indirectly, India needs to focus on growing more economically and spending more on military because they are foundational for soft power. Soft power like power in general is however contextual
The Global Threat Assessment 2026 examines the evolving global security environment shaped by superpower rivalry, geopolitical fragmentation, and the persistence of terrorism and extremism. While attacks in Western states will remain limited, the vast majority of terrorist violence will occur in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, driven primarily by Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliates and state-sponsored militant proxies. The assessment highlights the growing convergence of state and non-state actors, the rise of hybrid and irregular warfare, and the expanding role of digital platforms in radicalisation, recruitment, and operations. It concludes that terrorism will remain the preeminent national security threat in 2026, requiring preventive counterterrorism strategies, stronger regulation of physical and digital spaces, and sustained international cooperation across ideological divides.
This article examines India’s diplomacy and self-conception through the revival of the idea of “Greater India”, which flourished in the early twentieth century and died out shortly after India’s independence. Once developed for nation-building, “Greater India”, was based on the idea of ancient India’s civilizational influence in Asia, especially Southeast Asia. After independence, however, this concept was largely abandoned, as it conflicted with India’s post-war aspiration to act as an equal partner in Asia and in Asian and African self-organisation: “Greater India” was incompatible with a partnership of equals and was largely absent at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in Delhi and the 1955 Bandung Conference. This is now beginning to change. The idea of “Greater India” serves as a historical framework to assert India’s cultural and geopolitical influence. As it has reappeared in the last decade, it has taken older forms, but without the subtleties of those forms.
The discourse on India–Israel relations has remained constrained by a security centred paradigm in which defence cooperation and diplomatic pragmatism are treated as the partnership’s principal markers. Recent scholarship, however, indicates that this framing no longer captures the wider ideational, technological and geoeconomic forces shaping the relationship in the twenty first century. A more textured account emerges when cultural nationalism, technology as statecraft and geoeconomic convergence are approached as interconnected domains that recast how each state understands and pursues strategic alignment. These domains reveal a form of strategic behaviour shaped by the demands of technological competition, economic fragmentation and shifting regional orders. By tracing how ideas, infrastructures and economic strategies intersect within this bilateral relationship, the analysis contributes to wider debates on strategic culture and the transformation of statecraft in the contemporary global landscape.
